A lawyer must separate bluster from truth and act accordingly: Halsey Minor’s fall.

Being an effective lawyer requires an enormous amount of confidence in one’s own judgment. As I tell my students, when you’re a lawyer, there is always someone who is telling you you’re wrong. You have to figure out the extent to which the person telling you you’re wrong is right, adjust your position accordingly, and move on. Frequently, the person telling you you’re wrong is wrong himself. It’s not always easy to tell the difference between wrong and right. But the real signs of maturity are (1) being able to adjust your position to what’s right in someone else’s words, and (2) being able to reject disagreement you judge for yourself is without merit.

[One of my pet peeves with contemporary journalists is precisely there lack of nerve -- rather than making judgments and explaining them, most journalists merely "report" the words of people who disagree without judgment.]

An example of being told I was flat-out wrong occurred over a year and a half ago, when I wrote about Sotheby’s $16.8 million lawsuit against the art collector and Internet entrepreneur Halsey Minor for refusing to pay the auction house for three paintings he bought in May” (including The Peaceable Kingdom and the Leopard of Serenity by Edward Hicks). I explained that I didn’t see merit in Minor’s claims that Sotheby’s had been in the wrong in failing to disclose to Minor that it had a security interest in The Peacable Kingdom and that the painting’s owner had agreed Sotheby’s would receive the proceeds of the sale. Minor argued that he had relied on Sotheby’s expertise in connection with the painting, and that if he had known of Sotheby’s security interest in the painting he would not have been willing to pay so much. In short, he claimed, Sotheby’s had been supposed to be working on his behalf in giving him advice regarding the painting but in fact had been acting on its own behalf and to his detriment.

Minor agreed to buy the paintings in May 2008. We all know what happened subsequently — we all experienced financial disaster. As a result, the art market collapsed, and the paintings Minor had bought were worth significantly less than he had agreed to pay. Moreover, one could presume,Minor might have suffered severe financial problems in and after 2008. I suspected strongly that Minor either no longer had the money to buy the paintings or, at least, no longer saw them as worth owning at the price he had agreed to pay.

Minor, though, made plain in a comment to my post (as he had to other people who had written skeptically of his claims) that he thought I was wrong, concluding

Sotheby’s committed Fraud and will pay for it and its disappointing to see you allow them to get away with charging outrageous fees and then blaming lack on knowledge on the victim.

What do you say to someone so vehement when you think he’s full of it? You ignore him, and you let the evidence speak for itself. Which, apparently, is what Sotheby’s did. As Donn Zaretetsky of the Art Law Blog reported over 2 months ago, the federal judge who heard the case ruled on March 30 in favor of Sotheby’s on all counts, entering judgment in Sotheby’s favor for $4.4 million plus interest, late charges, and legal fees. (Decision embedded below.)

And now Zaretsky points out  too that my suspicions regarding Minor’s financial hardships are, apparently, well-founded. According to the New York Post:

Fallen Internet tycoon Halsey Minor is so hard up for cash that he can’t even afford to send Sotheby’s his art collection to make good on his $6.6 million debt to the famed auction house. Court papers filed yesterday say the CNet.com co-founder ‘has represented that he cannot pay shippers to transport his fine and decorative art as directed.

And Elizabeth Lesly Stevens of the Bay Citizen reports that Minor has defaulted on the rent for the offices of his corporate home, offices which he has abandoned:

Minor Ventures, Minor’s investment vehicle and corporate home in recent years, has recently cleared out of its 12th-floor, 17,000-square-foot space at 199 Fremont, in San Francisco’s trendy SoMa neighborhood. Minor left behind artwork, office equipment and cubicles, says Laura Binai, a staffer with the building’s management company.

“All their mail comes here, but no one comes to get it,” she said.

Minor Ventures is technically a subtenant of insurance giant Aon Corp., which is “hunting down Minor for rent,” Binai says. An Aon spokesman declined to comment, and efforts to reach Minor have been unsuccessful.

And a second part of Minor’s design collection is set to be sold on Wednesday by some of Minor’s creditors. And a court has allowed Sotheby’s “to register the $6.6 million judgment in the Western District of Virginia and the District of Delaware, where Minor has significant assets,” including “a $6.52 million mortgage for a farm near Charlottesville, Va., that he recently brought current after it was foreclosed upon.”

So what does it seem happened? Minor suffered severe financial losses in the second half of 2008 and his emphatic assertions of wrongdoing by Sotheby’s were just so much bluster.

Sothebys v. Minor Judgment

What is the best preparation for law school? I’d suggest it is a liberal arts education.

