Cuckoo Kookabura — Culture as the Language of Art

I wrote in November of the claim by the owners of the copyright in the Australian chestnut Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree that Men at Work had infringed Kookabura’s copyright in their 1981 #1 hit Men Down Under. The claim is ridiculous. As the Sydney Morning Herald reported at the time, “[t]he key, harmony, structure and rhythm of Down Under’s famous riff changed the sound of it so much that nobody – not the band, [the managing director of the company that owned the copyright to Kookaburra], or even five out of six [of the game show] panellists . . . noticed it until someone turned it into a quiz show question.”

But now, as Celebrity Justice (among others) reports, “[a]fter a 3 year fight, a federal court in Australia has ruled against favorite sons Men At Work saying they plagiarized one portion of the Kookaburra tune and will now owe some of their royalties to the publishing group who bought the rights to that song in 1990.”

As CNN reports, the judge in his decision wrote that “I would emphasise that the findings I have made do not amount to a finding that the flute riff is a substantial part of Down Under or that it is the ‘hook’ of that song.”

Whether the judge’s decision will withstand appeal under Australian copyright law is beyond my expertise, but the suggestion that the quotation of a copyrighted song in a new work constitutes copyright infringement would make a travesty of the notion of fair use under U.S. law. My zealousness on this question is not merely the result of the argument that I made in my November post — that the “transformative” nature of Men Down Under is proven by the way it alters the melody it takes from Kookabura and the failure of anyone to recognize the borrowing for 29 years. It is also because that being able to “quote” works that have resonance and meaning in our culture is fundamental to artistic creation. Kookabura is fundamental to Men Down Under as a song because Men Down Under, from its title to its performers to its lyric to its video is about Australia, and the use of a musical phrase from Kookabura is as resonant a way to convey Australia as there is.

Instead of recognizing what Lewis Hyde calls the “Cultural Commons,” many people have the knee-jerk impulse people have to identify cultural creations as “property” and thereby equate them to real estate or cars or something. Beside the rather large fact that property rights are limited in all sorts of ways in order to advance social goals (you can’t have a pig farm in the middle of a suburb, you can’t paint your house fuschia in most places, and the government can take your property if it pays you a fair (and rather low) price for it, etc.), that knee-jerk reaction entirely ignores how cultural creations draw (and must draw) on existing cultural creations, and how those creations then achieve meaning in the social sphere and are used to convey meaning in the social sphere. Copyright exists to feed, not hinder, creation, and the sooner we under what creativity really involves the more creative a culture we’ll have.

You be the judge: are Men at Work plagiarists or composers?

Archers Daniel Midland abuses copyright law to censor criticism — corporations have the right to free speech, but not the people who criticize them?

Some corporations apparently believe in free speech for themselves but not for individuals. The first video below is a deadly dull piece of propagandistic pap in which Patricia A. Woertz, Chairman, President and CEO of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), USA drones on (someone get her better training for dealing with the media!) about ADM’s profound importance to feeding the world. The piece was produced in advance of the recent Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

ADM has, top it mildly, been the subject of considerable ire, criticism, and even criminal prosecution for price fixing (the subject of Matt Damon’s recent film The Informant and Fair Fight in the Marketplace, an excerpt of which appears below’s Woertz’s blathering), political corruption, destruction of the rainforests, and the forced labor of children.

A couple of days ago I posted on my Facebook page what I thought was a hilarious edit of the Woertz video in which some of her original words were retained and many were dubbed over to make it appear as if she were speaking openly on behalf of an evil multinational bent on the gross and horrific exploitation of the world and especially of multinational food markets. I thought it was hilarious piece of political critique. No one could have mistaken it as an “official” ADM production, but plainly it hit a nerve at ADM.

Today I noticed that when I click on the video on my Facebook profile a message appears that it is “no longer available due to a copyright claim by Archers Daniel Midland Company” and that if I click through to YouTube there’s no page for the video at all, not even a page with the same empty video box and takedown message.

This is outright copyright abuse. Criticism is fair use. When anyone asks whether in fact fair use is grounded in the Constitution’s guarantee of free speech, all you need is to think of a situation like this — one can appropriate copyrighted works to criticize and parody the copyright holder. And to use the copyright laws to silence that critique has nothing to do with protecting intellectual property and the rights of a creator to profit from his, her, or its creation: it’s unconstitutional censorship! (Peter Bouchard wrote a good summary yesterday on ” The Battle against Bogus Takedowns, a topic I’ve touched on in the past.”

