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Ruling Imagination: Law and Creativity

January 27th, 2012 | Art & Money, copyright, copyright and fair use, legal interpretation, originality | Add your comment

Richard Prince doesn’t have to describe one of his paintings as a Rhino in Hot Pants Shouting, “Repent, Repent!” for it to be so.

Tom Waits on the “meanings” of his songs:

If you break open a song, you’ll find the eggs of other songs. Misunderstandings are really kind of an epidemic and acceptable. I think it’s about one thing, but someone else will say, ‘That song is kind of a rhino in hot pants on a burnt rocking horse with a lariat shouting, “Repent, repent!” I think that’s great.

Why do I bring up Waits rejoicing in the fact someone might hear one of his songs as a “kind of rhino in hot pants on a burnt rocking horse with a lariat shouting, “repent, repent!” Because the lawyer for Patrick Cariou believes that a work of art appropriating another work can only be interpreted to be sufficiently “transformative” of that earlier work if the appropriator expresses in words a transformative purpose. Richard Prince, in appropriating Patrick Cariou’s photographs for his own artistic purposes, said he had no real interest in the meaning behind Cariou’s work, and that he used it strictly as “raw material,” that it was “taking for the sake of taking.”

Cariou’s lawyer thinks that Prince’s inability to state an artistic purpose is fatal to his case. In his eyes, the law requires a 2-step process: “First the defendant has to say” he was engaged in a transformative use of the work he was appropriating. “Only then does the court go on to say, ‘Well let’s see if this is reasonably perceivable.’”

As I made clear yesterday, and as I think Tom Waits makes clear far more vividly, it seems absurd to limit the meaning of a work of art to whatever the artist might state it is. Nor is this particular controversial. The phrase “intentional fallacy” was coined in the title of an influential scholarly article (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946) claiming that artists’ intentions are neither available nor desirable as a standard for assessing art. As has been pointed out, “Intentionalists disagreed, arguing that any sense of the artist’s intention, however obscure, can be a useful resource in interpreting a work of art.”

But the point is, even “Intentionalists” acknowledge that judging, interpreting, and assessing art calls on attention to the art and all it evokes in the eyes of the viewer. Those judgments, interpretations, and assessments are never limited to what the artist wanted the viewer to see and think.

So Cariou’s lawyer is advancing nonsense when he suggests the court should be limited in that way. Nor is the precedent for court reliance in making fair use decisions on the expressed intent of the appropriating artist particularly compelling support for that nonsense. It is true that in Blanch v. Koons the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit relied on what Jeff Koons stated his purposes were in appropriating a photograph for use in one of his paintings. But there were no competing interpretations submitted to the court. As the court pointed out: “Koons asserts — and Blanch does not deny — that his purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s goals in creating it.” Quite simply, the court was persuaded by Koons’ explanations. That the court was so persuaded does not mean, however, that the artist’s explanations are the only means by which the court could be persuaded.already stated their intent to parody. Nor, as Cariou’s lawyer contends, did a lower court find that 2 Live Crew’s re-working of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” depended on 2 Live Crew’s assertion their song was a “parody.” In fact, the Court found that 2 Live Crew’s words parodied Orbison’s and remanded the case so a lower court might determine (a) whether there had been any negative economic impact on sales of Orbison’s song in the potential “derivative market” of rap cover versions, and (b) whether the quantity of musical elements taken from Orbison’s song were more than necessary to 2 Live Crew’s purposes. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91. After remand, the case settled, and there were no further court hearings.

There are 2 other important points to be made here. First, the Supreme Court made clear that the extent to which 2 Live Crew had “parodied” Orbison’s song was hardly overwhelming and, to the extent it was, that parody was apparent in the perception of a listener, not in Luther Campbell’s stated purpose:

While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. 510 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added).

Even more important, perhaps — given the widely held misconception that “transformative” uses are only those that comment directly upon the appropriated works — is the Court’s statement that if an appropriating work has no impact on the commercial market for the appropriated work the need to find that it comments upon or otherwise “parodies” the original correspondingly diminishes:

A parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody presented here may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis of parody. If a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk of serving as a substitute for the original or licensed derivatives . . . it is more incumbent on one claiming fair use to establish the extent of transformation and the parody’s critical relationship to the original. By contrast, when there is little or no risk of market substitution, . . . taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required. 510 U.S., n. 14.

You can be the judge. First, I am including the lyrics of Orbison’s song and 2 Live Crew’s (courtesy of the Copyright Website). The Supreme Court held that the latter were sufficiently transformative of the former to constitute fair use. Second, I am including a recording of 2 Live Crew’s song itself. Is the second a parody of the first? Or does it use the first as raw material to make express its own view of a woman?

Lyrics

Oh, Pretty Woman” -
by Roy Orbison and William Dees

Pretty Woman, walking down the street, Pretty Woman, the kind I like to meet,
Pretty Woman, I don’t believe you, you’re not the truth,
No one could look as good as you
Mercy

Pretty Woman, won’t you pardon me, Pretty Woman, I couldn’t help but see,
Pretty Woman, that you look as lovely as can be , Are you lonely just like me?

Pretty Woman, stop a while, Pretty Woman, talk a while,
Pretty Woman, give your smile to me, Pretty Woman, yeah, yeah, yeah
Pretty Woman, look my way, Pretty Woman, say you’ll stay with me
‘Cause I need you, I’ll treat you right, Come to me baby, Be mine tonight

Pretty Woman, don’t walk on by, Pretty Woman, don’t make me cry,
Pretty Woman, don’t walk away, Hey, O.K.
If that’s the way it must be, O.K., I guess I’ll go home now it’s late
There’ll be tomorrow night, but wait!

What do I see
Is she walking back to me?
Yeah, she’s walking back to me!
Oh, Pretty Woman.

