In fact, the first major “breakthrough” moment in any good legal education is that one when the student realizes law is not what she thought it is — the learning of rules that she then applies to facts — but is instead that legal reasoning involves the enormously creative and imaginative ability to relate legal rules, earlier applications of those rules, and the myriad of other considerations that go into our conceptions of justice. As importantly, legal practice is also a matter of being able to communicate that complex reasoning, and the ability to communicate it well is inextricably intertwined with the ability to imagine it in the first place. Creativity and imagination, of course, are required to find the law as well.

These are not controversial views. They are central, however, to my fascination with the interplay between law and art.

One enormous component of genuinely creative work is audacity, which, in an article entitled Audacity in Contemporary Art, Diogenes March 1969 vol. 17 no. 65 1-19, Eduardo Gonzalez Lanuza defines very aptly in this way:

Audacity is “an attitude which consists of ignoring what is expected of you and daring to do what no one else dares to do.”

And yet most everyone believes law is authority that determines what is expected of you and requires you do what everyone else does.

So it is with enormous pleasure that I note that Corporate Counsel magazine has awarded Google its “Best Legal Department” award because of, as the magazine’s editor explained, the group’s audacity:

Past years’ winners were often defined by sedate virtues like superior systems and organization, but this year I’d have to say the key quality was audacity.

I’ve long been a fan of Google (though not an unqualified one), and there’s no doubt that its daring has been no small part of my admiration. I can think of few things I would want more as a lawyer than to represent Google in connection with the Google Library Project. So here’s to Google, and if anyone there in the legal department is reading this, I’d love to become your colleague.

Addendum: Speaking of Google’s audacity, not more than a few minutes after posting the above, I came across this, via Plagiarism Today:

Google has signaled that the company is prepared to oppose the major film and music companies as well as Congress and the president of the United States on a controversial bill designed to thwart online piracy.

Google Chairman Eric Schmidt said today in London that the company is prepared to go on fighting the bill should it become law, according to published reports. U.K. publication the Guardian is reporting that in a discussion with reporters during a London business conference, Schmidt said: “If there is a law that requires DNS [domain name systems, the protocol that allows users to connect to Web sites], to do x, and it’s passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the president of the United States, and we disagree with it, then we would still fight it…If it’s a request, the answer is we wouldn’t do it; if it’s a discussion, we wouldn’t do it.”

Thus, for example, Benton writes that “undergraduates are not prepared adequately in any academic area but often arrive with strong convictions about their abilities.” This point rings particularly loudly for me. I teach legal writing, and while a lot of people seem to believe the topic involves nothing more than grammar, style, and legal citation, anyone who has actually engaged in legal writing in practice knows that high level achievement in matters of grammar and style are prerequisites to learning and mastering the sophisticated analytic and persuasive abilities that are part and parcel of the skills of legal writing. In other words, if you haven’t already mastered English Composition, you are not ready for first year legal writing. Moreover, even if you have mastered English Composition, that does not mean you will earn an A in first year legal writing.

Benton doesn’t address the matter quite as squarely as I might, but he does recognize that the huge cost of education is a large part of the problem:

As the college-age population declines, many tuition-driven institutions struggle to find enough paying customers to balance their budgets. That makes it necessary to recruit even more unprepared students, who then must be retained, shifting the burden for academic success away from the student and on to the teacher.

At my law school, tuition is $40,000 per year. As a result, the students are the school’s most valuable resource. Let a student walk away and you let a huge chunk of revenue walk away. Thus, the institution’s desire to retain students threatens to override other institutional goals. Teaching first year law students what they need to know to become effective lawyers often is something that does not make them terribly happy, but keeping students happy often is imperative to keep them from walking away. Would you rather discourage someone who does not have the fortitude to be a lawyer from becoming one or keep him happy enough to pay $120,000 to you over 3 years? The threat to a law school’s legitimate purposes posed by that dilemma is obvious.

Even apart from financial incentives, the importance of student evaluations in making faculty promotion and retention decisions — especially in a system that is increasingly dependent on non-tenure track faculty — can drive professors to value keeping students happy more highly than challenging students to the extent they need to be challenged, as Benton points out: “The common wisdom, for the untenured, at least—whether it is true or not—is to find ways to keep the students happy.”

Finally, it is difficult to maintain rigor in a course when others teach the course from very different foundations of experience and, consequently, have very different expectations. As Benton writes, “[i]t is impossible to maintain high expectations for long unless everyone holds the line in all comparable courses—and we face strong incentives not to do that. A course in which the professor assigns a 20-page paper and 200 pages of reading every week cannot compete with one that fills the same requirement with half of those assignments.”