Cukoo Kookaburra copyright claim

In 1980, Men at Work released Down Under, and in 1981 it was a #1 song in Australia, Britain, and the U.S. In 2007, 26 years later, a game show contestant identified Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree as the nursery rhyme the song’s riff was based on. The contestant needed prompting. It’s no surprise he had trouble thinking about where the tune had come from. As the Sydney Morning Herald reports, “[t]he key, harmony, structure and rhythm of Down Under’s famous riff changed the sound of it so much that nobody – not the band, [the managing director of the company that owned the copyright to Kookaburra], or even five out of six [of the game show] panellists . . . noticed it until someone turned it into a quiz show question.”

But that didn’t stop the copyright holder from suing Men at Work, despite the fact it had bought the rights to Kookaburra in the 1980s “when it bought them for $6100 from the family of its late composer, Toorak School teacher Marion Sinclair.” In fact, one of its managing director’s jobs was to track down unauthorized uses — it’s a wonder he hasn’t yet gotten to the school chorus version below.

The mere fact the use went unnoticed for so long is itself, I think, evidence that its use in Down Under is fair use. If something is so transformed that it isn’t noticed even in a #1 hit, it must be transformative, right? I think Shepard Fairey’s Obama Hope poster is fair use for a similar reason — the photographer himself didn’t realize the poster was based on his own photograph. Copyright claims like the one against Men at Work pervert the very basis of so much we call creative. As the Morning Herald states, “The reuse of riffs is as old as rock’n'roll. And it’s a good thing, according to Martin Armiger, former member of the Sports and composer of music for The Secret Life of Us and Young Einstein. The 1955 hit Louie Louie by Richard Berry became the template for hundreds of songs including the Troggs’ Wild Thing and the Beatles’ Twist and Shout, he pointed out in his expert evidence for Men at Work and EMI.”

Or, as the KLF puts it, “Every Number One song ever written is only made up from bits from other songs.”

Girl Talk on Remix Culture

Gregg Gillis, a/k/a Girl Talk, spoke with fans online via the Globe and Mail on his work:

I believe in what I’m doing, so at this point, the fact that there has been no problems feels great.   Some of those national publications like to write stories and make it seem like me or Illegal Art are a bunch of idiots, like we just don’t give a fuck and that’s why we’re releasing the music.   Completely ignoring the whole idea of Fair Use. It’s definitely not under the radar any more.   That was the point I was trying to make. But times are changing. The way the general public views intellectual property in 2009 is much different than in 1999. Look around the internet.   So much content comes from pre-existing media. We’re used to it now. Christian Bale goes crazy on the set of T4.   That turns into a techno song, which then turns into a cartoon on YouTube, which will then turn into a T-shirt. Everyone is constantly exchanging ideas and building upon previously existing material.  So the idea of a remix being a real artform is being validated in our culture every day.

Lessig’s Conversation of Remix – fair use? Warner Music doesn’t think so.

Lawrence Lessig’s lecture on remix culture, posted to YouTube, was the subject of a DMCA takedown notice by Warner Music. As Lessig explains, “Apparently, YouTube’s content-ID algorithm had found music in the video that they claimed ownership to.” The uploader’s protest to the takedown notice was apparently successful, which reinstates the video while Google reviews the legitimacy of the fair use claim against Warner Music’s copyright infringement claim.  Lessig’s blog post, along with the entirety of his lecture, is here.  Below is the segement that was blocked and is, for now, restored:

Here’s more on DJ Danger Mouse’s Grey Album. And more on Girl Talk here, here, and here.

Wikipedia should know better/Addendum: it does, and the problem is solved, though Wikipedia really didn’t have to be quite so heavy-handed.

Determining whether the use of someone else’s trademark is a non-infringing fair use does not involve an analysis identical to determining whether the use of someone’s copyrighted work is a fair use, but there are significant similarities.  One is that the absence of any exploitation of the commercial value of the intellectual property is a significant reason to find that use of the trademark is not infringing.  Another is that the property interest one has in the intellectual property has to be balanced against the constitutional right to free speech. Thus, owning a trademark no more gives you total control over use of the trademark than owning a copyright gives you total control over the copyrighted work.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation therefore is disturbed that Wikipedia, whom the EFF has represented, is trying to stop a group of artists from using the name “wikipediaart.org” as the domain for a site that documents  a Wikepedia article they had established last year.  The article “was intended to comment on the nature of art and Wikipedia. But Wikipedia editors did not take kindly to the project, and it was shut down within fifteen hours for being insufficiently ‘encyclopaedic.’”