“Pretty Woman” -
as Recorded by 2 Live Crew

Pretty Woman, walking down the street, Pretty Woman, girl you look so sweet,
Pretty Woman, you bring me down to that knee, Pretty Woman, you make me wanna beg please,
Oh, Pretty Woman

Big hairy woman, you need to shave that stuff, Big hairy woman, you know I bet it’s tough
Big hairy woman, all that hair ain’t legit, ‘Cause you look like Cousin It
Big hairy woman

Bald headed woman, girl your hair won’t grow, Bald headed woman, you got a teeny weeny afro
Bald headed woman, you know your hair could look nice, Bald headed woman, first you got to roll it with rice
Bald headed woman here, let me get this hunk of biz for ya, Ya know what I’m saying, you look better than Rice a Roni
Oh, Bald headed woman

Big hairy woman, come on in, And don’t forget your bald headed friend
Hey Pretty Woman, let the boys
Jump in

Two timin’ woman, girl you know it ain’t right, Two timin’ woman, you’s out with my boy last night
Two timin’ woman, that takes a load off my mind, Two timin’ woman, now I know the baby ain’t mine
Oh, Two timin’ woman
Oh, Pretty Woman.

ADDENDUM: I am also embedding below the amicus brief filed by Google in Cariou v. Prince. It does a far better and more extensive job than I at explaining that a “transformative appropriation” need not at all be one that comments or criticizes the original:

Google Amicus Brief in Cariou v Prince

May 19th, 2011 | good lawyering, innovation, lawyers, Legal education | 2 comments

Audacity: fundamental to the practice of art and of law

I tend more often on this blog to write about the impact of law on creative endeavors, but it has always been my intent to address as well the ways creativity informs the practice of law.

In fact, the first major “breakthrough” moment in any good legal education is that one when the student realizes law is not what she thought it is — the learning of rules that she then applies to facts — but is instead that legal reasoning involves the enormously creative and imaginative ability to relate legal rules, earlier applications of those rules, and the myriad of other considerations that go into our conceptions of justice. As importantly, legal practice is also a matter of being able to communicate that complex reasoning, and the ability to communicate it well is inextricably intertwined with the ability to imagine it in the first place. Creativity and imagination, of course, are required to find the law as well.

These are not controversial views. They are central, however, to my fascination with the interplay between law and art.

One enormous component of genuinely creative work is audacity, which, in an article entitled Audacity in Contemporary Art, Diogenes March 1969 vol. 17 no. 65 1-19, Eduardo Gonzalez Lanuza defines very aptly in this way:

Audacity is “an attitude which consists of ignoring what is expected of you and daring to do what no one else dares to do.”

And yet most everyone believes law is authority that determines what is expected of you and requires you do what everyone else does.

So it is with enormous pleasure that I note that Corporate Counsel magazine has awarded Google its “Best Legal Department” award because of, as the magazine’s editor explained, the group’s audacity:

Past years’ winners were often defined by sedate virtues like superior systems and organization, but this year I’d have to say the key quality was audacity.

I’ve long been a fan of Google (though not an unqualified one), and there’s no doubt that its daring has been no small part of my admiration. I can think of few things I would want more as a lawyer than to represent Google in connection with the Google Library Project. So here’s to Google, and if anyone there in the legal department is reading this, I’d love to become your colleague.

Addendum: Speaking of Google’s audacity, not more than a few minutes after posting the above, I came across this, via Plagiarism Today:

Google has signaled that the company is prepared to oppose the major film and music companies as well as Congress and the president of the United States on a controversial bill designed to thwart online piracy.

Google Chairman Eric Schmidt said today in London that the company is prepared to go on fighting the bill should it become law, according to published reports. U.K. publication the Guardian is reporting that in a discussion with reporters during a London business conference, Schmidt said: “If there is a law that requires DNS [domain name systems, the protocol that allows users to connect to Web sites], to do x, and it’s passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the president of the United States, and we disagree with it, then we would still fight it…If it’s a request, the answer is we wouldn’t do it; if it’s a discussion, we wouldn’t do it.”

October 21st, 2010 | Free Speech, Law as a reflection of its society, Legal News, technology and law | Add your comment

On the internet, they’ll find out you’re a dog if you bite.

I’ve made clear I consider anonymity on the internet a stance often abused and almost always one that detracts from the speaker’s credibility, but it also can be a legal problem when anonymous writers do real damage, without justification, to the targets of their words. As SignOn San Diego reports:

A business consultant who wants to know who’s been anonymously disparaging and fixating on her online has gotten a court to force Google to tell her.

As she joined a growing number of people who have persuaded courts to unmask troublesome cyber ciphers, Carla Franklin said Wednesday she hoped her case would help others combat similar problems.

As Bennet Kelley makes clear, you do have a right to speak anonymously, but that right doesn’t mean you have the right to use your words to harm someone without justification:

“There’s a tension there – there’s a First Amendment right to be able to speak anonymously, but there’s no First Amendment right to violate the law,” said Bennet G. Kelley, a Santa Monica, Calif., attorney who specializes in Internet law.

“People think: ‘It’s the Internet. I can do whatever I want,’” he said, but “the law applies, online and offline.”

June 25th, 2010 | Art & Money, copyright and fair use, decision making, Law as a reflection of its society, legal madness, Legal News | 1 comment

Viacom’s schizophrenia over YouTube: the industry cries “serial killer!”

Does YouTube threaten the entertainment industry? On the one hand, Viacom and others will scream that it threatens the very livelihood of those who produce our entertainment. On the other, Viacom and others use it effectively to promote their products. And would you really prefer a regime that required YouTube to approve the legitimacy of every video uploaded to it? Frankly, it simply wouldn’t exist if that were required. To me it makes sense that if a copyright holder believes his copyright is being infringed by an online video, he can have it removed upon request. And if the person who uploaded the video believes the request is mistaken, he can ask Google to review it and make its determination at that point whether it will allow it to remain.

Moreover, history teaches that you should view with extreme skepticism the cries of alarm from the entertainment industry. In doing so, you likely would be doing them a favor.

As I wrote the other day in connection with the decision dismissing Viacom’s lawsuit against Google alleging copyright infringement for the posting on YouTube of videos infringing Viacom’s copyrights, As I wrote above, the existing regime makes sense to me and, as I wrote in that recent post,  ”[t]he decision is a straightforward application of the DMCA’s “safe harbor” provision, which insulates service providers from liability for activities by their users that infringe copyrights.” Viacom, of course, disagrees, stating in its press release:

We believe that this ruling by the lower court is fundamentally flawed and contrary to the language of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the intent of Congress, and the views of the Supreme Court as expressed in its most recent decisions. We intend to seek to have these issues before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as soon as possible.

