Judges: you never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view.

Dahlia Lithwick writes of her legal hero, Atticus Finch, and the noxious myth that empathy has nothing to do with being an effective judge:

Atticus’s life instruction to his daughter, Scout. As he explains, “If you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you’ll get along a lot better with all kinds of folks. You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view, until you climb inside of his skin and walk around in it.” In summer 2009, and again this July, the United States was roiled by debate about Barack Obama’s promise to appoint a supreme court justice who embodies this quality of “empathy”. Scores of critics asserted that judicial empathy is the same as judicial bias; that judges are at their best when they coldly and mechanically apply the law. There is no place for climbing inside anyone else’s skin as a judge. There is only truth and cold fact.

How strange it is, that we have come to a place in the national debate about justice when Atticus Finch’s mild admonition to his daughter to try to walk a mile in someone else’s shoes has become the definition of dangerous judicial activism. While Atticus still has much to teach lawyers about race and violence and prejudice and the rule of law, I have also come to think of him as the patron saint of patient, quiet listening; a quality to which all of us ought to aspire.

Richard Posner: Law Schools need to hire more professors who identify more strongly with legal practice.

From Richard Posner writing in honor of the memory of Bernard Meltzer:

What has happened since the 1960s—that watershed decade in modern American history—is the growing apart, especially but not only at the elite law schools, of the lawyer and the judge on the one hand and the law professor on the other hand. Law professors used to identify primarily with the legal profession and secondarily with the university. The sequence has been reversed. Law professors in that earlier era were hired after a few years of practice, on the basis of evidence (heavily weighted by performance as a law student) of possessing superlative skills of legal analysis. A law professor was expected to be a superb lawyer and to see his primary role as instructing generations of law students so that they would become good, and some of them superb, lawyers—instructing them by precept but also by example, by being a role model; and the role was that of a practicing lawyer. . . .

By the late 1960s this model was almost a century old and ripe for challenge. The challenges came from two directions, which though opposed to each other turned out to be complementary in their effect on the traditional model. . . .

These challenges to the conventional model of the law professor’s vocation so far succeeded as to bring about a fundamental change in the character of legal teaching and scholarship and the method of recruitment into academic law. From the challenge mounted by social science came a novel emphasis on basing legal scholarship on the insights of other fields, such as economics, philosophy, and history, and from the challenge mounted by the Left came a reinforcing skepticism about the capacity of conventional legal analysis to yield intellectually cogent answers to legal questions. These ideologically opposed challenges complemented each other by agreeing that the traditional model was narrow and stale.

The model was largely buried in these twin avalanches, especially in the elite law schools. . . .

Even at the most intellectually ambitious of the modern law schools, a large majority of students will become and remain practicing lawyers; and there is a good deal more to the practice of law than economics, or philosophy,or feminism, or theories of race. There is the knack of reading cases and statutes creatively, there is a largish body of basic legal concepts that every practicing lawyer should internalize, there is a bag of rhetorical tricks to be acquired along with a professional demeanor, a procedural system to be mastered, a subtle sense (“judgment”) of just how far one can go in stretching the limits of established legal doctrines to be absorbed. These things cannot be the entirety of the modern lawyer’s professional equipment, and their inculcation cannot be the entirety of a first-rate modern legal education, because the law has become too deeply interfused with the methods and insights of other fields—and the law schools are still lagging badly in attempting to overcome the shameful aversion of most law students to statistics, math, science, and technology. Maybe at the law schools that have the brightest students only a third of the instruction should be in the traditional mold. But to reach that level the law schools will have to start hiring teachers who identify more strongly with the practicing profession than they do with academia.

Legal decisions based on what the law is not — the “permission culture” and copyright overclaiming

One thing law students don’t get at all is the ways lawyers negotiate a world in which legal decisions are based on what the law is not.

Mike Masnick over at techdirt, , writing about the “Permission Culture” (that is, the culture that insists that sampling and quoting should only be done with permission), puts his finger directly on one of the biggest problems — the fear of even frivolous lawsuits, even by big publishing concerns, prevents writers, musicians, and artists from quoting, sampling, and appropriating parts of copyrighted works they don’t need permission to take:

The unfortunate reality these days is that publishers won’t touch such quotes without permission being granted. It’s almost impossible to find a publisher these days that would sign off on even that snippet of eight words, claiming that they don’t want the liability of a lawsuit. I’ve had this discussion a few times with authors and publishers, and they all say the same thing: due to the potential liability of a lawsuit, even if it clearly does appear to be fair use, it’s just not worth using the quote. In fact, we discussed this point here last year, where we wrote about an author who had to drop an entire section of a book, because of a few short quotes. Clear fair use… but his publisher wouldn’t touch it.

I would suggest too that one reason publishers won’t publish books without permission for the use of quotations is that they perceive it to be in their interests not to do so. That way, other publishers will ask and pay for permission to use quotations from their own books. That is why, I am convinced, the music industry never has seriously challenged lower court decisions requiring permission (and, presumably, payment) for the use of any recorded sample — the practice makes each company’s record vault’s sources of income.