But since the site is non-commercial and is a critical commentary on Wikipedia, Wikipedia has no right to shut it down.  The artists are not attracting paying customers who stumble upon the site because they are looking for Wikipedia.  And you can’t shut someone down just because they are criticizing you.  As the EFF cogently sums up the issues:

Wikipedia should know better. There is no trademark or cybersquatting issue here. First, the site is entirely noncommercial, which puts it beyond the reach of U.S. trademark law. . . . Moreover, even if U.S. trademark laws somehow reached this noncommercial activity, the artists’ use of the mark is an obvious fair use. Wikipedia Art uses the “Wikipedia” mark to refer to the project: a critical comment on Wikipedia and creativity. The disputed site describes the project, provides links to media coverage of the project, and so on. It does not use any more of the Wikipedia mark than need be; for example, it doesn’t even use the Wikipedia logo. Simply put, the site does not purport to be, nor does it look anything like, Wikipedia and the artists have done nothing to suggest Wikipedia endorses their work. Finally, the creators are engaging in precisely the kind of critical speech sheltered by the First Amendment.

ADDENDUM: asdfghjk in the comments states that the “EFF’s description of events is somewhat incomplete at best,” and points to a post by Mike Godwin, General Counsel of Wikimedia Foundation, that explains that Wikipedia’s only concern was that wikipediaart.org would be mistaken by visitors as a site affiliated with Wikipedia and that, once the creators of wikipediaart.org have posted the prominent disclaimer now visible on the site, Wikipedia considered the matter resolved, and amicably so. I’m glad to hear it.  It’s dispute resolution, folks, and when people get upset and have disputes all you need to do is resolve them.  It’s just not so easy all the time.  Here’s to wikipediaart.org for responding with the disclaimer and to Wikipedia for backing off once its legitimate concern had been addressed. And thank you, asdfghjk, whoever you are and wherever you may be. But I’ll take exception to one point you made — I do not believe the EFF was “played” by a bunch of performance artists.  Even without the disclaimer, their non-affiliation with Wikipedia seemed clear.  And it does not seem far-fetched for EFF (or me) to have mistaken the meaning of communications, in which, Mr. Godwin now claims,  “no litigation [against wikepediaart.org] was threatened or commenced.”  On April 9, Doug Isenberg, a lawyer for Wikimedia, wrote Wikipedia Art a letter that sure sounds like it threatened litigation:

Wikimedia appreciates your offer to “explore an amicable resolution to this matter.” Accordingly, I think it would be helpful to draw your attention to a recent domain name dispute between Wikimedia and the registrant of the domain name <visualwikipedia.com>. The registrant of that domain name was using it in connection with a website that described itself as “a visual, intuitive, and interactive web interface to encyclopedic knowledge/information.” The registrant of that domain name refused to cooperate with Wikimedia, after which Wikimedia filed a complaint pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (”UDRP”), resulting in a published decision ordering the domain name transferred to Wikimedia. See WIPO Case No. D2009-0139, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2009/d2009-0139.html. . .

In light of the above, Wikimedia suggests that Mr. Kildall select a domain name that does not include any of Wikimedia’s trademarks and that Mr. Kildall transfer the <wikipediaart.org> domain name to Wikimedia. Doing so would allow Mr. Kildall to continue to freely express himself without raising the same concerns that Wikimedia has asked me to investigate. If Mr. Kildall is willing to do so, please let me know by April 16, 2009.

But all is well that ends well.  The disclaimer removes any possible claim of visitors to wikipediaart.org would believe the site is affiliated with Wikipedia, and Wikipedia Art, despite Mr. Isenberg’s “suggestion,” keeps its domain name. Perhaps next time Mr. Godwin should not delegate to outside lawyers the writing of letters he does not intend to contain threats of litigation.

Is republication of Mark Cuban’s tweet on Twitter non-infringing? Almost certainly it is.

Mark Cuban asks:

Here is a question for all you legal scholars out there. Is a tweet copyrightable? Is a tweet copyrighted by default when its published ? Can there possibly be a fair use exception for something that is only 140 characters or less ?

Well, sure, a “tweet” might be protected by copyright. The more creative it is, the more powerful is the protection. Cuban wouldn’t be wondering whether a 140 character poem by William Carlos Williams could be protected by copyright.