And those who represent the interests of large corporate copyright holders such as Viacom, like the Washington Legal Foundation (whose mission is to “champion free market principles [and] limited and accountable government”) argue that the decision allows Google “to exploit the statute’s safe harbors by designing an entire business model based on improperly profiting from copyrighted content.” Ronald Cass writes in Forbes that the decision is “broad enough to sink the protection copyright holders had enjoyed under the law.” And the Directors Guild of America claims its members’ very livelihoods are at stake:

We fear that the precedent established in this ruling, if not overturned by the appeals court, could result in a drastic rising tide of Internet theft that could decimate our members’ livelihoods, their pension and health plans, and their ability to continue creating the content that is beloved by people all over the world.

Reading these dire warnings you might not realize that as the judge stated in his decision Google took down the offending videos the day after Viacom delivered a mass takedown notice identifying the ones it claimed a copyright in. Nor would you realize that Viacom recognized the value of YouTube to its business by employing people to post its videos to YouTube to promote its productions while at the same time other Viacom employees were adding those same videos to the list for the takedown notice:

For years, Viacom continuously and secretly uploaded its content to YouTube, even while publicly complaining about its presence there. It hired no fewer than 18 different marketing agencies to upload its content to the site. It deliberately “roughed up” the videos to make them look stolen or leaked. It opened YouTube accounts using phony email addresses. It even sent employees to Kinko’s to upload clips from computers that couldn’t be traced to Viacom. And in an effort to promote its own shows, as a matter of company policy Viacom routinely left up clips from shows that had been uploaded to YouTube by ordinary users. Executives as high up as the president of Comedy Central and the head of MTV Networks felt “very strongly” that clips from shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report should remain on YouTube.

Viacom’s efforts to disguise its promotional use of YouTube worked so well that even its own employees could not keep track of everything it was posting or leaving up on the site. As a result, on countless occasions Viacom demanded the removal of clips that it had uploaded to YouTube, only to return later to sheepishly ask for their reinstatement. In fact, some of the very clips that Viacom is suing us over were actually uploaded by Viacom itself.

Fear that directors will have their livelihoods decimated and that the decision sinks copyright protection is of course, nothing new for an entertainment industry that can profit enormously from new technologies they demonize, so Viacom’s schizophrenia is, perhaps, progress over Hollywood’s reaction to the VCR, which was 100% self-destructive. In 1982, Jack Valenti, in sworn testimony before Congress , stated “that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman home alone.” But, as Digital America explains, Valenti was not merely crying wolf — he was describing the greatest benefit to the movie industry in the last 40 years as a serial killer:

As the VCR became more important to the consuming public, the Hollywood establishment that fought it bowed to its inevitable benefits. In January 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 5-4 that VCRs were legal products and that home taping of copyrighted works fell under the “fair use” exception to copyright. While Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), legislative attempts to codify the Betamax decision and fair video recording rights are still pending before Congress. CEA (at that time known as the Consumer Electronics Group of the Electronic Industries Association), in cooperation with the Home Recording Rights Coalition, protected the legality of home recording and promoted the acceptance of the new technology.

Additionally Hollywood studios established home video divisions to reap the profits from a technology it once considered a threat. Blay’s idea sparked a retail revolution as hundreds of mom-and-pop video rental and sales stores popped up in every community in America. In 1987, video rental income reached $5.25 billion for the year, surpassing movie theater ticket sales for the first time. Today, movie studios regularly make more money on a film from home video sales and rentals than from the theatrical box office.

June 23rd, 2010 | Legal News | 1 comment

Judge Dismisses Viacom’s Lawsuit against Google for Infringing Videos Uploaded to YouTube.

Judge Louis L. Stanton of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has granted Google’s motion for summary judgment (opinion and order embedded below) and dismissed Viacom’s lawsuit that alleged that that Google was liable under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for videos uploaded to YouTube that infringed Viacom’s copyrights because Google had “actual knowledge” and was “aware of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity [was] apparent” but failed to “act[] expeditiously to stop it, “received a financial benefit directly attirubutable to the infringing activity” and “had the right and ability to control such activity” and did not engage in these infringements solely by providing “storage at the direction of the user” or any other Internet function specificied in the DMCA.”

The decision is a straightforward application of the DMCA’s “safe harbor” provision, which insulates service providers from liability for activities by their users that infringe copyrights. The judge acknowledged that Viacom was right about its central contention: Google was “not only aware of, but welcomed, copyright-infringing material being placed on their website.” (Opinion and Order at 6) Nonetheless, he also noted that Google designates an agent who, when he receives a takedown notice, “swiftly” removes infringing videos. (Id.)

The judge concluded that for Google to be liable under the DMCA Viacom would have to show more than that Google knew that infringing activity “in general” was occurring on YouTube because the DMCA does not require that degree of responsibility on service providers for the actions of its users:

To let knowledge of a generalized practice of infringement in the industry, or of a proclivity of users to post infringing materials, impose responsibility on service providers to discover which of their users’ postings infringe a copyright would contravene the structure and operation of the DMCA.

By insulating service providers from liability for infringements by their users, the Judge Stanton concluded, the DMCA makes perfect sense because it would be far too burdensome for the service provider to make individual judgments on each of its user’s activities to determine whether those activities were infringing:

The infringing works . . . may be a small fraction of millions of works posted [on the service provider’s] platform, [and the service provider] cannot by inspection whether the use has been licensed by the owner, or whether its posting is a “fair use” of the material, or even whether its copyright owner or licensee objects to its posting. The DMCA is explicit: it shall not be construed to condition “safe harbor” protection on a “service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity . . . .”  (citations omitted)

Moreover, the fact Google took down over 100,000 videos within one business day in response to a single, mass take-down notice sent by Viacom was proof to Judge Stanton that the existing regime works perfectly well:

Indeed, the present case shows that the DMCA notification regime works efficiently: when Viacom over a period ov months accumulated some 100,000 videos and then sent one mass take-down notice on February 2, 2007, by the next business day YouTube had removed virtually all of them.

Viacom v YouTube Summary Judgment

March 26th, 2010 | creative lawyering, creativity, lawyers, Legal education, legal interpretation, legal records, legal writing, originality, technology and law | 2 comments

Research only begins with information: patience, insight, and imagination are the most important parts of it.

