Losing $500 million was a legal win: outcomes and predictions from a lawyer’s point-of-view

In case you haven’t read it already, there’s a new study that purports to establish that lawyers consistently overestimate the chances of success in their cases (pdf). David Post of the Volokh Conspiracy takes the study and applies the typical academic condescension to practitioners: “I’m constantly amazed, given the obvious fact that half of all litigants are holding losing hands, at how easily most lawyers can persuade themselves of the rightness of their client’s cause.”

Jeff Gamso, a criminal defense attorney (and former English professor!) in Toledo, Ohio who writes a terrific blog, Gamso for the Defense, takes a much more nuanced approach to the study in his post, “Blessed are the Oddsmakers.” First, it’s important to note the difference between criminal defense and civil litigation. As Gamso reminds his readers, in his practice, “[m]ost trials result in guilty verdicts. But most cases aren’t tried; they’re resolved by pleas of one sort or another.” It reminds me of what a friend of mine, a public defender, once told my class in response to the question “what’s the hardest part of your job?” He answered, “Losing 95% of my cases.”

But Gamso reminds us that pleas, the criminal analog to a civil settlement, is a strategic move made with the best possible` estimation of likelihood of success at trial, an estimation by no means easy to make:

The idea of the plea is that it’s a compromise because trials are problematic. They’re a lot of work and they are, ultimately, uncertain. Anyone who’s been at this for a while can tell you that juries and judges sometimes surprise. We win (whatver that means) some cases we should lose. We lose (whatever that means) some cases we should win. The jury, the judge, the world sometimes just gets it wrong.

Accordingly, the decision to accept an offer from the other side is a complicated combination of prediction of an uncertain future, the ability to convey the relevant information to the client, the other side’s own predictions and resulting offer (if any), the client’s own inclinations and decision (it is his decision), and the adversary’s response to the client’s decision.

Perhaps most importantly, however, it’s fundamental to any effective legal representation to understand that lawsuits and prosecutions are not binary, win/loss situations. Overcoming binary thinking is, in fact, one of the most important and difficult tasks in teaching first year law students. It’s difficult enough to get students to understand that the outcome of a case is the only thing that matters to a client, but then also to get them to realize that the result is usually a whole lot more complicated matter than merely stating that the plaintiff or defendant won or lost. (And it’s a shame that Remedies is one of the most neglected courses in law schools these days.) Let’s get this straight: Exxon won the litigation which resulted in it paying over $500 million in punitive damages. Or, as Gamso so pungently puts it in connection with criminal defense:

[David] Dow tells of Van Orman, an innocent man on death row. He simply didn’t commit the crime. He’s also got mental retardation. Dow proves the retardation and gets him off the row. Now the innocent man will do life in prison. “But I’m a death-penalty lawyer and Van Orman won’t get executed, so I count it as a victory. One of my clients committed suicide a week before his execution. That’s a victory. Another died of AIDS. A victory.”

You bet. I had a client who died of hepatitis right after I filed the papers asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. He died before the state had a chance to reply, certainly before the Court ruled. That goes down as a win. That’s how it works when you’re doing death penalty defense. Whenever the government doesn’t murder your client, you’ve got a win.

All of which is a way of saying that in this business, winning often isn’t an all-or-nothing proposition. Confession suppressed? Win. Even if the drugs aren’t suppressed? Yep. Just not a complete win.

•Get some of the charges dismissed? Win. Even if the client’s found guilty of some things? Yep. Just not a complete win.

•Get a five year sentence? Win if the client might have gotten 8. Or 50.

•LWOP? Win if the alternative was death.

•Continuance? Hung jury? Wins. Even if they’re only temporary. (The old line is that a continuance is as good as an acquittal – it just doesn’t last as long.)

•Client goes home after a not guilty verdict? Big Win.

And on it goes.

The key isn’t that what counts as a win depends. The key is that you need to have a sense of things. (emphasis added)

Yes, the key is to have a sense of things. A win is getting the best outcome the circumstances permit you to get for a client. Do human beings tend to be overconfident in their predictions? Cognitive science establishes that does indeed seem to be the case, and as a lawyer you ought to be aware of it, and you ought to be aware that your adversary shares the same bias, and you ought to be aware of the risks associated with going to trial, and you ought to be aware of your client’s fears and desires and his ability to deal with risk and loss. You need to have a sense of an infinite number of things, and the better your sense of these things is and the better you are at communicating them to your client, the better you will be as a lawyer and the better the outcomes you will produce. Will you be able to tally those outcomes as wins and losses? Only if you have a very flexible understanding of what constitutes a win or a loss.

