On tossing aside centuries of tradition.

New York Times, May 2009:

Racially segregated proms have been held in Montgomery County [,Georgia] — where about two-thirds of the population is white — almost every year since its schools were integrated in 1971. Such proms are, by many accounts, longstanding traditions in towns across the rural South, though in recent years a number of communities have successfully pushed for change. . . . The senior proms held by Montgomery County High School students — referred to by many students as “the black-folks prom” and “the white-folks prom” — are organized outside school through student committees with the help of parents. All students are welcome at the black prom, though generally few if any white students show up. The white prom, students say, remains governed by a largely unspoken set of rules about who may come. Black members of the student council say they have asked school administrators about holding a single school-sponsored prom, but that, along with efforts to collaborate with white prom planners, has failed. According to Timothy Wiggs, the outgoing student council president and one of 21 black students graduating this year, “We just never get anywhere with it.” Principal Luke Smith says the school has no plans to sponsor a prom, noting that when it did so in 1995, attendance was poor.

Students of both races say that interracial friendships are common at Montgomery County High School. Black and white students also date one another, though often out of sight of judgmental parents. “Most of the students do want to have a prom together,” says Terra Fountain, a white 18-year-old who graduated from Montgomery County High School last year and is now living with her black boyfriend. “But it’s the white parents who say no. … They’re like, if you’re going with the black people, I’m not going to pay for it.”

“It’s awkward,” acknowledges JonPaul Edge, a senior who is white. “I have as many black friends as I do white friends. We do everything else together. We hang out. We play sports together. We go to class together. I don’t think anybody at our school is racist.” Trying to explain the continued existence of segregated proms, Edge falls back on the same reasoning offered by a number of white students and their parents. “It’s how it’s always been,” he says. “It’s just a tradition.”

The decision in Perry v. City and County of San Francisco — trial court decision striking down Proposition 8, which banned gay marriage.

Proposition 8 Gay Marriage Trial Court Decision, Perry v. City and County of San Francisco

Trying Proposition 8 as teachable moment

Margaret Talbot notes that a trial can be a terrific method of educating the public on controversial issues. In particular, she focuses on Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the case in which the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, overturning the state’s gay marriage law, is being challenged. Talbot has been blogging about the trial throughout the 3 weeks it has been going on. Her latest post points out that trials, in subjecting witnesses to cross examination, permits scrutiny of controversial views that other forums don’t ever provide. As David Boies puts it “The crucible of cross examination forces the witness to confront the other side; they can’t fall back on bumper sticker slogans like ‘marriage is between a man and a woman.’ ”

Talbot compares the educational value of Perry to that of the trial in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, the successful legal challenge against a public school district’s requirement that “intelligent design” be taught as an alternative to evolution as an explanation of the origin of life:

In many ways [the trial in Perry] reminded me of another culture-war trial that I covered, in 2005, one that presented a similar opportunity for intellectually engaging with the arguments and research that usually remain submerged beneath a politicized controversy. That trial was to decide whether intelligent design could be part of the curriculum in a Pennsylvania school district, and its expert testimony covered everything from the fossil record of obscure dinosaurs to Darwin’s own religious beliefs to the theoretical underpinnings of the separation of church and state.

It really is unfortunate the Supreme Court ruled that Perry could not be broadcast via the internet. I very much would like to have seen a witness explain exactly how it is that gay marriage undermines straight marriage. I’ve genuinely tried to understand the argument from some very intelligent people who think that gay marriage does indeed undermine straight marriage, but, I’ll confess, my mind has been unable to get itself around the argument.

Supreme Court decides, 5-4, that those public courts aren’t so public after all.

From the L.A. Times:

By a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court kept in place Wednesday its order blocking video coverage of the trial of California’s Proposition 8, with a conservative majority ruling that defenders of the ban on same-sex marriage would likely face “irreparable harm” if the proceedings were broadcast to the public.

“It would be difficult — if not impossible — to reverse the harm of those broadcasts,” the court wrote in an unsigned opinion. The witnesses, including paid experts, could suffer “harassment,” and they “might be less likely to cooperate in any future proceedings.” The high court also faulted U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker for changing the rules “at the eleventh hour” to “allow the broadcasting of this high-profile trial” that will decide whether gays and lesbians have a right to marry in California.

Though the opinion is unsigned, it clearly speaks for Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito Jr. . . .

The majority cited newspaper accounts from the last year to bolster its contention that opponents of same-sex marriage have been “subject to harassment,” including “confrontational phone calls and e-mail messages” and even “death threats.” Under the court’s rules, the justices do not intervene in pending cases unless they are convinced that the appealing side has a strong legal claim as well as evidence of “an irreparable harm” if the court fails to act.