The problem, of course is exacerbated considerably because the wealth and of the corporate conglomerates that own so much of our intellectual property. Who is going to fight Disney, even if he’s right? Another problem is the widespread ignorance in the media about copyright. As Richard Posner has written, the fear of litigating against rich copyright holders who place a premium on their fear of losing something of value leads to behavior based on law that isn’t at all what the law is supposed to be:

Look at the copyright page in virtually any book, or the copyright notice at the beginning of a DVD or VHS film recording. The notice will almost always state that no part of the work can be reproduced without the publisher’s (or movie studio’s) permission. This is a flat denial of fair use. The reader or viewer who thumbs his nose at the copyright notice risks receiving a threatening letter from the copyright owner. He doesn’t know whether he will be sued, and because the fair use doctrine is vague, he may not be altogether confident about the outcome of the suit. The would-be fair user is likely to be an author, movie director, etc. and he will find that his publisher or studio is a strict copyright policeman. That is, since a publisher worries about expansive fair uses of the books he publishes, he doesn’t want to encourage such uses by permitting his own authors to copy from other publishers’ works. So you have a whole “law in action” law invented by publishers, including ridiculous rules such as that any quotation of more than two lines of a poem requires a copyright license.

Melissa Harris Lacewell on Empathy, its importance to social cohesion, and more on its importance to good judging.

Wisdom from Melissa Harris Lacewell on the centrality of empathy in creating a United States:

[W]e are participants in a nation only to the extent that we imagine ourselves to be part of a community or a “people.” Empathy is an important part of what allows us to engage in that imagined sense of linked fate, shared identity, and common purpose. Without empathy we cannot enter into a social contract whereby we are willing to subjugate some of our selfish impulses in order to abide by the rule of law and the dictates of a civil society.  

As Laura E. Little points out in “Adjudication and Emotion,” 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal, 205, 210 ( 2002)  , “Empathy . . . may actually facilitate the process of understanding competing points of view so necesssary to quality adjudication. As Judge Richard Posner argues, empathy enables a judge to integrate into her decsionmaking remote human interests that are not immediately before the judge, but are possibly affectetd substantially by the judge’s decsions. Posner praises empathy for its cognitive character, suggesting that the emotion more likely reflects an evaluation of beliefs, rather than an ungrounded emotional reaction that short-circuits reasoning.” [Citing Richard Posner, “Emotions versus Emotionalism in Law,” The Passions of Law (Susan A. Bandes, ed. 1999).

Richard Posner too knows empathy is a component of good judging.

Richard Posner “is considered to be one of the most respected judges in the United States, and “although generally considered a man of the right, Posner’s pragmatism, his qualified moral relativism and moral skepticism, and his affection for the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche set him apart from most American conservatives.” Posner is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and he quite plainly recognizes that empathy is a fundamental component of good judging. As he writes in How Judges Think (at 117; emphasis added):

Another . . . major factor in judicial decisions in the open area [that is, where the language of the law does not prescribe a clear answer] is “good judgment,” an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality and common sense. . . . It is another of the means that people have for maneuvering in situations of uncertainy. If law were logical, “good judgment” would not be an admired quality in judges – as it is even by legalists. 

If you can’t say it clearly, you aren’t thinking it clearly.

At Language Log, Geoffrey K. Pullum makes a crucial point in criticizing Sarah Palin’s inchoherence:

I think being so utterly unable to explain what one wants to say is truly and reasonably regarded as a defect in one’s qualifications for office – partly because being so inept at talking in a controlled and sensible way strongly suggests that there was no sensible thought back there, and partly because even if there were sensible thoughts back there somewhere, a leader needs to be more skilled at articulating them.

I suppose I’d qualify Mr. Pullum’s statement in one way — where there’s incoherence, there rarely are sensible thoughts, even allowing for the ungrammatical nature of a lot of spoken language,

In short, if you cannot write or speak your thoughts coherently, you don’t have coherent thoughts. Think about it. How often have you heard a lecture, thought how much brilliance was there, and then gone home to write down notes embodying that brilliance, only to find out that there are gaps and fallacies filling spaces that must be filled if the brilliance is to persist?

If you can’t say it, you don’t know it. On this point, Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink has been widely misinterpreted (and was perhaps intended) as a brief in favor of gut feeling over analysis. I think, given the compelling examples he writes about, that Gladwell’s thesis would better be stated as follows: the gut feelings of people well trained and experienced in a field are often better than analysis. There is a huge difference between the gut feelings of hockey moms untrained in tax or foreign policy and hockey moms trained in tax and foreign policy when it comes to opining on tax and foreign policy. Richard Posner’s review of Blink explains (emphasis and hyperlink added) my point well:

As Exhibit A for the superiority of intuitive to articulate thinking, Gladwell offers the case of a purported ancient Greek statue that was offered to the Getty Museum for $10 million. Months of careful study by a geologist (to determine the age of the statue) and by the museum’s lawyers (to trace the statue’s provenance) convinced the museum that it was genuine. But when historians of ancient art looked at it, they experienced an “intuitive revulsion,” and indeed it was eventually proved to be a fake.

The example is actually a bad one for Gladwell’s point, though it is a good illustration of the weakness of this book, which is a series of loosely connected anecdotes, rich in “human interest” particulars but poor in analysis. . . .