The question would only come up, though, if the author of the tweet was claiming someone had infringed his copyright. If Cuban, for example, claimed ESPN were infringing the copyright in his tweet, I strongly suspect the use would be a non-infringing fair use. Nevertheless, my ultimate conclusion would require consideration of the specific message Cuban is talking about and application of the specific facts in dispute under the appicable analysis:

(1) What is the nature and character of the allegedly infringing use? The more creative it is in its own right or the more it is an instance of the type of expression protected by the First Amendment (journalism or political speech, for example), the more likely it is to be a non-infringing fair use. The fact ESPN, an outlet for sports journalism, would be transmitting the words of Mark Cuban, the owner of a sports franchise (the Dallas Mavericks of the NBA), makes it seem more likely ESPN is engaged in legitimate journalism . . . , but

(2) What is the nature of the copyrighted work? The more creative or journalistic or political the expression, the less likely use of it without permission will be fair use. And the fact the work is available anyway would cut in favor of ESPN’s use of it being a fair use. This factor is almost impossible to determine based on Cuban’s hypothetical question. There can be 140 words that are as creative and expressive as anything can be (think Shakespeare or William Carlos Williams), or the 140 words might be utterly an utterly generic report about facts Cuban is passing on, or the 140 words might be mostly lifted from someone else. So which way and how hard this factor would cut on this hypothetical is without examining the specific words difficult to tell. It is, nonetheless, difficult to believe much creativity would be produced by Mark Cuban in a tweet. Moreover, the fact Cuban has already transmitted it via Twitter to everyone that follows him indicates that he doesn’t have that strong an interest in controlling the use of the words.

(3) How much of the copyrighted work is taken? Assuming ESPN takes the entire 140 characters, I suppose this factor cuts against ESPN’s claim of fair use, but, of course, the brevity of the entirety (under factor 2) cuts in favor of fair use, so in the abstract the two factors nullify one another. This is one reason hypothetical questions are useful, but only of limited use, in answering legal questions. One can only take abstract hypotheticals so far. 140 characters written by Shakespeare in a play are probably very different than 140 characters written by Mark Cuban in a tweet, but they might not be.

(4) How much does the allegedly infringing work affect the market for the copyrighted work? Is there a market for Mark Cuban’s tweets? It’s hard to believe there might be.

In short, I’d advise Cuban to be very light-hearted and laid back about ESPN republishing his tweets. If he really thinks he’s got something so worthwhile he should have the exclusive right to its commercial value, he shouldn’t have put it out on Twitter in the first place.

Is Michael Murphy another Shepard Fairey?

Do you think that if we ever discover the photo from which Michael Murphy derived the image for this “shadow portrait” of Obama in urethane Murphy will be accused of copyright infringement?  I do, but I don’t think it’s infringement.

Shepard Fairey, lightning rod

I’ve pointed out both that I believe strongly that Shepard Fairey’s use of an AP photograph to create his Obama Hope poster does not infringe the pohotograph’s copyright and that Fairey has been the target of frequent criticism in the art community regarding his “originality” and regarding his apparent hypocrisy in asserting infringement claims against artists who had appropriated his images.

It has come to my attention that some criticize the Fair Use Project’s decision to take up Fairey’s cause in the case of the Obama Hope poster and think Fairey should be taken down because of his apparent hypocrisy.

As a lawyer, I strongly disagree with this position.  If, as I zealously believe, the Obama Hope poster is fair use, it would be self-defeating to those of us who support the explicit application of the fair use doctrine to transformative appropriation art and various other methods of “remixing” pre-existing works, regardless of our view of Fairey himself,  if we failed to support Fairey’s position in connection with the Obama Hope poster.

I cannot help but recall last year’s lawsuit brought by Yoko Ono, Sean Ono, and Julian Lennon seeking to require the makers of the documentary “Expelled” from using a 15 second excerpt of John Lennon’s song “Imagine” in their documentary.  As I wrote at the time, I believed the lawsuit was misbegotten and that the film’s use of the excerpt constituted fair use despite my love of John Lennon and my contempt for the film, which purports that “theorists” of “Intelligent Design” have unjustifiably been expelled from the conversation regarding evolution and the development of life.  The court hearing the case agreed with my position and dismissed the case. Not coincidentally, the Fair Use Project represented the producers of “Expelled” in that case.

Fair use is fair use, and if we believe in it we should support it wherever it exists, even if we despise the people asserting fair use.  I supported the right of Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois, a community full of Holocaust survivors, because I believe that the right to demonstrate in public is protected by the First Amendment regardless of how vile the message being conveyed may be.  The Supreme Court agreed.

That doesn’t mean we can’t criticize Fairey when he seems to want his cake and eat it too.  (Though it may be that Fairey’s thoughts have evolved on these issues — while he sent a cease-and-desist letter to Baxter Orr for Orr’s appropriation of one of Fairey’s images, Fairey never followed that letter up with any other action despite Orr’s continued use of the image.)