[Justice] Breyer [in the dissenting opinion joined in by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor] scoffed at the notion that the witnesses in this case would face harm, because they have gone on television in the past to advocate their views. “They are all experts or advocates who have either already appeared on television or Internet broadcasts, already toured the state advocating a ‘yes’ vote on Proposition 8,” he said.

Here’s legal innovation: YouTube Broadcast of the Proposition 8 Trial. But will it happen? Stay tuned.

There are few more important and timely issues concerning innovation and law than the impact of the internet on courts. Courts have always been considered public institutions anyone could walk into to see court proceedings or to look themselves at court files. But now making something “public” means making it available to anyone at his or her own computer, and the inherent resistance to change that resides in any well-established institution makes courts and those who don’t want their legal stands exposed to the brightest possible public lights reluctant to embrace this new notion of public access.

So, as CNN reports, controversy and legal wrangling has erupted over the decision by “the federal judge who is hearing appeals of California’s Proposition 8 this week ruled that the proceedings could be shown — albeit in delayed fashion — on YouTube.”  But opponents of same-sex marriage, outlawed by Proposition 8, appealed the judge’s order and yesterday the Supreme Court postponed the online broadcasts at least until tomorrow (when, it is hoped, the Supreme Court will rule on the issue).

Jon Davidson, legal director of the pro-gay rights Lambda Legal, argued that opponents of same-sex marriage want to keep the trial as much out of the public eye as they can because public debate on same-sex marriage actually increases support for it. In addition, he argued that the risks of true public access to the proceedings is way overblown:

“One of the things we find on the marriage issue, but really on all issues in response to gay rights, is that the more discussion there is — the more conversation, the more people learn — the more likely it is that gay people are going to do well,” Davidson said.

Davidson said posting the trial on YouTube wouldn’t increase the potential for witnesses to be harassed, saying that anyone can read news reports after the fact to find out who spoke and what they said.

Besides, any effort to block new-media coverage of the hearings is already too late, Davidson said. He said people in the courtroom for opening arguments Monday were posting live updates to Twitter throughout.

What in God’s name is wrong with same sex marriage?

What in God’s name is wrong with same sex marriage? I truly cannot comprehend it, and the failure to recognize it in most of the country has led to genuine pain and hardship to families who should not have to experience that discrimination in the U.S.A.

The case for allowing same sex marriage was made quite well by the Supreme Court of  California last year, in the decision California citizens felt so threatened by they just had to pass Proposition 8. I quote below from it at some length. Page numbers reference the pages in the pdf copy of the opinion:

At 7: [T]he substantive right of two adults who share a loving relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family of their own – and, if the couple chooses, to raise children within that family – constitutes a vitally important attribute of the fundamental interest in liberty and personal autonomy that the California Constitution secures to all persons for the benefit of both the individual and society.

At 11: [T]the purpose underlying differential treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex couples embodied in California’s current marriage statutes – the interest in retaining the traditional and well-established definition of marriage - cannot properly be viewed as a compelling state interest for purposes of the equal protection clause, or as necessary to serve such an interest.

At 11-12:  First, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the designation of marriage clearly is not necessary in order to afford full protection to all of the rights and benefits that currently are enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples; permitting same-sex couples access to the designation of marriage will not deprive opposite-sex couples of any rights and will not alter the legal framework of the institution of marriage, because same-sex couples who choose to marry will be subject to the same obligations and duties that currently are imposed on married opposite-sex couples. Second, retaining the traditional definition of marriage and affording same-sex couples only a separate and differently named family relationship will, as a realistic matter, impose appreciable harm on same-sex couples and their children, because denying such couples access to the familiar and highly favored designation of marriage is likely to cast doubt on whether the official family relationship of same-sex couples enjoys dignity equal to that of opposite-sex couples. Third, because of the widespread disparagement that gay individuals historically have faced, it is all the more probable that excluding same-sex couples from the legal institution of marriage is likely to be viewed as reflecting an official view that their committed relationships are of lesser stature than the comparable relationships of opposite-sex couples. Finally, retaining the designation of marriage exclusively for opposite sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of perpetuating a more general premise – now emphatically rejected by this state – that gay individuals and same-sex couples are in  Some respects “second-class citizens” who may, under the law, be treated differently from, and less favorably than, heterosexual individuals or opposite-sex couples. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that retention of the traditional definition of marriage constitutes a compelling state interest. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent the current California statutory provisions limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, these statutes are unconstitutional.

