In 2006, the Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet investigated the links between the Icelandic bank Kaupthing and tax havens. Kaupthing’s managers did not like what they read, but failed to persuade the Danish press council that the paper had done anything wrong. The bank sued for libel in London instead. The newspaper pulled the articles and apologised because English lawyers ran up costs that were beyond its editor’s worst nightmares – £1 million, and that was before a case had gone to court.

Kaupthing went for the paper in England not just because it wanted to kill the original story, but because it also wanted to deter others from spreading the idea that Iceland was not a safe place for investors. The English legal profession obliged. Newspapers’ lawyers thought once, twice, one hundred times before authorising critical stories. A few months later Kaupthing collapsed – along with the other entrepreneurial, go-ahead Icelandic banks – and British depositors lost £3.5 billion. By allowing libel tourists to fly to London and use our repressive laws, the English legal profession had also stopped the British investors from learning of the danger in investing in the country’s banks.

You no more hear writers and broadcasters admit that they are frightened of investigating investment banks than you hear them admit that they are frightened of challenging the founding myths of Islam. We cannot puncture our own myth that we are fearless seekers after truth, even though, if we honestly owned up to our limitations, we might force society to confront the fact that modern censorship does not conform to old models. It is a mistake to think of repression as repression by the state alone. In much of the world it still is, but in Britain, America and most of continental Europe the age of globalisation has done its work, and it is privatised rather than state forces that threaten freedom of speech.

This passion for freedom of expression is part of what drives my passion on behalf of appropriation artists and against Patrick Cariou in his copyright infringement case against Richard Prince. One of Cariou’s purported motivations in bringing the lawsuit was to vindicate the offense taken by the Rastafari (the subjects of Cariou’s photographs that were appropriated by Prince) at Prince’s images. As the Caribbean Rastafari Organization put it in its “Statement of Protest and Demand for Cancellation” of Prince’s exhibit:

[Prince's exhibit] is egregiously disrespectful of Rastafari culture and peoples, and reflects racial stereotyping that is morally offensive and that has no place in the 21st century. So-called artistic license cannot permit the trivialization and abuse of a people still marginalized by race and gender to evoke images of subordination and exploitation of Africans and women. This is a legacy of the European colonial enterprise that continues to have a negative impact on African peoples in the Americas and it is a legacy that the Rastafari have resisted and condemned for nearly 80 years. Rastafari at the vanguard of Pan-African Liberation ceaselessly demanding justice based on truth and right, find the Canal Zone exhibit distasteful, insensitive, insulting and totally unacceptable.

According to Hebrew University of Jerusalem . . ., when it inherited Einstein’s estate, the bequest included ownership of Einstein’s very identity, giving it exclusive legal control over who could use Einstein’s name and image, and at what cost.

Einstein is not the only example. While we might think of people like the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., George Patton, Rosa Parks, Frank Lloyd Wright and Babe Ruth as part of our cultural heritage, available for all to use, the identities of each of them, and thousands more, are claimed as private property, usable only with permission and for a fee.

This phenomenon is fairly recent — and it’s getting out of control. For most of this country’s history, a person’s identity was not something that could be owned. . . .

Today the right of publicity clearly allows people to control the commercial use of their names and images during their lives. What happens after death is much murkier.

Throughout much of the world, the right of publicity ends at death, after which a person’s identity becomes generally available for public use. In the United States, however, this issue is governed by state laws, which have taken a remarkably varied approach. In New York, the right of publicity terminates at death; other states provide that the right of publicity survives death for limited terms. But in Tennessee (whose laws govern the use of Elvis Presley’s image, since he died there), Washington (home of a company that purports to own Jimi Hendrix’s right of publicity) and Indiana (where CMG Worldwide, which manages the identities of hundreds of dead people, is based), control over the identities of the dead has been secured for terms ranging from 100 years to, potentially, eternity.

Extending control over the identity of important people to their estates after death is, I think, to mistake how culture and art work and to elevate property rights to an importance that does us very little good. The identities of famous people as varied as Einstein, Elvis Presley, and Marilyn Monroe become part of our culture’s language. That cultural meaning then becomes part of the language of our cultural conversations, and as a part of that language it then has meaning that can be used in the sorts of compressed and symbolic ways that culture and art thrive on. To remove the identities of dead people from this language in the absence of payment for their use would substantially damage our culture. Madoff suggests congressional legislation limiting control over a person’s identity to a short term of, for example, ten years. To extend control at all past death seems to me to be problematic as a cultural and expressive matter (and Madoff raises all sorts of ways in which it is problematic as a matter of estate law). But to extend it any longer than ten years seems just plain obtuse — doing so would raise the threat that by the time an identity becomes available for use as part of the public domain it would have lost much if not all of its expressive value.

A business consultant who wants to know who’s been anonymously disparaging and fixating on her online has gotten a court to force Google to tell her.

As she joined a growing number of people who have persuaded courts to unmask troublesome cyber ciphers, Carla Franklin said Wednesday she hoped her case would help others combat similar problems.

As Bennet Kelley makes clear, you do have a right to speak anonymously, but that right doesn’t mean you have the right to use your words to harm someone without justification:

“There’s a tension there – there’s a First Amendment right to be able to speak anonymously, but there’s no First Amendment right to violate the law,” said Bennet G. Kelley, a Santa Monica, Calif., attorney who specializes in Internet law.

“People think: ‘It’s the Internet. I can do whatever I want,’” he said, but “the law applies, online and offline.”

The opinion announces and perpetuates a shallow, simplistic understanding of the First Amendment, one that actually undermines one of the most basic purposes of free speech, which is to protect democracy. The nerve of his argument—that corporations must be treated like real people under the First Amendment—is in my view preposterous. Corporations are legal fictions. They have no opinions of their own to contribute and no rights to participate with equal voice or vote in politics.