Suffering from one of my occasional bouts with insomnia the other night, I came upon a message on the legal writing professors’ listserv from a professor who was seeking advice from students who were wondering what tricks or tools they might use to find the analogies and legal arguments that they were finding so difficult to discover in the course of their legal research. No doubt the hour contributed to the poor quality of my response. In her poem “4 a.m.,” Wislawa Szymborska writes that “No one feels fine at four a.m.” But the passionate rage I felt at the belief that there are simple tips and tricks to effective research of any sort was not purely the product of the feeling Szymborska describes as “Hollow. Vain./Rock bottom of all the other hours.”

We have a serious misunderstanding these days about what constitutes research.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, research is the

Systematic investigation or inquiry aimed at contributing to knowledge of a theory, topic, etc., by careful consideration, observation, or study of a subject.

Let’s assume that the inquiry is into a legal topic. The first element of research is a “systematic investigation or inquiry.” I suppose location of a database or the use of a particular search algorithm could be considered one sort of a systematic investigation, but to suppose that the notion of systematic investigation is exhausted by the location of sources is nonsensical. I can point students to particular treatises I personally find of great value in certain subjects, and of course legal research is filled with secondary sources and finding tools that fill virtually any style one might find useful in such sources. And we live in the age of databases — there are databases for everything.

But systematic investigation is barely begun, if even begun at all, by merely finding a source or set of sources in which answers might lie. The real art of research lies in the second part of that definition of the term: “careful consideration, observation, or study.”

The answers to difficult legal questions don’t lie around waiting to be found as if they are treasure chests left lying on forest floors. They are constructed and created by elements buried within our universe of databases. Thus, research that is genuine research not only requires Sisyphean patience in combing through the sources, it requires also consideration, observation, and study of what one finds within those sources so that one can, first, identify the elements that matter, and, second, put those important, buried, and isolated elements together in some useful and novel way.

Perhaps more importantly, the identification of the elements that matter cannot be done without simultaneously developing ways of putting those elements together in some useful and novel way. How can you know what matters without knowing what purpose you are putting it to? And how can you decide what purpose you are trying to accomplish if you don’t know what elements you’ll have to use?

In short, research, analysis, and theorizing are all a single activity — finding things, making sure they are the right things, and putting them together in the right ways.

To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that finding the historical sources concerning the U.S. Civil War that James McPherson used in writing his brilliant history of that conflict was virtually all the work that had to be done to produce the book. After all, once one has found the sources, the writing is just a matter of stringing the information in those sources together, right?

Of course not. One must find the sources, of course. But the research is inseparable from the perspicacious mind that finds within those sources the elements that the creative and original mind then can mold into a work that educates, entertains, moves, and even convinces.

There is no such thing as research apart from insight and imagination. And an enormous amount of work.

And so, in perhaps the most coherent part of my e-mail the other night, I wrote:

Research is about drawing connections between ideas and words from wildly disparate sources, connections that can only be found by means of painstakingly patient reading of one source after another, tracing connections between sources that might be as seemingly trivial as the bare citation in one case to a another case in connection with a discussion in the first case that strikes the attentive and imaginative reader as potentially relevant to the legal issue he or she is researching. Obviously, tracing such connections (and the myriad of similarly subtle connections effective researchers exploit) requires an enormous amount of concentration, and enormous amount of patience with the continual following up of leads that go nowhere, an enormous amount of imagination to spot connections that courts don’t make explicit (and often don’t even recognize the true significance of), and an abandonment of the idea that engaging in research in this manner is to neglect (in some Luddite fashion) “tools” that can do the job so much more quickly and effectively.

Research is painstaking work that requires enormous imagination and is inextricably intertwined with and develops simultaneously with the development of the legal analysis the research is intended to support. (Which is one reason I go ballistic anytime someone suggests librarians rather than legal writing professors should be teaching research to first year law students, as if legal research is simply a matter of knowing sources and databases and how to develop effective word searches rather than being part and parcel of the writing and analysis.)

I’ve always told my students that law is as requires as much creativity and originality as any human endeavor. I mean it.

One last point: I don’t think Google is making us stupid. Yes, there is more information available to us than ever before. But, again, we can’t confuse information with research. Research is inquiry that contributes to knowledge. Information may be a sine qua non of research, but without attention, insight, and imagination, it isn’t research at all.

February 04th, 2010 | copyright and fair use, Law as a reflection of its society, Law Enforcement, propaganda | 4 comments

Archers Daniel Midland abuses copyright law to censor criticism — corporations have the right to free speech, but not the people who criticize them?

Some corporations apparently believe in free speech for themselves but not for individuals. The first video below is a deadly dull piece of propagandistic pap in which Patricia A. Woertz, Chairman, President and CEO of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), USA drones on (someone get her better training for dealing with the media!) about ADM’s profound importance to feeding the world. The piece was produced in advance of the recent Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

ADM has, top it mildly, been the subject of considerable ire, criticism, and even criminal prosecution for price fixing (the subject of Matt Damon’s recent film The Informant and Fair Fight in the Marketplace, an excerpt of which appears below’s Woertz’s blathering), political corruption, destruction of the rainforests, and the forced labor of children.

A couple of days ago I posted on my Facebook page what I thought was a hilarious edit of the Woertz video in which some of her original words were retained and many were dubbed over to make it appear as if she were speaking openly on behalf of an evil multinational bent on the gross and horrific exploitation of the world and especially of multinational food markets. I thought it was hilarious piece of political critique. No one could have mistaken it as an “official” ADM production, but plainly it hit a nerve at ADM.

Today I noticed that when I click on the video on my Facebook profile a message appears that it is “no longer available due to a copyright claim by Archers Daniel Midland Company” and that if I click through to YouTube there’s no page for the video at all, not even a page with the same empty video box and takedown message.

This is outright copyright abuse. Criticism is fair use. When anyone asks whether in fact fair use is grounded in the Constitution’s guarantee of free speech, all you need is to think of a situation like this — one can appropriate copyrighted works to criticize and parody the copyright holder. And to use the copyright laws to silence that critique has nothing to do with protecting intellectual property and the rights of a creator to profit from his, her, or its creation: it’s unconstitutional censorship! (Peter Bouchard wrote a good summary yesterday on ” The Battle against Bogus Takedowns, a topic I’ve touched on in the past.”


