Is peer-to-peer music downloading fair use? I doubt it.

In defending an individual against liability for downloading music via peer-to-peer networks, Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson apparently is going to argue that his client’s activities constitute fair use of the copyrighted music. His arguments don’t seem terribly persuasive to his peers, and I confess that it is not clear to me at all what his argument is. Ars Technica even asks, “Is Harvard Law professor Charlie Nesson crazy?”

Nesson seems likely to argue that there is no remedy for non-commercial music downloading in the absence of proof of actual economic harm. If that is the basis of his argument for fair use, at least it makes some sense (even if it seems unlikely to prevail). 

More effective, perhaps, will be Nesson’s efforts to convince the court that a jury should decide his client’s fate. As he explains:

 Fair use is recognized as a common law, perhaps a constitutional concept, not defined by but merely recognized and continued by the statute (Sony, Harper); that the statutory four factors are illustrative and not exhaustive; that analysis must be case by case; and the question is a jury issue. 

But I’m not sure he’s entirely right about that. Both an influential treatise (4-13 Nimmer on Copyright Section 13.05, n. 17) and the courts suggest that whether certain acts constitute fair use is a “mixed question of law and fact.” A question of law is one a judge determines; a question of fact is one a jury determines. A mixed question of law and fact is one in which a jury determines what happened, and the judge determines the legal effect of those facts. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)  I’m not sure how Nesson is going to persuade jurors who might be sympathetic to his client to find the historical facts he needs to convince the court his client’s music downloading was fair use.

There is nothing new under the sun.

From BestActEver.com:  The Long War: Music Piracy in 1897 (NYTimes):