[G]iving faint praise is far worse than saying nothing at all. Why? Because silence is not a critical judgment—but faint praise, in contrast to honest and direct criticism, is empty criticism, the most banal form imaginable.

Another way that compassionate, caring critics get around their credo is to shroud their negative comments in anonymity. . . .

Like faint praise, anonymous criticism is empty criticism. Consider a recent example from The Chronicle Review. Carlin Romano’s article “Heil Heidegger!” was savaged in numerous anonymous comments. “Romano writes like an undergrad convinced by the argument of the last book he has read,” wrote one critic. “And, yes, he is a professor of philosophy, and yes, he was a Pulitzer Prize finalist, but his understanding of philosophy is so paltry that it beggars belief.” To that and other similar comments, Romano responded: “Those who savage me and my article from behind anonymous Internet tags emulate the cowardice, dishonesty, and taste for mobbing of the Nazi thinker they revere. It has often been that way with dupes who defend Heidegger—an abysmal thinker and writer, an immoral monster, and a disgrace to the historic enterprise of philosophy.”

Whether or not one agrees with Romano’s views of Heidegger, his take on anonymity is worth thinking about. Anonymity has more in common with cowardice than with courage—and is antithetical to critical dialogue. The common rationale for academic anonymity is quite clear: Honesty and truth require anonymity. To offer critical judgment anonymously, or, as Michel Foucault puts it in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Pantheon Books, 1972), as “a nameless voice,” allows one to stand outside the order of discourse, dialogue, and language. Writes Foucault, “I don’t want to have to enter this risky world of discourse; I want nothing to do with it insofar as it is decisive and final; I would like to feel it all around me, calm and transparent, profound, infinitely open, with others responding to my expectations, and truth emerging, one by one.” In other words, anonymity is more calming and less risky—or even more cowardly—than named criticism.

The inclination to pull one’s punches, to refrain from stating straight out one’s disagreement with one’s colleagues and the reasons for the disagreement, seems to me a particular problem in law schools. I always tell my students that one of the blessings of being a lawyer is that there’s always someone telling you you’re wrong, whether it’s your adversary, a judge, or even your client. That constant challenge to your views forces you to both be as thoughtful and well-spoken as is possible, and it forces you too to trust in your own judgment, not to defer always to authority. Lawyers disagree as a matter of professional duty. If law professors refuse to voice disagreement, they are therefore doing their students a disservice. they are like parents who model irresponsible behavior to their children.

I’m not suggesting one not be civil. Nasty adversaries make wonderful work unpleasant. But professional adversaries are a pleasure. They recognize that disagreement is one’s professional duty, and they don’t take your disagreement with them personally.

Addendum: Law professors don’t like telling their students they’re wrong either.

[One of my pet peeves with contemporary journalists is precisely there lack of nerve -- rather than making judgments and explaining them, most journalists merely "report" the words of people who disagree without judgment.]

An example of being told I was flat-out wrong occurred over a year and a half ago, when I wrote about Sotheby’s $16.8 million lawsuit against the art collector and Internet entrepreneur Halsey Minor for refusing to pay the auction house for three paintings he bought in May” (including The Peaceable Kingdom and the Leopard of Serenity by Edward Hicks). I explained that I didn’t see merit in Minor’s claims that Sotheby’s had been in the wrong in failing to disclose to Minor that it had a security interest in The Peacable Kingdom and that the painting’s owner had agreed Sotheby’s would receive the proceeds of the sale. Minor argued that he had relied on Sotheby’s expertise in connection with the painting, and that if he had known of Sotheby’s security interest in the painting he would not have been willing to pay so much. In short, he claimed, Sotheby’s had been supposed to be working on his behalf in giving him advice regarding the painting but in fact had been acting on its own behalf and to his detriment.

Minor agreed to buy the paintings in May 2008. We all know what happened subsequently — we all experienced financial disaster. As a result, the art market collapsed, and the paintings Minor had bought were worth significantly less than he had agreed to pay. Moreover, one could presume,Minor might have suffered severe financial problems in and after 2008. I suspected strongly that Minor either no longer had the money to buy the paintings or, at least, no longer saw them as worth owning at the price he had agreed to pay.

Minor, though, made plain in a comment to my post (as he had to other people who had written skeptically of his claims) that he thought I was wrong, concluding

Sotheby’s committed Fraud and will pay for it and its disappointing to see you allow them to get away with charging outrageous fees and then blaming lack on knowledge on the victim.

What do you say to someone so vehement when you think he’s full of it? You ignore him, and you let the evidence speak for itself. Which, apparently, is what Sotheby’s did. As Donn Zaretetsky of the Art Law Blog reported over 2 months ago, the federal judge who heard the case ruled on March 30 in favor of Sotheby’s on all counts, entering judgment in Sotheby’s favor for $4.4 million plus interest, late charges, and legal fees. (Decision embedded below.)

And now Zaretsky points out  too that my suspicions regarding Minor’s financial hardships are, apparently, well-founded. According to the New York Post:

Fallen Internet tycoon Halsey Minor is so hard up for cash that he can’t even afford to send Sotheby’s his art collection to make good on his $6.6 million debt to the famed auction house. Court papers filed yesterday say the CNet.com co-founder ‘has represented that he cannot pay shippers to transport his fine and decorative art as directed.