January 11th, 2010 | copyright and fair use, legal madness, Stupid legal events | Add your comment

AP shoots itself (twice) in the Copyright Wars.

The Associated Press occupies a controversial place in the so-called “Copyright Wars,” and it certainly isn’t making many friends anywhere in recent news. First, on December 31 of last year, AP filed its Amended Answer to Complaints, Crossclaim, Counterclaim., and a cross claim against Mannie Garcia. In that document, AP contends that it, not Garcia, owns the copyright in the photograph Garcia took of then candidate Obama that Shepard Fairey subsequently used as the source material for the (in)famous Hope poster. AP’s contention rests on the assertion that Garcia was acting within his the scope of his duties as a staff photographer for AP when he shot the photo and that it therefore constituted a “work for hire.”

There are, I think, two sets of allegations in AP’s latest filing that are interesting in terms of whether Fairey’s use of the photograph as source material for the poster constituted a non-infringing fair use. First, AP states that Garcia was sent to the event at which he shot the photo by AP in order to take photos such as the disputed one. Second, AP states that Garcia sent “several” of those photos to AP and that AP chose the photo it decided ultimately to publish. One might think these allegations reduce the extent to which Garcia can claim the shot was one so much of his own choosing. He was assigned to take the shots he took, he took a lot of them, and AP, not Garcia, chose the one that fit its purposes best.

AP also goes right after Garcia, accusing him in its counter-claim of committing fraud in registering his own copyright in the photo on the grounds that AP’s ownership of that copyright under the work for hire doctrine was so plain that Garcia knew he at the time he filed the copyright registration that he wasn’t entitled to do so. It might not be the only accusation of dishonesty hurled at Garcia in this case.

Meanwhile, AP, of course, has been quite vocal about voicing its contention that “news aggregators” infringe AP’s copyrights on a regular basis. No matter your view on the legitimacy of the infringement claim, there’s lots of reason to believe that AP’s stance is bad business. Google seems to have been a principal target of AP’s complaints, and yet shutting Google off (something, incidentally, AP could do at any time) would seem likely to drive traffic away from AP’s stories.

Well, Google seems to have called AP’s bluff. The Guardian reports that “it has become apparent that new Associated Press stories are no longer appearing on the site, which has hosted them since 2007. Google hasn’t added new AP content since December 24.

December 01st, 2009 | copyright and fair use, Law as a reflection of its society, Legal News, problem solving, technology and law | Add your comment

Breathlessly waiting for Murdoch to be sued . . . or wither on the web?

The Kwika Entertainment Blog (reprinting a piece from the Huffington Post) breathlessly announces that “if Microsoft and [Rupert Murdoch's] News Corp. go forward with a deal whereby News Corp. demands that Google stop indexing its websites, don’t be surprised if it leads to one of the most important copyright lawsuits in history.”

Don’t bet on it.

Google’s display of snippets from News Corp’s web pages for search engine purposes is almost certainly fair use. Can you imagine a Google snippet ever serving as a substitute for the original? If not, then the snippet is fair use. And copying the entire site for the sake of creating the snippet is fair use too.

The idiotic part of Murdoch’s move would be that, assuming Google allows Murdoch’s publications to “opt-out” of Google (as Google does for any site — all you have to do is insert some code into your site to exclude your site from Google’s indexing), the result will be that Murdoch’s publications will lose all that traffic Google generates. Stupid, stupid, stupid.

Murdoch has always had the option to opt out of Google. The other stupid player here might be Microsoft — why pay to index something that will only be losing readership?

November 17th, 2009 | technology and law | 1 comment

You can now use Google Scholar to find case law.

This is a terrific new innovation. Today, from Google:

Starting today, we’re enabling people everywhere to find and read full text legal opinions from U.S. federal and state district, appellate and supreme courts using Google Scholar. You can find these opinions by searching for cases (like Planned Parenthood v. Casey), or by topics (like desegregation) or other queries that you are interested in. For example, go to Google Scholar, click on the “Legal opinions and journals” radio button, and try the query separate but equal. Your search results will include links to cases familiar to many of us in the U.S. such as Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, which explore the acceptablity of “separate but equal” facilities for citizens at two different points in the history of the U.S. But your results will also include opinions from cases that you might be less familiar with, but which have played an important role.

October 27th, 2009 | creative lawyering, good lawyering, Legal education, technology and law | Add your comment

Kids need to learn a lot, but they can teach us a lot too.

The information and communication revolution wrought by the internet is, among other things, a generational divider. While one generation bemoans the threat of the internet to newspapers and books, a new generation — the one I teach — appears to do the vast majority of its reading online. It is of course not all a matter of the younger generation having aptitudes for a new environment we old people resist adapting to. There is as much lost as is gained. (One of these days I’ll explore the loss I’ve noticed in researching skills, the ability to ferret out information that is not easily accessible or even immediately recognizable as important.)

But there is so much that is of great use in the new environment that too many of my contemporaries (and, also, too many of my students) don’t take advantage of. Social Media Law Student is a terrific site for helping us all find and learn how to use new tools. It’s run and written by law students. Yana Siganur writes today’s lead article, in which she takes the opportunity “to remind everyone of the efficiency that is Google” in a well-written and concise guide to a number of tools available from Google that can our professional lives easier.

June 18th, 2009 | copyright and fair use, Significant Legal Events, technology and law, The evolution of law | 1 comment

Google’s Library of Babel and its opponents.

library-of-babelSteven Shankland has written a good piece on the proposed settlement of the lawsuits over the Google Library Project; the proposed settlement is “now under review by Judge Denny Chin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.”

Under the proposed settlement, the owners of copyrights in books would need to opt out of the project to prevent Google from including those books in its Library database, which is being compiled by scanning the libraries of several major insitutions around the world. As Shankland points out, “that means essentially that Google would be permitted to show content from in-copyright, out-of-print books and sell online copies of those books even without an explicit agreement with the books’ rightsholders.” Copyrighted, out-of-print books constitute approximately 70 percent of the books in the library collections Google is scanning, and that 70 percent includes the vast majority of “orphan works” in those libraries. Orphan works are works whose copyright holders cannot be identified, a common problem because there is no registry of copyrights and the authors of the books are not necessarily the copyright holders. Rather, the copyright holders might include unidentifiable heirs or even corporate entities that have gone through mergers, dissolutions, or other forms of corporate reorganization that make it difficult or impossible to identify the entity that currently owns the copyright.