47, n. 27: If a comprehensive domestic partnership law had not been enacted in California, and if plaintiffs had brought a constitutional challenge to the California marriage statutes and our court had concluded that those statutes were unconstitutional because they did not afford same-sex couples rights and benefits equal to those available to opposite-sex couples under the marriage statutes, we might well have further concluded – as other state courts have determined in similar situations – that the appropriate disposition would be to direct the Legislature to provide equal treatment to same-sex couples, leaving to the Legislature, in the first instance, the decision whether to provide such treatment by a revision of the marriage statutes or by the enactment of a comprehensive domestic partnership or civil union law. (See Baker v. State, supra, 744 A.2d 864, 886-889; Lewis v. Harris, supra, 908 A.2d 196, 221-223.)

Because the California Legislature already has enacted a comprehensive domestic partnership law which broadly grants to same-sex couples virtually all of the substantive legal rights and benefits enjoyed by opposite-sex married couples, plaintiffs have been relieved of the burden of successfully prosecuting a constitutional challenge to obtain those substantive rights and benefits. Thus, in this proceeding, we are faced only with the narrower question that logically ensues: whether, in light of the enactment of California’s domestic partnership legislation, the current California statutory scheme is constitutional.

57: As these and many other California decisions make clear, the right to marry represents the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one’s choice, and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society and to the individual. (footnote omitted)

 At 66: In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights embodied in the right to marry – and their central importance to an individual’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member of society – the California Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual orientation. (footnote omitted).

At 69-70: In light of this recognition, sections 1 and 7 of article I of the California Constitution cannot properly be interpreted to withhold from gay individuals the same basic civil right of personal autonomy and liberty (including the right to establish, with the person of one’s choice, an officially recognized and sanctioned family) that the California Constitution affords to heterosexual individuals. The privacy and due process provisions of our state Constitution – in declaring that ”[a]ll people . . . have [the] inalienable right[] [of] privacy” (art. I, § 1) and that no person may be deprived of “liberty” without due process of law (art. I, § 7) – do not purport to reserve to persons of a particular sexual orientation the substantive protection afforded by those provisions. In light of the evolution of our state’s understanding concerning the equal dignity and respect to which all persons are entitled without regard to their sexual orientation, it is not appropriate to interpret these provisions in a way that, as a practical matter, excludes gay individuals from the protective reach of such basic civil rights.

At 79: Accordingly, we conclude that the right to marry, as embodied in article I, sections 1 and 7 of the California Constitution, guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive constitutional rights as opposite-sex couples to choose one’s life partner and enter with that person into a committed, officially recognized, and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based incidents of marriage. (footnote omitted)

 At 103: [W]we conclude that in the present context, affording same-sex couples access oly to the separate institution of domestic partnership, and denying such couples access to the established institution of marriage, properly must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to have their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.

At 105: [W]e conclude that the distinction drawn by the current California statutes between the designation of the family relationship available to opposite-sex couples and the designation available to same-sex couples impinges upon the fundamental interest of same-sex couples in having their official family relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that conferred upon the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.

At 106: In the present case, the question before us is whether the state has a constitutionally compelling interest in reserving the designation of marriage only for opposite-sex couples and excluding same-sex couples from access to that designation, and whether this statutory restriction is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. In their briefing before this court, various defendants have advanced different contentions in support of the current statutes, and we discuss each of these arguments.

109: We disagree with the Attorney General and the Governor to the extent they suggest that the traditional or long-standing nature of the current statutory definition of marriage exempts the statutory provisions embodying that definition from the constraints imposed by the California Constitution, or that the separation-ofpowers doctrine precludes a court from determining that constitutional question.

On the contrary, under “the constitutional theory of ‘checks and balances’ that the separation-of-powers doctrine is intended to serve” (Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53), a court has an obligation to enforce the limitations that the California Constitution imposes upon legislative measures, and a court would shirk the responsibility it owes to each member of the public were it to consider such statutory provisions to be insulated from judicial review.

At 111: By the same token, the circumstance that the limitation of marriage to a union between a man and a woman embodied in section 308.5 was enacted as an initiative measure by a vote of the electorate similarly neither exempts the statutory provision from constitutional scrutiny nor justifies a more deferential standard of review.