You may not like Fairey.  But that does not mean we shouldn’t support his position when he happens to be right.  To fail to do so would be to cut off our noses to spite our faces.

U.S. Journalism is nothing but he says, she says

What has happened to journalism in this country?  All journalists do is quote one side of an issue and then quote the other side.  Rarely do they engage in meaningful analysis, and when it comes to legal matters they’re often just plain wrong.  In this Wall Street Journal article, the reporter quotes one law professor who says that Shepard Fairey has nothing to fear in his lawsuit against AP in connection with Fairey’s Obama Hope poster, while a lawyer thinks AP will prevail.

I’ve said before: I don’t even think it’s a close case.  Fairey will win. You can call me on it if it turns out I’m wrong.

Collage is art, not theft.

From Negativeland, whom I’ve previously mentioned as a precursor to Girl Talk:

[F]rom an artistic point of view, it is ponderously delusional to try to paint all these new forms of fragmentary sampling as economically motivated “theft”, “piracy”, or “bootlegging”. We reserve these terms for the unauthorized taking of whole works and reselling them for one’s own profit. Artists who routinely appropriate, on the other hand, are not attempting to profit from the marketability of their subjects at all. They are using elements, fragments, or pieces of someone else’s created artifact in the creation of a new one for artistic reasons. These elements may remain identifiable, or they may be transformed to varying degrees as they are incorporated into the new creation, where there may be many other fragments all in a new context, forming a new “whole”. This becomes a new “original”, neither reminiscent of nor competitive with any of the many “originals” it may draw from. This is also a brief description of collage techniques which have developed throughout this century, and which are universally celebrated as artistically valid, socially aware, and conceptually stimulating to all, it seems, except perhaps those who are “borrowed” from.

No one much cared about the centuries old tradition of appropriation in classical music as long as it could only be heard when it was played live in front of your ears. But now all music exists as a mass produced, saleable object, electronically frozen for all time, and seen by its owners to be in continuous, simultaneous economic competition with all other music. The previously interesting idea that someone’s music might freely include some appropriated music of another has now been made into a criminal activity. This example is typical of how copyright laws now actually serve to inhibit or prevent the creative process, itself, from proceeding in certain interesting ways, both traditional and new.

This has become a pressing problem for creativity now because the creative technique of appropriation has jumped from the mediums in which it first appeared (principally in the visual fine arts of painting, printmaking, and sculpture) to popular, electronic mass distributed mediums such as photography, recorded music, and multimedia. The appearance of appropriation techniques in these more recent mass mediums have occasioned a huge increase in owner litigations of such appropriation based works because the commercial entrepenours who now own and operate mass culture are apparently intent on oblitering all distinctions between the needs of art and the needs of commerce. These owners of mass produced cultural material claim that similarly mass produced works of appropriation are a new and devastating threat to their total control over the exclusive profits which their properties might produce in the same mass marketplace. They claim that, art or not, an unauthorized appropriation of any kind can not be allowed to directly compete in the appropriated material’s avenue of commerce, as if they were equal in content, and equal in intent. The degree to which the unique nature and needs of art practice do not play any part in this thinking is more than slightly insane.

Consider the starkly stupid proposition that collage has now become illegal in music unless the artist can afford to pay for each and every fragment he or she might want to use, as well as gain permission from each and every owner. Consider how this puts a stop to all independent, non-corporate forms of collage in music, and how those corporately funded collage works which can afford the tolls had better be flattering to the owner in their usage. . . .

Please consider the ungenerous and uncreative logic we are overlaying our culture with. Artists will always be interested in sampling from existing cultural icons and artifacts precisely because of how they express and symbolize something potently recognizable about the culture from which both they and this new work spring. The owners of such artifacts and icons are seldom happy to see their properties in unauthorized contexts which may be antithetical to the way they are spinning them. Their kneejerk use of copyright restrictions to crush this kind of work now amounts to corporate censorship of unwanted independent work.

Now Shepard Fairey sues AP

The AP/Shepard  Fairey showdown continues.  The New York Times reports:

In a pre-emptive strike, the street artist Shepard Fairey filed a lawsuit on Monday against The Associated Press, asking a federal judge to declare that he is protected from copyright infringement claims in his use of a news photograph as the basis for a now ubiquitous campaign poster image of President Obama. . . .

Mr. Fairey’s lawyers, including Anthony T. Falzone, the executive director of the Fair Use Project and a law lecturer at Stanford University, contend in the suit that Mr. Fairey used the photograph only as a reference and transformed it into a “stunning, abstracted and idealized visual image that created powerful new meaning and conveys a radically different message” from that of the shot Mr. Garcia [the photographer] took.

