More Important Considerations Than Personnel

What the hell were McChrystal and co. thinking? I don’t know. (Yes I do: they were drunk.) But this much I know to be true: their complaints about the civilian leadership are a hell of a lot less important than the actual on-the-ground success of their strategy in Afghanistan. Matt Yglesias makes the necessary point:

Back in the real world it seems obvious to me that the Obama administration’s actual McChrystal-related problem is simply that the situation in Afghanistan is deeply problematic. The hoped-for improvements in governance and the credibility of Hamid Karzai’s regime have not emerged. The population in much of the country remains pro-Taliban, anti-Karzai, and anti-ISAF. This is a big problem. And the portrait that emerges in the Rolling Stone article is of a military command that knows it’s not really making progress but doesn’t see the door open to any alternative policies. It’s a huge problem—much bigger than the question of what to do or not about one general.

What you have to remember here is that McChrystal is the architect of the bold and controversial Af-Pak strategy announced last December. The outcome of the months-long “strategic review” was buy-in to his vision. And that vision is failing. However, I don’t think that if McChrystal does leave, as is looking increasingly likely, this affair will occasion any change in strategy — the basic underpinnings of the current strategy are time and patience, after all. There’s still a year to go until the July 2011 deadline, nearly six months until the December review. Obama cannot be seen as capricious in this. But it does seem clear that McChrystal, brilliant strategist though he may be, is not the man for the job.