What precisely is the purpose of a law school? Is it to keep students happy? To train good lawyers? To train legal scholars? I wonder too whether the failures of our universities have something to do with what, as the New York Times recently noted, a couple of lawyer friends of mine are expressing when they criticize younger lawyers as the members of the “slackoisie”:

Two well-known legal bloggers, Dan Hull of What About Clients? and Scott Greenfield of Simple Justice have respectively coined and popularized the term slackoisie to describe Gen-Y attorneys as narcissists who believe:

“that having a job is an entitlement, rather than a privilege … complain about the work they have (if working), opine on the lack of ‘real lawyer’ jobs available in the market, and … criticize the long hours and inadequate pay found at most small firms [while asserting] entitle[ment] to work/life balance [and complaining that] whatever benefits they enjoy are inadequate.”

Especially at law schools in the upper echelons of the U.S. News & World Report rankings, the core of the faculties seem indifferent or even hostile to the concept of law school as a professional school with the primary mission of producing competent practitioners. … Regardless whether they possess a Ph.D., a vastly disproportionate number of new law professors graduated from so-called “elite” law schools, which not coincidentally employ the largest percentage of impractical faculty. “Law professors are a self-perpetuating elite, chosen in overwhelming part for a single skill: the ability to do well consistently on law school examinations, primarily those taken as 1L’s, and preferably ones taken at elite “national” law schools. Some critics contend this homogeneity in law school faculties has resulted in an ethos of perceived intellectual superiority and classism and has made full-time professors, at least those with tenure, jealous of their privileged positions. Other critics contend that many law professors are so absorbed in their scholarly pursuits that they are largely unconcerned with students’ needs – academic or otherwise. …

Could [a typical law school] professor whose primary scholarly interest is criminal law and procedure effectively prosecute or represent a criminal defendant at a felony trial? Could such a professor who writes law review articles about the First Amendment effectively represent a client in a civil rights litigation? Could such a professor whose expertise is securities regulation effectively represent a client or the government in an S.E.C. enforcement action? Imagine such professors being first-chair counsel in a complex civil or criminal litigation who must interview potential witnesses, take depositions and engage in electronic discovery, file and respond to summary judgment motions, conduct voir dire, present the testimony of an expert witness, cross-examine (and impeach) hostile witnesses, and make closing arguments to a jury. There are some full-time non-clinical law professors capable of competently representing clients in real cases, but they are the exception, not the rule, particularly among professors hired in recent years at highly-ranked law schools.

How can we expect law students to become competent practitioners if the core of full-time law faculties, notwithstanding their scholarly prowess, do not themselves possess even the basic skills required to practice the type of law about which they teach and write? How can we expect law students to become competent and ethical practitioners when the faculty members best suited to teach them the necessary practical skills and ethical lessons from real-world cases – clinicians, LRW [Legal Research & Writing] professors, and adjuncts – are marginalized and even openly held in disdain by some members of the “main” faculty?

In short, learning law cannot be separated from learning the practice of law. And law schools, for some reason, don’t seem to think their job is to teach their students the practice of law.

My views are clearly minority ones within law school academia, but they clearly are not so in the legal practice. As Above the Law reported last week: “United Technologies‘ General Counsel, Chester Paul Beach . . . stood up and told approximately 75 law school deans and legal educators from around the country:

We don’t allow first or second year associates to work on any of our matters without special permission, because they’re worthless.

And last week, at the Harvard Law School/New York Law School Future of Education Conference,

Vielka Holness, Director of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Pre Law Institute, . . . said that schools need to bridge the gap between legal theory and actual practice. . . . Most importantly, she said that you need to look further up the pipeline, so students go into law school with an idea of what they need to learn in order to be successful practitioners.

Gillian Hadfield, Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at USC, . . . said that law schools weren’t even very good at doing the things that they think they’re doing well. She had some great examples about how bad students are when asked to pick out the important information in the case, or even pick out the information that will be important to a client.

Elie Mystal, the author of the post, concludes, in response to Hadfield’s point:

It’s an important note. The kind of information regurgitation that will get an ‘A’ in torts and help you pass the bar will make your memo bleed red — if you’re lucky enough to find a mid-level that will even bother to read it.

In common law jurisdictions [such as the U.S.], legal treatises compile common law decisions, and state overarching principles that (in the author’s opinion) explain the results of the cases. However, in common law jurisdictions, treatises are not the law, and lawyers and judges tend to use these treatises as only “finding aids” to locate the relevant cases. In common law jurisdictions, scholarly work is seldom cited as authority for what the law is. When common law courts rely on scholarly work, it is almost always only for factual findings, policy justification, or the history and evolution of the law, but the court’s legal conclusion is reached through analysis of relevant statutes and common law, seldom scholarly commentary.

In contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, the writings of law professors are given significant weight by courts. In part, this is because civil law decisions traditionally were very brief, sometimes no more than a paragraph stating who wins and who loses. The rationale has to come from somewhere else, and the academy often filled that role. As civil law court decisions move in the direction of common law reasoning, it is possible that this balance may shift.

A footnote to this explanation adds: “At least in the U.S., practicing lawyers tend to use ‘law professor’ or ‘law review article’ as a pejorative to describe a person or work that is insufficiently grounded in reality or practicality – every young lawyer is admonished repeatedly by senior lawyers not to write “law review articles,” but instead to focus on the facts of the case and the practical effects of a given outcome.”

I do not mean to point out the stereotypical disregard for legal scholarship among practicing lawyers to disparage legal scholars. Rather, I mean to emphasize what I wrote yesterday: it is the evidence in each case that persuades the legal decision maker what the just result is in each case. The legal rules of the common law system are not abstract principles of justice pronounced from on high to produce justice in each and every situation; instead, they are the refined products produced by centuries of case-by-case efforts to achieve just results based on the specific evidence presented in each of those cases. Thus, those legal rules are subordinate to the case-by-case efforts to achieve justice, not the infallible determinants of just outcomes in all future cases. As I wrote yesterday in suggesting that my students in analyzing legal disputes first consider what the dispute is about, then consider the evidence and its persuasiveness in helping them as human beings determine a just result in that dispute, and only then employ the legal rules to articulate as legal professionals speaking in the language of their technical expertise to explain the justice of that result:

In other words, the legal rules and their proper application arise from the evidence the parties bring to bear. The rules do not predetermine disputes that are predictable before they arise. Instead, they provide the legal language (developed over the centuries’ long development of the common law) in which to couch the just conclusions compelled by the evidence.

In explaining the practice of the common law, I do not mean to denigrate U.S. legal scholarhip. But I do mean to put it into the proper context within our legal system: scholars strive to develop generalizations that govern all cases. Courts, on the other hand, decide individual cases involving individual disputes between individuals who have personal stakes in those disputes. In doing so, the courts do their best to do justice in those individual cases. Scholarly generalization, inevitably, conflicts to a considerable degree with that individual effort to find justice between individuals involved in specific disputes.

And yet the reputation of law schools is weighted enormously in favor of the evaluation by law professors of the legal scholarship of other law professors. For law students, the vast majority of whom go to law school to become lawyers, the basis of these reputations must cause some consternation if there is any truth to what I have written above about legal scholarship’s distance from and irrelevance to legal practice. But here it is, from Brian Leiter, one of the most respected authorities on the evaluation of law school quality. What measures a law faculty’s quality? Not success as a lawyer. Instead:

Faculty Quality (70% of [a law school's] final rank): the rank in this category is based on three criteria: scholarly productivity; scholarly impact of faculty work; and reputation. More precisely, 25% of the rank is based on the per capita rate of publication for the period 1998 through summer 2000 of,

1. articles in the ten most frequently cited student-edited law reviews (Yale Law Journal, Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Michigan Law Review, California Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and Texas Law Review, plus New York University Law Review, which is less-often cited but benefits in prestige from being affiliated with a top law school;

2. articles in ten leading peer-edited law journals (Administrative Law Review, American Journal of Comparative Law, Constitutional Commentary, Environ- mental Law, Journal of Legal Studies, Law & Contemporary Problems, Law & Social Inquiry, Legal Theory, and Tax Law Review);

3. books from the three leading law publishers (Aspen, Foundation, West); and

4. books from the six leading academic presses in law (Cambridge, Chicago, Harvard, Oxford, Princeton, Yale).

Another 25% of the faculty quality rank is based on the per capita rate of scholarly impact for the top quarter of each faculty based on citations to faculty work on the Westlaw JLR database as of August 2000. Finally, 50% of the faculty quality rank is based on the subjective academic reputation of the school based on a fall 1999 survey of academics conducted by U.S. News & World Report.

Each measure of faculty quality has advantages and limitations, but together they promise to present an informative picture. The rationale for the particular weightings, and the details of the study methodology, can be found in “Measuring the Academic Distinction of Law Faculties.”

So there you have it. The law schools with the best reputations are the law schools with law professors who write law review articles read by other law professors but that have little if any impact on the actual product of the U.S. legal system.

Then again, I am on record expressing my opinion that the most reputable of law professors at the most reputable of law schools have, given the opportunity, shown themselves to the worst of lawyers.