You can’t own facts — Tremé belongs to all of us.

Tremé is a neighborhood in New Orleans. Treme is an HBO series about New Orleans residents rebuilding their lives after Hurricane Katrina. The Chicory opines correctly that the t-shirt pictured to the left does not infringe any rights anyone holds in the television series. There cannot be a copyright in a fact, so there can be no copyright in the name “Treme.” And while trademark is a distinctive sign or symbol (a “mark”), the t-shirt bears no font or insignia distinctive to the television show. So get your Treme t-shirts and show your support for my friends in New Orleans.

Hat tip to Ray Ward.

The South Butt Answer to the North Face

For a brilliant combination of technical perfection, persuasion, and humor of a sort I’ve never before seen in an answer to a complaint, you’ve got to see the answer filed by South Butt to the complaint filed by North Face alleging that South Butt’s name and its slogan, “Never Stop Relaxing,” infringe North Face’s trademarks in its name and its own slogan, “Never Stop Exploring.” I will be forever grateful to techdirt for bringing this document to my attention.
The South Butt Answer to the North Face

Trademark madness

From Legal Pad: “Sand Hill Advisors, the Palo Alto wealth management company, is suing Sand Hill Advisors, the commercial real estate company in Los Altos, for trademark infringement.” I am, apparently, one of the 3 people Legal Pad asserts did not know that “Sand Hill Road is the iconic stretch of pavement near which the sainted feet of venture capitalists tread daily to their places of work.” There was a time I would’ve known the signifiers that mattered to venture capitalists. I suspect I’m better off no longer knowing.

Apparently the wealth management company claims it’s been using the name since 1995 and that the real estate company is profiting off the value that the wealth management company has created in the name. There would be some merit in the claim if people really are using the real estate company because they think it’s somehow associated with the wealth management company, but that would seem to be a difficult set of facts to establish. Typically, a trademark cannot be enforced against someone using it in a different market because in doing so the alleged infringer typically is not capitalizing on value in the trademark created by the claimant.

In addition, the real estate company claims (it its motion to dismiss (pdf)), that the trademark claim is deficient because the wealth management company “doesn’t even have an enforceable service mark, since the government rejected a trademark application because the name was descriptive of a place.”

Legal Pad, though, is dead on in its prediction: “Sand Hill Advisors has it in the bag.”

But who will win the lawsuit filed by Mickey Mouse against Donald Duck?

Money or racism? Could the Dolans just do the right thing already? The courts won’t.

The Lanham Act, the federal law governing trademarks prohibits trademarks “which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt. . . .” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declined to review a lower court decision (pdf download) in Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo ruling that, even assuming the name of the Washington, D.C. football team, Redskins, is disparaging to Native Americans or brings them into contempt, the Redskins cannot be forced to give up their trademark rights. Why? Because, given the length of time that the Redskins have had the name without challenge and the delay in the plaintiffs bringing their claim, it would be unfair to deprive the football team of the profits to be made from selling goods bearing the Redskins name.

There are serious questions to be raised about the legal merits of the NFL’s position — among other points, the Lanham Act states that challenges to a trademark can come “at any time.” But my more serious question, to Daniel Snyder and to Larry Dolan, is this: why in the world would you want to make money off of a symbol so many people consider racist? Well, Larry Dolan’s answer is that he doesn’t see evidence that Chief Wahoo is racist.

It’s amazing how money can blind someone.

Painting people whose images are protected — Alabama football, Tiger Woods, and Obama

The Tuscaloosa News reports that a decision is expected soon in the University of Alabama’s lawsuit against sports artist Daniel Moore. As the newspaper explains, the university “sued Moore for trademark violations in March 2005, alleging he painted scenes of Crimson Tide football games [such as the one at right] without permission from the university and reissued previously licensed prints without paying royalties. The university is seeking back pay for more than 20 paintings and wants Moore to license any future paintings.”

Although the decision is by no means binding on the court deciding the Alabama case, a lawsuit filed in 2000 by Tiger Woods and ETW Corporation, Wood’s licensing agent, against the artist Rick Rush might be illuminating. The focus of the Woods lawsuit were a group of Rush’s prints depicting Woods’s victory at the 1997 Masters. Woods sued to protect “his name and his image under right-of-publicity and trademark laws.” Rush, like Moore, argued his prints are protected by the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals in Cincinnati (6th Cir.) agreed with Rush.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision is illuminating, not only with respect to the lawsuit between Alabama and Moore, but also with respect to the dispute between the AP, Manny Garcia, and Shepard Fairey. The court explained in reaching its decision that, like Andy Warhol’s paintings of celebrities, Rush’s paintings were sufficiently “transformative” to be entitled to First Amendment protection:

When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist. On the other hand, when a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity….

Accordingly, First Amendment protection of such works outweighs whatever interest the state may have in enforcing the right of publicity. . . . [I]n Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001)] the California [Supreme] [C]ourt []stated the test as follows: “Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”

. . . citing the art of Andy Warhol, the court noted that even literal reproductions of celebrity portraits may be protected by the First Amendment.