Further complicating the matter is the fact that “Mr. Garcia contends that he, not the Associated Press, owns the copyright for the photo.” Mr. Garcia also states, “‘If you put all the legal stuff away, I’m so proud of the photograph and that Fairey did what he did artistically with it, and the effect it’s had.’”

Mr. Garcia might want to put the “legal stuff away,” but,  as I’ve written,  “the legal stuff” is precisely what Mr. Garcia is talking about when he talks about what  Mr. Fairey did artistically  with the photo and that the effect his artistic transformation of the photo had.  That Fairey so transformed the photo into something that changed the stencil of a generic wire service campaign photo into an iconic image is a huge part of why legally what he did is perfectly legitimate. So, while Mr. Garcia might “not condone people taking things, just because they can, off the Internet,” what Mr. Garcia condones or does not condone is really what is not the “legal stuff.”

One artist’s take on issues related to Shepard Fairey

When does appropriation serve creativity? Quite often, in fact.

A commenter to yesterday’s post on Shepard Fairey’s Obama poster has suggested that I don’t believe in copyright because I believe that, even though Fairey created his image by initially tracing a copyrighted photo, the changes he made to the image and its re-contextualization within the campaign poster might well be sufficiently transformative to make his work non-infringing fair use.  In fact, I’d go so far as to say I genuinely believe Fairey’s image is a creative work in its own right even though it derives from another work.

In that regard, it’s worth noting that Henry McKervey and Declan Long, in “Makers and Takers: Art and the Appropriation of Ideas, write::

[I]t is the expression of an idea which is subject to legal protection. While perhaps this has meant that an artist such as Gillian Wearing can be faced with difficulties over the unattributed re-application of her work, the law also could be said to give artists a relative amount of freedom to take and re-use material in any number of subtly different ways without the spectre of plagiarism remaining ever-present. In a work such as Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho, for instance, there is in one sense very little of the artist’s ‘own’ work (Hitchcock’s classic thriller being merely re-played at a radically slowed-down pace) yet Gordon’s intervention makes for a powerful, transformative artistic statement. The question of “knowing originality when you see it” is almost beside the point in cases such as this: artists’ strategies of appropriation prompt questions of originality to become thematically intriguing on, one level, while also being critically irrelevant and, on occasion, inappropriate, on another.

Believing that genuinely transformative appropriation is legitimate does not imply I do not believe in copyright.  It means, rather, that I believe that copyright should serve the only purpose it constitutionally is meant to serve: increased invention and creativity.

And did anyone notice that the John Williams composition played at the inauguration, “Air and Simple Gifts,” borrowed heavily from Aaron Copland’s Appalachian Spring, which itself appropriated a Shaker hymn?

Copying or transforming?

Brian Sherwin of myartspace>blog is very upset with Shepard Fairey for creating the Obama poster (pictured on the left) because Fairey produced his image by, first, stenciling the original photograph pictured on the right. Fairey never attributed the image to the photographer and, of course, never compensated him. I don’t share Sherwin’s umbrage. The photo on the right is a generic image that is indistinguishable from photos seen constantly the world over these last several months. The image on the left became a resonant symbol. The photo could not begin to be considered a substitute for the poster. I think the poster is in fact “transformative” of the photo.

The e-book will open a new front in an ongoing legal revolution.

The New York Times reports today that “[f]or a decade, consumers mostly ignored electronic book devices, which were often hard to use and offered few popular items to read. But this year, in part because of the popularity of Amazon.com’s wireless Kindle device, the e-book has started to take hold.”

An e-book that works well is a dream of mine.  At any given moment, I literally am reading 25 different books.  Whenever I travel, one of my toughest choices is which 2 or 3 I’ll bring with me.  Not only are my infinitely wide, but my moods change constantly.

But as the e-book takes hold, expect a new wave in the copyright wars.  With more and more books being published in electronic form, they’ll be as easy to copy and disseminate as music is now.  So illegal copying and distribution will be inevitable.

In addition, the cutting and pasting of portions of books will create a whole new set of questions regarding fair use.  We will witness the resurrection of the commonplace book:

“Commonplacing is the practice of entering literary excerpts and personal comments into a private journal, that is, into a commonplace book or, to use a 17th century synonym, a silva rerum (”a forest of things”).  Typically the excerpts were regarded as exceptionally insightful or beautiful or as applicable to a variety of situations, and so as such they are often especially quotable. . . . The practice of commonplacing can be traced back in the European tradition to the 5th Century B.C.E. and the Sophist Protagoras.

