Doing justice versus making rules.

There is a tension in the common law between doing justice in an individual lawsuit and articulating rules of general application that can guide decisions in future cases. The beauty of the common law system, however, is that the primary goal is to do justice in the individual case. Civil law, the system that governs in non-Anglo-American countries, on the other hand, relies on a civil code of general application that provides predictability but often at the cost of individual justice.

One consequence of the common law system is that a “rule” articulated by a court in one case to reach the proper result in that one case can often be modified in a subsequent case in which the facts differ in a way that would make it unjust to merely apply the earlier “rule.”

One of my problems with Supreme Court jurisprudence in recent years has been that it has lost sight of this principal purpose of common law judging: to do justice in the particular case before before the court. The justices seem often more concerned with formal, abstract consistency than justice, an emphasis that to this common law lawyer seems very misplaced.

No more blatant example of this distinction exists than the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Caperton v. Massey (pdf). Thankfully, by a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reached what plainly was the right result, but Justice Roberts’ dissent (joined by Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia) epitomizes the ways striving for abstract, intellectual consistency can do violence to what, plainly, is common sense justice.

Caperton began in West Virginia, where a jury found the A.T. Coal Co., Inc. liable for $50 million for fraudulent misrepresenta-tion, concealment, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations. Knowing the West Virginia Supreme Court would consider an appeal of the verdict, Don Blankenship, Massey’s chairman and principal officer, contributed $3 million to the campaign of Brent Benjamin, who was running for the state Supreme Court against an incumbent. The $3 million contributed by Blankenship exceeded the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and by Benjamin’s own committee. Benjamin won the election by fewer than 50,000 votes.

Subsequently, Caperton, who had won the $50 million verdict, moved 3 times to disqualify Benjamin from hearing the appeal of the verdict. Each time, Benjamin himself denied the motion. Benjamin also turned out to be the deciding vote that resulted in a reversal of the verdict against Massey’s company.

Apparently, as they say, money talks. There is, however, a constitutional right to “due process” under the Constitution, and, accordingly, Caperton appealed to the Supreme Court, which held, as anyone with any sense would hold, that Judge Benjamin could not be counted upon to be a fair and impartial judge of an appeal of a $50 million verdict against the man who got him elected. Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of the Court, concluded that the primary legal quesiton is whether “under a realistic appraisal of psy-chological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.”  Kennedy concluded: “There is a serious risk of actual bias when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significantand disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case byraising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when thecase was pending or imminent.”

Justice Roberts, jointed by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, on the other hand, ignored the egregious facts before the Court because requiring disqualification based on a “probability of bias,” is a standard that “cannot be defined in any limited way.” Thus, Roberts complains, “[t]he Court’s new ‘rule’ provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required.”

I think Roberts is full of it. Any law student knows that common law rules often turn on standards such as “reasonableness” and “probability.” What do we know based on Caperton? We know that deciding a case in favor of the man who has contributed more than 50% of the funds to get you elected to the bench is enough to establish a “probability of bias.” That hardly seems arguable. If it means we’ll get other cases arguing for a “probability of bias” under facts far less probabitive of such undue influence, the courts can deal with those cases by hearing the evidence and determining, using common sense and the guidance of precedents such as Caperton, whether there is or is not a probability of bias.

But Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito would prefer to let stand a travesty than to burden the courts with deciding exactly the kinds of questions the courts decide every day. That’s not doing justice, and it certainly isn’t common law justice. I’m not sure what it is.

How does legal innovation occur? Slowly, by looking to the laws of other countries, and by disguising innovation as interpretation.

In “Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation,” Professor John F. Duffy recognizes that change and evolution in law are taken for granted but rarely studied in depth: “Legal change is treated as if it is something that just happens-that follows inexorably from the emergence of social needs and changed social conditions.” Duffy’s article is an antidote to these truisms, studying in depth the development of the requirement that in order to be patentable an invention must be “non-obvious.”  Duffy identifies in the development of this major legal innovation several characteristics he believes could be generalized to a lot of legal innovation:

(1) “Nation-states do not seem to create new legal conceptions independently nearly as frequently as they borrow them from other nation-states.”

(2) “Nations with similar legal cultures and industrial capabilities, such as the United States and England, sometimes maintain significant differences in their law for periods of decades. The speed of convergence on a single ‘common’ law seems extraordinarily slow.” This deliberate pace seems to be the product of a wait and see attitude: “because [one country does] not know whether the innovation is a pathbreaking and salutary development, like obviousness, or a disastrous experiment that will eventually be discarded,” it will wait and see the results.

(3) Courts are wary of the criticism often directed at them for “making policy” rather than merely applying existing law. As Chief Justice John Roberts puts it, his role is merely to be an umpire, not to determine what is a ball and what is a strike. Of course, Roberts ignores the fact that a strike zone is rather well defined, whereas law is full of open-ended standards (the requirement of “due process,” for example), gaps that do not fit cases that courts must decide, and outright ambiguities. But, as Duffy points out, the attitude Roberts exemplifies forces courts to engage in innovation under the guise of mere intepretation: “even when courts are trying to change the law, they often deny that they are doing so by creating clever reconstructions of the language that previously defined the relevant doctrine.”