“ Through distortion and the careful manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself…. Although the distinction between protected and unprotected expression will sometimes be subtle, it is no more so than other distinctions triers of fact are called on to make in First Amendment jurisprudence.”  Id. at 408-409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 811 (citations and footnote omitted). . . .

The evidence in the record reveals that Rush’s work consists of much more than a mere literal likeness of Woods. It is a panorama of Woods’s victory at the 1997 Masters Tournament, with all of the trappings of that tournament in full view, including the Augusta clubhouse, the leader board, images of Woods’s caddy, and his final round partner’s caddy. These elements in themselves are sufficient to bring Rush’s work within the protection of the First Amendment. The Masters Tournament is probably the world’s most famous golf tournament and Woods’s victory in the 1997 tournament was a historic event in the world of sports. A piece of art that portrays a historic sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture attaches to such events. It would be ironic indeed if the presence of the image of the victorious athlete would deny the work First Amendment protection. Furthermore, Rush’s work includes not only images of Woods and the two caddies, but also carefully crafted likenesses of six past winners of the Masters Tournament: Arnold Palmer, Sam Snead, Ben Hogan, Walter Hagen, Bobby Jones, and Jack Nicklaus, a veritable pantheon of golf’s greats. Rush’s work conveys the message that Woods himself will someday join that revered group. . . .

We find, like the court in Rogers, that plaintiff’s survey evidence, even if its validity is assumed, indicates at most that some members of the public would draw the incorrect inference that Woods had some connection with Rush’s print. The risk of misunderstanding, not engendered by any explicit indication on the face of the print, is so outweighed by the interest in artistic expression as to preclude application of the Act. We disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that a jury must decide where the balance should be struck and where the boundaries should be drawn between the rights conferred by the Lanham Act and the protections of the First Amendment.

In regard to the Ohio law right of publicity claim, we conclude that Ohio would . . . [apply] a rule analogous to the rule of fair use in copyright law. Under this rule, the substantiality and market effect of the use of the celebrity’s image is analyzed in light of the informational and creative content of the defendant’s use. Applying this rule, we conclude that Rush’s work has substantial informational and creative content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s market and that Rush’s work does not violate Woods’s right of publicity.

We further find that Rush’s work is expression which is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment and not the more limited protection afforded to commercial speech. . . .

In balancing these interests against Woods’s right of publicity, we note that Woods, like most sports and entertainment celebrities with commercially valuable identities, engages in an activity, professional golf, that in itself generates a significant amount of income which is unrelated to his right of publicity. Even in the absence of his right of publicity, he would still be able to reap substantial financial rewards from authorized appearances and endorsements. It is not at all clear that the appearance of Woods’s likeness in artwork prints which display one of his major achievements will reduce the commercial value of his likeness. While the right of publicity allows celebrities like Woods to enjoy the fruits of their labors, here Rush has added a significant creative component of his own to Woods’s identity. Permitting Woods’s right of publicity to trump Rush’s right of freedom of expression would extinguish Rush’s right to profit from his creative enterprise.

The difference between Moore’s case and Rush’s principally seems to be that Moore’s painting’s are far more “realistic” than Rush’s (as the painting pictured above demonstrates). In contrast, Fairey’s Obama Hope poster is more like Warhol’s paintings of celebrities. The funny thing is that I have no doubt Moore’s paintings take more time and effort — but time and effort are not what is protected by the fair use test; rather, originality of expression is.

Wikipedia should know better/Addendum: it does, and the problem is solved, though Wikipedia really didn’t have to be quite so heavy-handed.

Determining whether the use of someone else’s trademark is a non-infringing fair use does not involve an analysis identical to determining whether the use of someone’s copyrighted work is a fair use, but there are significant similarities.  One is that the absence of any exploitation of the commercial value of the intellectual property is a significant reason to find that use of the trademark is not infringing.  Another is that the property interest one has in the intellectual property has to be balanced against the constitutional right to free speech. Thus, owning a trademark no more gives you total control over use of the trademark than owning a copyright gives you total control over the copyrighted work.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation therefore is disturbed that Wikipedia, whom the EFF has represented, is trying to stop a group of artists from using the name “wikipediaart.org” as the domain for a site that documents  a Wikepedia article they had established last year.  The article “was intended to comment on the nature of art and Wikipedia. But Wikipedia editors did not take kindly to the project, and it was shut down within fifteen hours for being insufficiently ‘encyclopaedic.’”

But since the site is non-commercial and is a critical commentary on Wikipedia, Wikipedia has no right to shut it down.  The artists are not attracting paying customers who stumble upon the site because they are looking for Wikipedia.  And you can’t shut someone down just because they are criticizing you.  As the EFF cogently sums up the issues:

Wikipedia should know better. There is no trademark or cybersquatting issue here. First, the site is entirely noncommercial, which puts it beyond the reach of U.S. trademark law. . . . Moreover, even if U.S. trademark laws somehow reached this noncommercial activity, the artists’ use of the mark is an obvious fair use. Wikipedia Art uses the “Wikipedia” mark to refer to the project: a critical comment on Wikipedia and creativity. The disputed site describes the project, provides links to media coverage of the project, and so on. It does not use any more of the Wikipedia mark than need be; for example, it doesn’t even use the Wikipedia logo. Simply put, the site does not purport to be, nor does it look anything like, Wikipedia and the artists have done nothing to suggest Wikipedia endorses their work. Finally, the creators are engaging in precisely the kind of critical speech sheltered by the First Amendment.