Nevertheless, some authors continue to oppose the Google Library Project:

“Under the actual law, it is Google’s burden and not yours to ask you for permission and then fairly negotiate terms of contract acceptable to you personally, not jam some monstrosity down your throat,” said Lynn Chu, a literary agent with Writers’ Reps who also called the proposed settlement a “ripoff for authors” in a Wall Street Journal opinion piece.

As a business matter, I don’t understand the view Chu expresses, as I’ve previously written. Why would someone whose work is out-of-print not want that work accessible to the general public? And if that someone wants to keep his work in the obscurity resulting from being out-of-print and available only at some far off insitution’s library, he can always opt out. Chu says that the “actual law” requires Google to ask permission first, not for the copyright holder to deny permission, but the wonderful thing about contracts (and a settlement is a contract) is that they can be a means parties have of altering the rules that govern their relationships in the absence of agreement.

I’ve been a fan of the Google Library Project since it was announced in 2003. It promises to make available for search the collections of many of the greatest libraries in the world. Google will only be able to display brief snippets of works that are in print and under copyright, but even that access will make known to researchers the availability of sources they never otherwise would have been able to find. The Project is one of those endeavors that make the internet and the digitization of information truly revolutionary and magical. It would be a shame if copyright law founded on old technologies and the unfounded knee-jerk reactions of copyright holders (it’s mine, and that means you can’t do anything with it without my permission!) were to end up preventing the realization of revolutionary magic.

Finally, Shankland points out that there is concern over the settlement because it would give Google an advantage over competitors: “Microsoft, Amazon, or the Internet Archive . . . –without their own handy class-action settlement [--] would be have to try to seek such permission in advance from each rightsholder or risk copyright infringement litigation.” But if copyright holders and their representatives are willing to reach this settlement with Google there’s no reason to suppose they wouldn’t with Microsoft, Amazon, or the Internet Archive. Google’s competitive advantage is the result of its initiative and daring in starting the Project in the first place and developing technology (including new scanning technology) to make it truly possible. Advantages gained by daring and initiative should be rewarded by the law, not stymied.

May 11th, 2009 | Law Enforcement, legal history, Legal News, Significant Legal Events | Add your comment

The Monopoly game is over.

google-monopoly-gameHere’s one reversal of Bush administration policy no one will mistake: the New York Times reports that the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division will strengthen antitrust rules and aggressively enforce the nation’s antitrust laws “against corporations that use their market dominance to elbow out competitors or to keep them from gaining market share.” Remarkably, “[d]uring the Bush administration, the Justice Department did not file a single case against a dominant firm for violating the antimonopoly law. Many smaller companies complaining of abusive practices by their larger rivals were so frustrated by the Bush administration’s antitrust policy that they went to the European Commission and to Asian authorities.”

When the Bush Administration, “[r]eflecting deep skepticism of the role of government in the marketplace,”  made its lax enforcement of antitrust laws official policy in 2008, “three of the four commissioners at the Federal Trade Commission denounced the guidelines, calling them ‘a blueprint for radically weakened enforcement’ against anticompetitive practices.”

The Obama Administration, in contrast, believes it was a major mistake to relax enforcement of the antitrust laws during the the early years of the Great Depression, a policy believed to have “enabled many large companies to engage in pricing, wage and collusive practices that harmed consumers and took years to reverse.” The new policy is expected to hit tech companies especially hard, but is also aimed at “agriculture, energy, health care, . . . and telecommunications companies. ”

In a related note, embedded below, from Silicon Alley Insider, is a copy of a PowerPoint presentation Google is showing around Washington, D.C., marked up with comments by Consumer Watchdog.


 

I have to give Google some credit for this last item — it came to my attention via a Google News Alert.

April 07th, 2009 | copyright and fair use, originality | Add your comment

AP doth protest too much, methinks.

It’s interesting how often the people who scream the loudest about a problem are the ones who in fact are vulnerable to precisely the criticism they are voicing.  I’m no psychologist, though you clearly need no professional degree to understand that zealotry apparent certainty can betray insecurity. AP has of late been rather extreme in its rush to protect its rights in copyrighted material. Now AP seems poised to take on Google’s contention that it is engaged in non-infringing fair use when it engages in its regular practice of displaying the headline and lead paragraph, along with credit and a direct link, of the news stories published by, among others, AP.

As Larry Dignan points out on ZDNet, AP regularly — a lot, every day — reports stories that are based purely on other public sources without either acknowledging or linking to those sources.  He concludes that “once folks figure out they can damn near replicate most of the AP just by finding source material things are going to get ugly quickly.”

December 02nd, 2008 | copyright and fair use, creative lawyering, Legal News | Add your comment

Why did I call Google a (former?) “white knight”?

I wrote yesterday that some fear Google’s decision to settle the lawsuit over the Google library project heralds a new era, one in which Google will not be the rich uncle fighting the fights over copyright that others, who cannot afford being engaged in protracted lawsuits, will be unable to fight. The point deserves some further observations.

First, those who represent wealthy corporate interests typically decry the fact that in the U.S. both the party who brings the lawsuit (the plaintiff) and the party who is sued (the defendant) bears its own litigation costs, win or lose. This rule (the American Rule) is in contrast to the English Rule. In the U.K., the party who loses a lawsuit pays the costs of the winner’s lawyers. As a result, there are fewer cases brought by plaintiffs without resources. Corporate interests that advocate for “tort reform” don’t want individuals suing corporations as often as they currently do for things like personal injury and employment discrimination. If plaintiffs had to pay the costs of the defendants’ attorneys in those lawsuits when the plaintiffs lost, far fewer plaintiffs would in fact sue.

But in the copyright arena in these internet days, it generally is wealthy corporate interests that are threatening to sue or suing individual defendants. Because many of these defendants cannot afford to pay for lawyers to fight these threats, they back down. As a result, there is what is called “copyright overclaiming” – that is, copyright holders claim rights they don’t have, threaten legal action (or send DMCA takedown notices), and get what they want even though they are not entitled to it. Sometimes copyright holders can get help (from, for example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation), but in 999 cases out of 1000 they’re left to their own devices, and it usually makes far more sense to back down then to fight. Why pay for a lawyer to fight an expensive lawsuit when, if you lose, you’ll have to pay the far more expensive legal costs incurred by your adversary too?