But back to the case of the Greek statue. It illustrates not the difference between intuitive thinking and articulate thinking, but different articulate methods of determining the authenticity of a work of art. One method is to trace the chain of title, ideally back to the artist himself (impossible in this case); another is to perform chemical tests on the material of the work; and a third is to compare the appearance of the work to that of works of art known to be authentic. The fact that the first two methods happened to take longer in the particular case of the Getty statue is happenstance. Had the seller produced a bill of sale from Phidias to Cleopatra, or the chemist noticed that the statue was made out of plastic rather than marble, the fake would have been detected in the blink of an eye. Conversely, had the statue looked more like authentic statues of its type, the art historians might have had to conduct a painstakingly detailed comparison of each feature of the work with the corresponding features of authentic works. Thus the speed with which the historians spotted this particular fake is irrelevant to Gladwell’s thesis. Practice may not make perfect, but it enables an experienced person to arrive at conclusions more quickly than a neophyte. The expert’s snap judgment is the result of a deliberative process made unconscious through habituation.

The uses and abuses of the differences between the law on the books and the law in action (with a particular emphasis on copyright overclaiming)

It’s pretty obvious law and behavior often diverge. In some cases, that divergence arises from ambiguity and the realities of human relationships. How do you respond when a valued customer arguably breaches his contract with your client? Quite possibly, if not likely, your client will be better served by ignoring the breach of the written obligation and keeping the customer satisfied. As Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, and Harry G. Prince write in the preface (pdf) to the casebook I use in my Contracts course:

[I]n real life there is likely to be not just one answer to a client’s problem but a whole range of possible answers, some of which are clearly wrong, but many of which are at least plausibly right, in varying degrees. Living with ambivalence and uncertainty is not always pleasant, but the ability to do so is surely a more necessary lawyering skill than mastering the niceties of citation form.

Some lawyers and clients, however, abuse this gap between law and behavior. I am not referring to the everyday, harmless disregard of the “rules.” How often do you obey the speed limit? But, as Judge Richard Posner writes, this “dichotomy long noted by legal thinkers between the law on the books and the law in action” is a particular problem in copyright law. Often the mere threat of an infringement action can extract money from someone using copyrighted material in a legitimate way. The problem, of course is exacerbated considerably because the copyrights to so much of our media are owned by corporate conglomerates. Who is going to fight Disney, even if he’s right? Another problem is the widespread ignorance in the media about copyright. As Posner writes:

The result is a systematic overclaiming of copyright, resulting in a misunderstanding of copyright’s breadth. Look at the copyright page in virtually any book, or the copyright notice at the beginning of a DVD or VHS film recording. The notice will almost always state that no part of the work can be reproduced without the publisher’s (or movie studio’s) permission. This is a flat denial of fair use. The reader or viewer who thumbs his nose at the copyright notice risks receiving a threatening letter from the copyright owner. He doesn’t know whether he will be sued, and because the fair use doctrine is vague, he may not be altogether confident about the outcome of the suit. The would-be fair user is likely to be an author, movie director, etc. and he will find that his publisher or studio is a strict copyright policeman. That is, since a publisher worries about expansive fair uses of the books he publishes, he doesn’t want to encourage such uses by permitting his own authors to copy from other publishers’ works. So you have a whole “law in action” law invented by publishers, including ridiculous rules such as that any quotation of more than two lines of a poem requires a copyright license.

Universal Music recently was, at least for the moment, slapped down in a particularly absurd instance of copyright overclaiming. Universal sought to remove Stephanie Lenz’s 29 second video of her son dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” from YouTube via a takedown notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”). Lenz in turn sued Universal on the grounds that in sending the takedown notice Universal knowingly misrepresented that Lenz’s video was infringing. Remarkably, Universal argued that a copyright holder need not consider whether the use of copyrighted material is legitimate fair use before sending a takedown notice. The DMCA provides, however, that a copyright owner can send a takedown notice only if he has “a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” If use of copyrighted material constitutes fair use, it is “authorized by the law.” And there is no question that determining fair use can be a difficult and complicated determination. But not in not in Stephanie Lenz’s case — here’s the “offending” video:

Thus, it should be no surprise that U.S. Federal District Court Judge Jeremy Fogel rejected Universal’s argument that, before sending a takedown notice to YouTube, it did not need to even consider whether the presence of Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” in the video was a fair use . Accordingly, the judge refused to grant Universal’s motion to dismiss Lenz’s case. In his decision (pdf), Judge Fogel wrote:

An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to . . . the DMCA. Such an interpretation of the DMCA furthers both the purposes of the DMCA itself and copyright law in general. In enacting the DMCA, Congress noted that the “provisions in the bill balance the need for rapid response to potential infringement with the end-users [sic] legitimate interests in not having material removed without recourse.”

Not everyone has the guts of Stephanie Lenz. That’s a problem. The Universals of this world have all the money. Recently, the Electronic Frontier Foundation noted that another “federal judge denied copyright infringement allegations from Universal . . . affirming an eBay seller’s right to resell promotional CDs that he buys from secondhand stores.”