ADDENDUM: asdfghjk in the comments states that the “EFF’s description of events is somewhat incomplete at best,” and points to a post by Mike Godwin, General Counsel of Wikimedia Foundation, that explains that Wikipedia’s only concern was that wikipediaart.org would be mistaken by visitors as a site affiliated with Wikipedia and that, once the creators of wikipediaart.org have posted the prominent disclaimer now visible on the site, Wikipedia considered the matter resolved, and amicably so. I’m glad to hear it.  It’s dispute resolution, folks, and when people get upset and have disputes all you need to do is resolve them.  It’s just not so easy all the time.  Here’s to wikipediaart.org for responding with the disclaimer and to Wikipedia for backing off once its legitimate concern had been addressed. And thank you, asdfghjk, whoever you are and wherever you may be. But I’ll take exception to one point you made — I do not believe the EFF was “played” by a bunch of performance artists.  Even without the disclaimer, their non-affiliation with Wikipedia seemed clear.  And it does not seem far-fetched for EFF (or me) to have mistaken the meaning of communications, in which, Mr. Godwin now claims,  “no litigation [against wikepediaart.org] was threatened or commenced.”  On April 9, Doug Isenberg, a lawyer for Wikimedia, wrote Wikipedia Art a letter that sure sounds like it threatened litigation:

Wikimedia appreciates your offer to “explore an amicable resolution to this matter.” Accordingly, I think it would be helpful to draw your attention to a recent domain name dispute between Wikimedia and the registrant of the domain name <visualwikipedia.com>. The registrant of that domain name was using it in connection with a website that described itself as “a visual, intuitive, and interactive web interface to encyclopedic knowledge/information.” The registrant of that domain name refused to cooperate with Wikimedia, after which Wikimedia filed a complaint pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”), resulting in a published decision ordering the domain name transferred to Wikimedia. See WIPO Case No. D2009-0139, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2009/d2009-0139.html. . .

In light of the above, Wikimedia suggests that Mr. Kildall select a domain name that does not include any of Wikimedia’s trademarks and that Mr. Kildall transfer the <wikipediaart.org> domain name to Wikimedia. Doing so would allow Mr. Kildall to continue to freely express himself without raising the same concerns that Wikimedia has asked me to investigate. If Mr. Kildall is willing to do so, please let me know by April 16, 2009.

But all is well that ends well.  The disclaimer removes any possible claim of visitors to wikipediaart.org would believe the site is affiliated with Wikipedia, and Wikipedia Art, despite Mr. Isenberg’s “suggestion,” keeps its domain name. Perhaps next time Mr. Godwin should not delegate to outside lawyers the writing of letters he does not intend to contain threats of litigation.

Could Thomas Kinkade assert a property right over his “style”?

Frank Pasquale writes that the painter Thomas Kinkade may be positioning himself to be able to assert copyright or trademark claims over people who allegedly appropriate his style. There are several problem that would face Kinkade. First, it’s difficult to protect a “style” rather than a “work.” Second, Kinkade’s style has been described as something less than an original one: Kenneth Baker, critic for the San Francisco Chronicle, barely conceals his contempt: “‘He has a vocabulary, as most painters do. And it’s a vocabulary of formulas, unfortunately. And he shuffles the deck every so often. Lighthouse, cottage, sea, ships, sky, so on, so on. Little bit of waves, so on, rocks. And you end up with this.’” Kinkade’s own instructions on how to make a film in his style may not belie this criticism that his “style” is little more than a simple formula:

Whenever possible utilize sunset, sunrise, rainy days, mistiness — any transitory effect of nature that bespeaks luminous coloration or a sense of softness.

Emphasize gentle camera moves, slow dissolves, and still camera shots. A sense of gradual pacing. Even quick cut-away shots can slightly dissolve.

[Make] references to my anniversary date, the number 52, the number 82, and the number 5282 (for fun, notice how many times this appears in my major published works). Hidden N’s throughout — preferably thirty N’s, commemorating one N for each year since the events happened.

There’s no question, though, that a court would hold that copying a Kinkaid painting whole would constitute copyright infringement, (Doing so in small, electronic form for purposes of commentary and criticism, however, would constitute non-infringing fair use.) Even maps, as Pasquale points out, are protected by copyright against wholescale copying, even if the underlying information they compile is entirely factual. That’s why mapmakers used to put fictional locations in obscure places on their maps — people who copied such maps whole would be revealed by the use of the fictional place. But can a “style” be protected? That would be a difficult position to maintain, especially given the legitimate influence any successful artist will necessarily have. Nevertheless, Pasquale concludes, “It’s a tricky legal question as to what critical mass of stylistic detail in a Kinkade painting is enough to warrant copyright protection when another is inspired/corrupted by it. Or what remarkable idiosyncrasy should be trademarkable.”