That’s why, if Fred von Lohman is right and Google is no longer going to fight copyright battles it thinks should be fought on the merits (and not only for short term business advantage), it would be a real loss; it is, in short, why I called Google a “white knight” in the title of yesterday’s post.

December 01st, 2008 | copyright and fair use, Legal News | 1 comment

Has the Copy-Left lost its white knight?

Google has been a very interesting company to anyone concerned with copyright law.  Google has taken on lawsuits raising issues others don’t have the resources to fight over, and Google has been very effective in making good arguments in those cases.  Fred von Lohman now wonders if those days are gone:

Late last month, Google announced a settlement in its lawsuit with book publishers and authors over its Google Book Search offering. . . .

The Book Search case is just one of a series of high-stakes lawsuits that Google has taken up in the name of the disruptive innovation that fuels the Internet economy. . . .

Google, assisted by its expensive, top-drawer legal team, has a track record of winning these precedent-setting Internet cases. And by winning, Google sets a precedent that other innovators can rely on, as well. In essence, Google’s legal investments have paid dividends for the entire Internet innovation economy.

Until now. By settling rather than taking the case all the way (many copyright experts thought Google had a good chance of winning), Google has solved its own copyright problem – but not anyone else’s. Without a legal precedent about the copyright status of book scanning, future innovators are left to defend their own copyright lawsuits. In essence, Google has left its former copyright adversaries to maul any competitors that want to follow its lead.

November 01st, 2008 | copyright and fair use, creative lawyering, Legal News, originality, problem solving | Add your comment

Is Google no longer the Copy-Left’s white knight?

Google has been a very interesting company to anyone concerned with copyright law.  Google has taken on lawsuits raising issues others don’t have the resources to fight over, and Google has been very effective in making good arguments in those cases.  Fred von Lohman now wonders if those days are gone:

Late last month, Google announced a settlement in its lawsuit with book publishers and authors over its Google Book Search offering. . . .

The Book Search case is just one of a series of high-stakes lawsuits that Google has taken up in the name of the disruptive innovation that fuels the Internet economy. . . .

Google, assisted by its expensive, top-drawer legal team, has a track record of winning these precedent-setting Internet cases. And by winning, Google sets a precedent that other innovators can rely on, as well. In essence, Google’s legal investments have paid dividends for the entire Internet innovation economy.

Until now. By settling rather than taking the case all the way (many copyright experts thought Google had a good chance of winning), Google has solved its own copyright problem – but not anyone else’s. Without a legal precedent about the copyright status of book scanning, future innovators are left to defend their own copyright lawsuits. In essence, Google has left its former copyright adversaries to maul any competitors that want to follow its lead.

October 30th, 2008 | copyright and fair use, Creative Legal Events, Legal News, Significant Legal Events | Add your comment

Jurist – the oldest and still greatest legal news site

Jurist, one of the oldest and very best legal news sites, has announced a new presence on Facebook.
Jurist is a production of the University of Pittsburgh University of Law, and was founded by Professor Bernard Hibbits, one of the pioneers of the use of the internet in legal education and the dissemination of legal news, having created the site that became Jurist back in the ancient days of 1996.  As Hibbits explains in connection with the decision to create a Facebook page:

The page is designed to give our US and worldwide audience a space in which to share their JURIST experiences and their common interest in the legal news and commentary that we offer every day, while giving readers occasional behind-the-scenes peeks at law student staff operations here at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, JURIST’s host institution. After more than a decade of delivering content to hundreds of thousands of largely anonymous readers around the world, our staff is looking forward to seeing the faces and hearing the voices of the ever-growing number of JURIST readers on the Facebook service!

Not only is Jurist one of the Ancient Wise Oracles of the online legal world, it is a moment-to-moment legal media center.  Just to give two examples of particular concern to me:

As I wrote yesterday, Google seemed on the verge of settling the long-running and profound disputes concerning its Google Library Project.  Jurist now reports the settlement is final:

Internet search company Google, Inc. [corporate website] agreed Tuesday to settle [Google press release] two copyright infringement lawsuits stemming from its book-scanning initiative [Google Book Search website]. The two lawsuits were brought against Google by The Authors Guild [advocacy website; press release, PDF], an advocacy group seeking to preserve copyright protection for authors, and by other plaintiffs including the Association of American Publishers (AAP) [organization website; AAP press release], The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Penguin Group (USA), Inc., and Simon & Schuster, Inc. [corporate websites]. Under the terms of the settlement agreement [text, PDF], which is subject to approval by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York [court website], Google will pay $125 million to authors and publishers of copyrighted works. In return, Google will be allowed to display online up to 20% of the total pages of a copyrighted book, and will offer users an opportunity to purchase the remainder of any viewed book. The New York Times has more. The Washington Post has additional coverage.The two lawsuits settled Tuesday were originally brought against Google in 2005. In September 2005, The Authors Guild alleged [JURIST report] “massive copyright infringement at the expense of the rights of individual writers.” The lawsuit accused Google of engaging in unauthorized scanning and copying of books through its Google Print Library Project [Google backgrounder; advocacy copyright analysis, PDF]. The AAP lawsuit, filed in October 2005 [JURIST report], alleged that Google infringed copyrights held by a number of publishing companies when it scanned the entire book collections of several universities to make them searchable online.

With respect to another profound concern of mine, military torture, Jurist reports that a federal judge has ruled that evidence obtained by torture cannot be admitted in the trial of a Guantanamo detainee:

A US military judge ruled Tuesday that a confession given by Guantanamo Bay [JURIST news archive] detainee Mohammed Jawad [DOD materials; JURIST news archive] to Afghan officials following his capture in 2002 was obtained using torture and is therefore inadmissible at his upcoming military commission [JURIST news archive] trial. Army Col. Stephen Henley found that Afghan officials threatened to kill Jawad and his family unless he admitted to throwing a grenade that injured three US soldiers in Kabul in 2002. Henley ruled that obtaining a confession using threat of death amounted to torture, and that under Guantanamo trial rules his confession is therefore inadmissible. Reuters has more.