Our courts and legislatures are bought and paid for — the laws they’ve made with respect to oil spills prove it.

In March, I emphasized — not for the first time — the insanity of considering corporate and other business entities as rational actors of the sort many economists consider people to be. The problem is that corporate decisions are made by individuals and are therefore driven to benefit those individuals, not the corporations (and their shareholders).”

One reason corporations focus on short-term profits is that the individuals making the decisions for a company will often take the cash made in the short term out of the company (by paying special dividends, for example) and then sell there stock, evading the long-term loss. Even if they hold onto their stock, they may have taken so much cash out of the company before the stock crashes in value that they’ve profited mightily from their holdings regardless of the company’s failures.

But still another reason is the idiocy of the regulation that is in place, regulation that instead of imposing responsibility on the companies for problems they cause limits that responsibility.

10 days ago David Leonhardt wrote about the  perversity of the federal limitations on corporate liability for oil spills and how they made BP’s oil spill, in retrospect, no great surprise:

In a little-noticed provision in a 1990 law passed after the Exxon Valdez spill, Congress capped a spiller’s liability over and above cleanup costs at $75 million for a rig spill. Even if the economic damages — to tourism, fishing and the like — stretch into the billions, the responsible party is on the hook for only $75 million. (In this instance, BP has agreed to waive the cap for claims it deems legitimate.) Michael Greenstone, an M.I.T. economist who runs the Hamilton Project in Washington, says the law fundamentally distorts a company’s decision making. Without the cap, executives would have to weigh the possible revenue from a well against the cost of drilling there and the risk of damage. With the cap, they can largely ignore the potential damage beyond cleanup costs. So they end up drilling wells even in places where the damage can be horrific, like close to a shoreline. To put it another way, human frailty helped BP’s executives underestimate the chance of a low-probability, high-cost event. Federal law helped them underestimate the costs.

We shouldn’t be surprised, then, at BP’s pathetic safety record and the retrospective inevitability of the Gulf spill:

Years before the Deepwater Horizon rig blew, BP was developing a reputation as an oil company that took safety risks to save money. An explosion at a Texas refinery killed 15 workers in 2005, and federal regulators and a panel led by James A. Baker III, the former secretary of state, said that cost cutting was partly to blame. The next year, a corroded pipeline in Alaska poured oil into Prudhoe Bay. None other than Joe Barton, a Republican congressman from Texas and a global-warming skeptic, upbraided BP managers for their “seeming indifference to safety and environmental issues.”

BP was only acting rationally!

Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has teamed with Congress in being an accessory to the corporate rape of the country. Even if compensatory damages are capped, conceivably courts can impose punitive damages in civil lawsuits to deter particularly egregious conduct. And, indeed, courts reacted precisely that way to the Exxon Valdez oil spill — that is, until the Supreme Court stepped in. In 1994, a jury imposed $5 billion in punitive damages on ExxonMobil for the Exxon Valdez  oil spill. 12 years later an appellate court reduced that amount to $2.5 billion, half the original amount.

2 years later, in a 5-3 vote (Sam Alito recused himself from the case because he owned Exxon stock), the Supreme Court reduced the amount to $507.5 million, about 10% of the jury’s award. The Court ruled that punitive damages (intended to punish bad behavior, not to compensate a plaintiff for his losses caused by that behavior) cannot be greater than compensatory damages (which compensate victims for their economic losses). As reported at the time, the reduced amount represented “about 12 hours of revenue for [Exxon], which reported record profits of $40.6 billion in February.” Justice Souter, writing for the Court, explained that “a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another. See The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897). Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (U.S. 2008)(hyperlink added).

Of course, one might argue pretty cogently that neither the Exxon Valdez spill nor the BP Gulf spill were conceivable in the minds of the people who made the decisions that resulted in disasters and that it is precisely that failure to conceive of, much less consider, those consequences that is what the courts should retain the power to punish.