At 113: Although defendants maintain that this court has an obligation to defer to the statutory definition of marriage contained in section 308.5 because that statute – having been adopted through the initiative process – represents the expression of the “people’s will,” this argument fails to take into account the very basic point that the provisions of the California Constitution itself constitute the ultimate expression of the people’s will, and that the fundamental rights embodied within that Constitution for the protection of all persons represent restraints thatthe people themselves have imposed upon the statutory enactments that may be adopted either by their elected representatives or by the voters through the initiative process. As the United States Supreme Court explained in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 638: “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”

At 116-119: After carefully evaluating the pertinent considerations in the present case, we conclude that the state interest in limiting the designation of marriage exclusively to opposite-sex couples, and in excluding same-sex couples from access to that designation, cannot properly be considered a compelling state interest for equal protection purposes. To begin with, the limitation clearly is not necessary to preserve the rights and benefits of marriage currently enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. Extending access to the designation of marriage to same sex couples will not deprive any opposite-sex couple or their children of any of the rights and benefits conferred by the marriage statutes, but simply will make the benefit of the marriage designation available to same-sex couples and their children. As Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals succinctly observed in her dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (dis. opn. of Kaye, C.J.): “There are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.” Further, permitting same-sex couples access to the designation of marriage will not alter the substantive nature of the legal institution of marriage; same-sex couples who choose to enter into the relationship with that designation will be subject to the same duties and obligations to each other, to their children, and to third parties that the law currently imposes upon opposite-sex couples who marry. Finally, affording same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the religious freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person; no religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) (f00tnote omitted)

While retention of the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not needed to preserve the rights and benefits of opposite-sex couples, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the designation of marriage works a real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples and their children. As discussed above, because of the long and celebrated history of the term “marriage” and the widespread understanding that this word describes a family relationship unreservedly couples and same-sex couples and exclude the latter from access to the designation of marriage, we conclude these statutes are unconstitutional. sanctioned by the community, the statutory provisions that continue to limit access to this designation exclusively to opposite-sex couples – while providing only a novel, alternative institution for same-sex couples – likely will be viewed as an official statement that the family relationship of same-sex couples is not of comparable stature or equal dignity to the family relationship of opposite-sex couples. Furthermore, because of the historic disparagement of gay persons, the retention of a distinction in nomenclature by which the term “marriage” is withheld only from the family relationship of same-sex couples is all the more likely to cause the new parallel institution that has been established for same-sex couples to be considered a mark of second-class citizenship. Finally, in addition to the potential harm flowing from the lesser stature that is likely to be afforded to the family relationships of same-sex couples by designating them domestic partnerships, there exists a substantial risk that a judicial decision upholding the differential treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex couples would be understood as validating a more general proposition that our state by now has repudiated: that it is permissible, under the law, for society to treat gay individuals and same-sex couples differently from, and less favorably than, heterosexual individuals and opposite-sex couples.

In light of all of these circumstances, we conclude that retention of the traditional definition of marriage does not constitute a state interest sufficiently compelling, under the strict scrutiny equal protection standard, to justify withholding that status from same-sex couples. Accordingly, insofar as the provisions of sections 300 and 308.5 draw a distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples and exclude the latter from access to the designation of marriage, we conclude these statutes are unconstitutional.

The argument against Proposition 8 — result due in a few hours.

Today, the California Supreme Court announces its decision on Proposition 8, the voter initiative passed in November that outlawed same-sex marriage. In May 2008, the court, held that prohibiting same-sex marriages violated the Equal Protection Clause in California’s Constitution.

The briefs filed in the case are all available here.

The essence of the argument advanced against proposition 8, as I understand it, is as follows: the state constitution’s requirement of equal protection requires that same-sex couples be permitted to marry. The state Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the state consitution. Thus, a voter initiative that by a mere majority declares that same-sex couples are not permitted to marry usurps the constitutional role of the state supreme court in interpreting the state’s equal protection clause. It’s an interesting argument — if the voters want someone other than the Supreme Court to interpret the state constitution, they must revise the constitution to alter the role of the Supreme Court. Leaving interpretation of constitutions, however, has been firmly embedded in U.S. jurisprudence since Marbury v. Madison, in which, of course, Chief Justice John Marshall stated:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.

Thus, the argument in California goes, the electorate usurped the role of the state Supreme Court in voting by a majority that the equal protection clause does not allow same sex marriage. Here, in summary, is the way the argument was articulated by the Petitioners in their Petition for Writ of Mandate (pdf):

13. Proposition 8 alters Article 1 of the California Constitution by adding “SEC. 7.5. Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” By its terms, Proposition 8 purports to strip a constitutionally protected minority group of the fundamental right to marry even though that right was previously conferred by the equal protection clause of the California Constitution.

14. Proposition 8 is invalid under the California Constitution because the initiative power does not permit voters to divest a politically unpopular group of rights conferred by the equal protection clause. A transfer of the final authority to enforce the equal protection clause from the judiciary to a political majority can only occur by revision. The Constitution, however, has never been revised to remove final autohority to enforce the equal protection clause from the judiciary.