Jawad, who was transferred into US custody after the confession to the Afghanistan government, was designated an “enemy combatant” in 2004. He was later charged [charge sheet, PDF; JURIST report] with attempted murder and intentionally causing serious bodily injury for his role in the attack, which injured two US soldiers and an Afghan translator. The case against him faces growing problems. Last month, former military commissions chief prosecutor Army Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld resigned [JURIST report], citing “ethical qualms” with the military commissions’ defense counsel discovery procedures. In May, Jawad moved [JURIST report] to have all charges against him dismissed, alleging that he has been tortured in US custody and subjected to the so-called “frequent-flier program,” in which certain inmates are moved between cells at two to four hour intervals in an attempt to cause physical stress through sleep deprivation. Jawad, the fourth Guantanamo detainee to be formally charged with war crimes under the 2006 Military Commissions Act [text, PDF], is set to face military commission on January 5, 2009.

October 29th, 2008 | copyright and fair use, Creative Legal Events, Significant Legal Events | 2 comments

Settlement imminent in lawsuit against the Google Library Project?

I’ve long been fascinated by the Google Library Project, considering it one of the greatest boons to research since Gutenberg. I’ve written on this blog of my bafflement at its opponents, especially those authors who fear their inclusion within the project. I’ve written elsewhere at the utter misconceptions that govern some views of the project. (I have, however, been called a “dickwad” for pointing out these misconceptions, a characterization unsupported by reference to any law.)

The good news is that, as Open Access News reports, “Andrew Albanese reports in Library Journal, October 10, 2008, that Google and a group of publishers may be close to settling the publishers’ lawsuit against the Google Library Project:

Nearly three years after its initial filing, it appears a settlement may finally be near in publishers’ lawsuit over Google’s controversial program to scan books from library shelves. Although rumors of a settlement have flared up and died down intermittently over the years, sources wishing to remain anonymous this week told the LJ Academic Newswire and Publishers Weekly that talk of a final agreement has indeed heated up, with one publishing insider confirming that a settlement was “imminent,” although no solid time frame was known….

A settlement has long-been expected, as it would avoid what is setting up to be a messy trial. Industry-watchers have predicted the two parties eventually would reach some kind of blanket license agreement, noting that avoiding a court decision involving murky copyright and fair use boundaries is the logical, least risky-and least costly-option for both parties.

From the start, publishers have maintained that the wholesale scanning of copyrighted books from libraries is an unreasonable expansion of fair use, and that Google is creating a valuable asset without compensating rightsholders. Google has countered that its plan, which makes only “snippets” of copyright-protected books viewable online, is fair use, and that publishers, can also “opt out” of having their books scanned….

[T]he AAP suit, filed in October 2005 on behalf of McGraw-Hill, Pearson Education, the Penguin Group, Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley & Sons, does not seek damages. It seeks an injunction that would essentially declare that Google’s scanning of an entire book still under copyright without permission is infringement. . . .

August 06th, 2008 | copyright and fair use, Uncategorized | 1 comment

Ruling Imagination: Law and Creativity

The loss of an important voice: William Patry, Copyright Maven

I am saddened to report that William Patry has, after 4 years, ended his Patry Copyright Blog.  There are several reasons for my sadness.  First, Mr. Patry is a wonderful writer, a creative thinker, and one of the leading authorities, if not the leading one, in the field of copyright.  His multi-volume treatise, Patry on Copyright, has instantly become the authority in the field, not only because of his expertise, but also because it is the first comprehensive treatise on copyright in 17 years.  And no one needs to be told that the last 17 years constitute an entire epoch in copyright law.

I am also saddened because Mr. Patry is a remarkably generous soul.  When, last February, I started a blog on copyright and fair use as a class project, I took a shot in the dark and wrote him to ask what he thought of the project.  I never expected to hear from him.  After all, he is Senior Copyright Counsel to Google.  I am way out of his league on the topics I planned to cover in the new blog.  Quite plainly, too, he is a very busy man. 

 Within minutes, however, he wrote me back, praising the project and welcoming my questions.  I tried not to abuse the invitation, but I did on several occasions write him and ask him for his reactions to things I wrote.  He was without exception gracious, generous, and, most wonderful of all, endlessly encouraging to me.  As he wrote, it is our human obligation to learn every single day.  He added that, in his 26 years of working in the field, there wasn’t a day he wasn’t amazed at how much more he had to learn.

That Mr. Patry also plugged my blog on his was just icing on the cake and instantly gave me credibility and attention I could never otherwise have expected.

It is a shame that Mr. Patry became viewed by some as a shill for Google.  He had a long and illustrious career in copyright long before joining Google and he made clear that the views he expressed on his blog were his own, not his employers.  Unfortunately, as he wrote in his last post:

There is nothing I can do to stop this false implication that I am speaking on Google’s behalf. And that’s just those who do so because they are lazy. Others, for partisan purposes, insist on on misdescribing the blog as a Google blog, or in one case involving a think tank, darkly indicating also a la Senator Joe McCarthy, that in addition to funding from Google, there may be other sources of funding too.

Saddest of all, Mr. Patry is in despair of the state of copyright law, which, in his view (as well as mine) has lost its purpose: to encourage and promote creativity.  He concludes his farewell as follows:

I regard myself as a centrist. I believe very much that in proper doses copyright is essential for certain classes of works, especially commercial movies, commercial sound recordings, and commercial books, the core copyright industries.  I accept that the level of proper doses will
vary from person to person and that my recommended dose may be lower (or higher) than others. But in my view . . . we are well past the healthy dose stage and into the serious illness stage. Much like the U.S. economy, things are getting worse, not better.

Copyright law has abandoned its reason for being: to encourage learning and the creation of new works. Instead, its principal functions now are to preserve existing failed business models, to suppress new business models and technologies, and to obtain, if possible, enormous windfall profits from activity that not only causes no harm, but which is beneficial to copyright owners. Like Humpty-Dumpty, the copyright law we used to know can never be put back together again: multilateral and trade agreements have ensured that, and quite deliberately.

If Walt Disney Co. (NYSE: DIS) didnt still own the copyright to Mickey Mouse, Walt Disney (the artist, not the company) would never have had the incentive to create him, right?

If Walt Disney Co. (NYSE: DIS) didn't still own the copyright to Mickey Mouse, Walt Disney (the artist, not the company) would never have had the incentive to create him, right?