And Elizabeth Lesly Stevens of the Bay Citizen reports that Minor has defaulted on the rent for the offices of his corporate home, offices which he has abandoned:

Minor Ventures, Minor’s investment vehicle and corporate home in recent years, has recently cleared out of its 12th-floor, 17,000-square-foot space at 199 Fremont, in San Francisco’s trendy SoMa neighborhood. Minor left behind artwork, office equipment and cubicles, says Laura Binai, a staffer with the building’s management company.

“All their mail comes here, but no one comes to get it,” she said.

Minor Ventures is technically a subtenant of insurance giant Aon Corp., which is “hunting down Minor for rent,” Binai says. An Aon spokesman declined to comment, and efforts to reach Minor have been unsuccessful.

And a second part of Minor’s design collection is set to be sold on Wednesday by some of Minor’s creditors. And a court has allowed Sotheby’s “to register the $6.6 million judgment in the Western District of Virginia and the District of Delaware, where Minor has significant assets,” including “a $6.52 million mortgage for a farm near Charlottesville, Va., that he recently brought current after it was foreclosed upon.”

So what does it seem happened? Minor suffered severe financial losses in the second half of 2008 and his emphatic assertions of wrongdoing by Sotheby’s were just so much bluster.

Sothebys v. Minor Judgment

So I am thrilled to read in yesterday’s New York Times that professors at the University of California, Berkeley, have studied what makes lawyers (not law students or law professors) effective and “have come up with a test that they say is better at predicting success in” practicing law than is the LSAT.  The study concluded, as I’ve long been convinced, that “LSAT scores . . . ‘were not particularly useful’ in predicting lawyer effectiveness’. . .”  What does the new test consider factors that contribute to lawyerly effectiveness?

“[T]he ability to write, manage stress, listen, research the law and solve problems.”

I am also not surprised to read that the new test is no better than the LSAT at predicting how well participants would do in law school.  As I wrote above, there is far too great a gap between most law school instruction and the actual practice to consider a test that measures effectiveness in the latter able to test effectiveness in the former.

I wish all my students would read this post.  They’ve been dealing with a considerable degree of stress of late that they blame on me and the problems I’ve given them to try to solve — problems that are down and dirty real life problems lawyers face — and they’ve been complaining a lot.  One student in my Contracts course yesterday complainied that online discussion boards made clear to him that students at other schools were covering a lot more “theory” than I am.  I looked at him a little in surprise.  That’s the whole point of my teaching.  And it’s the whole point of the rather unusual curriculum at the school where I am a visiting professor, the University of Detroit Mercy Law School, where it has been recognized that theory and practice are inextricably intertwined and that each can only be understood in the law in relation to one another.  Thus, the school offers a “revolutionary new curriculum . . . [that] complements traditional theory- and doctrine-based coursework with practical learning, providing a solid transition between law school and a legal career.

But it’s hard to teach students to manage stress, listen, and solve problems.  First, it mean subjecting them to the stress of solving problems they do not know the solutions to in advance because what lawyers do is solve problems they don’t know the solutions to in advance.  No one enjoys stress.  I like to think that the students realize the stress I am subjecting to them is not one intended to or that will break them.  It’s school.  As I’ve always told them, in law school we hurl you into the water to see if you can swim, but the water’s only about 4 feet deep, so when you can’t swim, you just get on your feet, come back, try to figure out what went wrong, and then try again.  It’s when you’re a lawyer trying to solve problems you don’t know the solutions to in advance that the stress can be truly overwhelming, especially if you have not been at all prepared for it.

]]> http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2009/03/the-making-of-a-lawyer/feed/ 2 http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2009/01/oppositional-figures/ http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2009/01/oppositional-figures/#comments Mon, 26 Jan 2009 21:26:31 +0000 pfriedman http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/?p=1382  Read more]]> Art and law are ways of exploring, defining, and even creating the world. They are also often romanticized as methods of expressing opposition — opposition to the ruling order, opposition to the status quo, opposition to conventional wisdom. Princeton will soon be hosting a symposium on The Art of Opposition. The promotional materials state:

Throughout history artists have created works as a form of opposition, whether to a dominant political order or to familiar social mores and conventions. This polemical mode of conceiving and interpreting art continues: artists frequently present their own work as a challenge to the status quo, while scholars and critics of contemporary art reinforce the notion that for art to be relevant it must at some level present a critique of prevailing habits and attitudes. For art historians, the concept of art as a form of protest or a challenge to established convention remains a frequent point of departure for research, particularly in relation to certain artists or in the study of specific historical junctures.

Art too, of course, has a long history of reinforcing the status quo, of glorifying the powers-that-be. Virgil’s Aeneid is at least in significant part pro-Augustan propaganda. And you don’t exactly find the world’s greatest art (or most art) in the more pedestrian places. Patronage has its price.

Law as well has its long history of opposition. Our entire system of litigation is founded an adversarial process. More to the point, however, lawyers have often been at the forefront of progressive social movements. As in the case of artists, however, it is not skill and creativity that frees one from the mass of humanity, or even from the forces that crush the most noble parts of humanity. It is the use to which one puts that skill and creativity.

As a lawyer, I’m perfectly comfortable with conflicting information. The remedy for conflicting information is not to try to eliminate “flawed sources,” but to think critically about all sources of information that you encounter.

And then he illustrates his satisfaction with Wikipedia by discussing its definition of the color “puce,” making clear all the while that he understand there’s some dispute whether the color Wikipedia calls puce really is puce.