Historically commonplacing has played an important role in education, and it has served as a vital tool of erudition.

“Boys … had to keep notebooks or commonplace books in which to record, and then learn, idioms, quotations, or figures useful in composition or declamation. Not a little of that wide learning and impressive range of quotation adorning Elizabethan literature comes from these commonplace books.” Schools in Tudor England, by Craig R. Thompson (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1958): p. 16, cf. 44.

“Students with literary tastes, in days when books were hard to come by, kept ‘commonplace’ or notebooks into which they copied out verses or prose extracts that particularly appealed to them.” The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England, by Samuel Eliot Morison (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965; reprint of the 2nd ed., 1956): p. 49.

–Norman Elliott Anderson, Commonplacing in the Spiritual Traditions

Will a professor’s commonplace book require permission for the reprinting of every excerpt?  There inevitably will be questions about when the excerpts are too long, though I would imagine a collection of excerpts that are small enough and together comprise a wholly new work (a literary collage) should be considered transformative enough to constitute fair use.  Inevitably, though, there will be lawsuits arising in particular situations.

Charges of plagiarism, no doubt, will also increase.  I strongly suspect that some of the recent incidents of plagiarism involving respected writers were the results of the inevitable errors that creep into works that require an enormous amount of research.  A quotation taken during research from one work is mistaken at the writing stage as a paraphrase and ends up verbatim in the finished product.  Someone spots the quotation (a process that will be even easier when the texts themselves are all electronic), and, voilà, charges of plagiarism fly through the blogosphere and plague the historian for the rest of her career.

These legal problems are inevitable.  I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again.  Law is a product of the material circumstances in which it arises, not an abstract set of truths brought down and imposed on reality.  When the material circumstances change, the law will have to change.  We are living through the most profound change in the availability of information since Gutenberg.  The law will change, and it will be a very interesting ride.

Has the Copy-Left lost its white knight?

Google has been a very interesting company to anyone concerned with copyright law.  Google has taken on lawsuits raising issues others don’t have the resources to fight over, and Google has been very effective in making good arguments in those cases.  Fred von Lohman now wonders if those days are gone:

Late last month, Google announced a settlement in its lawsuit with book publishers and authors over its Google Book Search offering. . . .

The Book Search case is just one of a series of high-stakes lawsuits that Google has taken up in the name of the disruptive innovation that fuels the Internet economy. . . .

Google, assisted by its expensive, top-drawer legal team, has a track record of winning these precedent-setting Internet cases. And by winning, Google sets a precedent that other innovators can rely on, as well. In essence, Google’s legal investments have paid dividends for the entire Internet innovation economy.

Until now. By settling rather than taking the case all the way (many copyright experts thought Google had a good chance of winning), Google has solved its own copyright problem – but not anyone else’s. Without a legal precedent about the copyright status of book scanning, future innovators are left to defend their own copyright lawsuits. In essence, Google has left its former copyright adversaries to maul any competitors that want to follow its lead.

I dont know how to tell you all just how crazy this life feels

From MSNBC:

John McCain may have lost the presidential election to Barack Obama, but his campaign seems absolutely determined not to lose to Jackson Browne. The singer/songwriter sued McCain in August after the Republican candidate for the highest office in the land used his song, “Running on Empty,” in a campaign commercial that targeted Obama’s energy plan. . . .

McCain, of course, is arguing that his use of the song was fair use, not copyright infringement (hyperlinks added):

The campaign’s fair use reading is based on the application of the standard four-factor test that includes the purpose and character of the use of the song (McCain argues it was non-commercial and transformative); the nature of the work (McCain derides the song as old, old, old, with a title that’s an acknowledged cliche); the amount and substantiality of the use of the song (McCain only used the title phrase, and cites a recent judgment against Yoko Ono, who had sought to prevent the unauthorized use of John Lennon’s “Imagine” in a film); and the effect of the use of the song (McCain says that rather than damage the song’s commercial potential, his use “will likely increase the popularity of this thirty year-old song”).

In some ways, the case is reminiscent of Master Card v. Nader 2000 Campaign Committee, in which the court dismissed Mastercard’s lawsuit against Ralph Nader’s 2000 Presidential Campaign Committee. Mastercard’s lawsuit alleged, among other things, that a Nader campaign add that borrowed heavily from Mastercard’s “priceless moments” television ads infringed on Mastercard’s copyright in those ads. The court concluded:

The Nader Ad does add something new and qualifies as a “transformative” work. Whether it “comments” on the original is the issue in question. MasterCard’s message depicted in its Priceless Advertisements is very plain and straightforward. In a series of advertisements, MasterCard presents various intangible moments that are highly valuable, yet unable to be “purchased” or are “priceless.” Hence, “there are some things that money can’t buy.”

