How does legal innovation occur? Slowly, by looking to the laws of other countries, and by disguising innovation as interpretation.

In “Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation,” Professor John F. Duffy recognizes that change and evolution in law are taken for granted but rarely studied in depth: “Legal change is treated as if it is something that just happens-that follows inexorably from the emergence of social needs and changed social conditions.” Duffy’s article is an antidote to these truisms, studying in depth the development of the requirement that in order to be patentable an invention must be “non-obvious.”  Duffy identifies in the development of this major legal innovation several characteristics he believes could be generalized to a lot of legal innovation:

(1) “Nation-states do not seem to create new legal conceptions independently nearly as frequently as they borrow them from other nation-states.”

(2) “Nations with similar legal cultures and industrial capabilities, such as the United States and England, sometimes maintain significant differences in their law for periods of decades. The speed of convergence on a single ‘common’ law seems extraordinarily slow.” This deliberate pace seems to be the product of a wait and see attitude: “because [one country does] not know whether the innovation is a pathbreaking and salutary development, like obviousness, or a disastrous experiment that will eventually be discarded,” it will wait and see the results.

(3) Courts are wary of the criticism often directed at them for “making policy” rather than merely applying existing law. As Chief Justice John Roberts puts it, his role is merely to be an umpire, not to determine what is a ball and what is a strike. Of course, Roberts ignores the fact that a strike zone is rather well defined, whereas law is full of open-ended standards (the requirement of “due process,” for example), gaps that do not fit cases that courts must decide, and outright ambiguities. But, as Duffy points out, the attitude Roberts exemplifies forces courts to engage in innovation under the guise of mere intepretation: “even when courts are trying to change the law, they often deny that they are doing so by creating clever reconstructions of the language that previously defined the relevant doctrine.”