This idea is followed by the message, that the viewer-consumer can purchase everything else with their MasterCard credit card–”for everything else, there’s MasterCard.” Ralph Nader’s Political Ad attempts to show various ways different Presidential candidates can be bought in the “big-money arena of Presidential politics” and contrasts the “priceless” truth represented by Ralph Nader as the remedy for the bought and paid for positions of others. Through this depiction, Ralph Nader argues that he not only sends across his own message, but that he wittingly comments on the craft of the original, “which cloaks its materialistic message in warm, sugar-coated imagery that purports to elevate intangible values over the monetary values it in fact hawks.” This commentary “may reasonably be perceived.” The message need not be popular nor agreed with. It may be subtle rather than obvious. It need only be reasonably perceived. Ralph Nader’s Political Ad is sufficiently a parody for the purposes of a fair use analysis, and consequently, is transformative.

William Patry, Google’s Senior Copyright Counsel, opines on typically futile efforts to use copyright to quell political speech here. There is a long history of this type of thing, as I’ve mentioned here and as you can see in the videos below, none of which was successfully blocked by the owners of the copyrighted works being used:

Is Google no longer the Copy-Left’s white knight?

Google has been a very interesting company to anyone concerned with copyright law.  Google has taken on lawsuits raising issues others don’t have the resources to fight over, and Google has been very effective in making good arguments in those cases.  Fred von Lohman now wonders if those days are gone:

Late last month, Google announced a settlement in its lawsuit with book publishers and authors over its Google Book Search offering. . . .

The Book Search case is just one of a series of high-stakes lawsuits that Google has taken up in the name of the disruptive innovation that fuels the Internet economy. . . .

Google, assisted by its expensive, top-drawer legal team, has a track record of winning these precedent-setting Internet cases. And by winning, Google sets a precedent that other innovators can rely on, as well. In essence, Google’s legal investments have paid dividends for the entire Internet innovation economy.

Until now. By settling rather than taking the case all the way (many copyright experts thought Google had a good chance of winning), Google has solved its own copyright problem – but not anyone else’s. Without a legal precedent about the copyright status of book scanning, future innovators are left to defend their own copyright lawsuits. In essence, Google has left its former copyright adversaries to maul any competitors that want to follow its lead.

How can something new come entirely from old things?

I’ve written before (here and elsewhere) about Girl Talk, the name under which Greg Gillis records and performs his aural collages, made up of hundreds of samples of pop recordings re-worked by him through contemporary technology into what can only be considered new songs. Gillis continues to get attention as he makes his way on tour across the country, this week in Tuscon and Dallas. As I have previously pointed out, on its face, Gillis’s work seems to run afoul of legal authority which holds that the use for commercial benefit of any recorded sample, no matter how brief, constitues copyright infringement. As the Tuscon Weekly points out, Gillis is a little tired of hearing about this:

Gillis says he’s tired of the media characterizing his music as a “lawsuit waiting to happen,” yet he admits: “There’s definitely a component there of seeming like an outlaw, and I think that appeals to some people.” Girl Talk’s appeal, perhaps, speaks to the preoccupations of a new generation raised online–and he may be just the sort of celebrity it fosters.

And indeed, Gillis samples such litigation-happy groups as Metallica. Nevertheless, I suspect Metallica will not sue Gillis. Why? Because lawyers no you don’t sue people who have the strongest case on the question of law you are concerned about. In other words, Gillis poses the greatest risk to the legitimacy of the cases ruling that any sample, no matter how brief, is an infringement. Metallica, thus, would rather sue someone who sampled their music in some ham-fisted way that plainly did exploit the value Metallica has created. Metallica would win the lawsuit against such a defendant.

Gillis, however, really does seem to have transformed his raw materials into something entirely new. (You can hear for yourself by downloading his album here, for any price (even zero — itself an interesting move in legal terms).)

In fact, whether a work is “transformative” is, exactly, what is determinative in deciding whether its appropriation of copyrighted work is fair use or infringement. No one is going to listen to a Girl Talk “song” that samples a Metallica song as a substitute for the Metallica song. The Girl Talk song is something entirely new, even if it is made up of things entirely old. This focus on the “transformative nature” of an appropriating work comes from one of those rare law review articles that actually have an impact on the real world, although in this case it was by a judge, Pierre Leval.