I am often asked what type of undergraduate education best prepares a student for law school. Most of my life I’ve been completely baffled by the question. It never occurred to me that my very Classical liberal arts education — I double majored in Ancient Greek and Latin — would be something to recommend, and while I have always been a huge supporter of liberal arts education, I never felt confident in recommending it as preparation for law school. But neither was I ever persuaded that my students who had thought long and hard about choosing the “right” major to prepare for law school — and ended up thereby majoring in political science, business, or economics — were any better prepared than those students who had not chosen an undergraduate major based on a desire to “prepare” for law school.

I was reminded of this question in reading Rebecca Mead’s commentary on the views of certain economists that an undergraduate degree is not an economically wise way of earning a living. As Mead explains, this conclusion is based in part on the fact that the greatest opportunities to earn money in the near future are in fields in which a college degree is not required:

Economics majors aren’t doing badly . . . : their starting salary averages about fifty thousand a year, rising to a mid-career median of a hundred and one thousand. Special note should be taken of the fact that if you have an economics degree you can, eventually, make a living proposing that other people shouldn’t bother going to college. This, at least, is the approach of Professor Richard K. Vedder, of Ohio University, who is the founder of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity. According to the Times, eight out of the ten job categories that will add the most employees during the next decade—including home-health aide, customer-service representative, and store clerk—can be performed by someone without a college degree. “Professor Vedder likes to ask why fifteen percent of mail carriers have bachelor’s degrees,” the paper reported.

In addition, “[a]nother economist, Professor Robert I. Lerman, of American University (Ph.D., M.I.T.), told the Times that high schools, rather than readying all students for college, should focus on the acquisition of skills appropriate to the workplace. According to the Times, these include the ability to ‘solve problems and make decisions,’ ‘resolve conflict and negotiate,’ ‘coöperate with others,’ and’listen actively.’”

These opinions awoke in me a gnawing feeling that has been building in me the past couple of years — the feeling that the best educational preparation for being a lawyer is a liberal arts education.

One particular moment in the last 2 years stands out form me in considering this question. I was reviewing an exam with a student and explaining a clever argument another student had come up with in connection with the interpretation of ambiguous contract language. The contract called for the supply of sweetener to the manufacturer of a soda being marketed to the types of buyers who would be interested in “healthier” alternatives to mass market sodas. The contract provided for the supply of “sugar,” and the dispute arose when the supplier substituted high fructose corn syrup for granulated sugar as the sweetener. The other students argument was based on the greater attractiveness of granulated sugar to the buyers the soda manufacturer was targeting to argue in favor of an interpretation that would limit “sugar” to granulated sugar even though high fructose corn syrup is also, chemically, a “sugar.”  The student with whom I was meeting thought about this point, realized the argument was a good one and one she herself had not come up with, but still felt my point was objectionable because the argument was grounded in facts about the world she didn’t know. So she told me, “You’re not testing us on Contracts. You’re testing us on what we know about the world!”

I smiled, and I explained: if you don’t know about the world, you can’t understand law. Law doesn’t supply answers that exist independent of the world it answers questions about. In contract interpretation, courts are asked to determine, based on the available evidence, what they believe people  intended contracts to mean. The “rules” that govern those interpretive acts don’t work like mathematical formulas — they constitute a structured way of approaching the question of what people intended, nothing more, and therefore don’t provide any way out of answering the question; what do you think the people entering this contract intended? While the rules might limit the scope of evidence that can be considered, within that scope anything that persuades the court about the intended meaning is fair game for the court to consider. So, in the question I was considering with my student, the attractiveness of granulated sugar to the  manufacturer’s target market was a very relevant consideration — if you could show that both the supplier and the manufacturer knew and understood the marketing strategy, you could argue persuasively that they both intended “sugar” in the contract to mean only “granulated sugar” and not to include high fructose corn syrup.

And so, more and more often I have found myself telling my students that in addition to studying law they should be learning everything they possibly can about everything. I hate to be that vague, but, at the same time, I am quite serious. Would a better education in “decision making” have helped BP decision makers planning for offshore oil drilling than an education grounded in Greek Tragedy? I don’t think so.

Why would a mail carrier consider an undergraduate education worthwhile even if the tuition is economically out of balance with his earnings as a mail carrier? I hate to say it — because I hate the thought it needs to be said — but the education might make him a happier person and the money he will earn is not the only measure of his happiness.

And what should you learn to prepare for law school? Anything and everything, but learn it well.

There is no shortcut to thoughtful decision making. It requires critical thinking and discussion, and PowerPoint not only doesn’t help, it hurts.

My points yesterday were about much more than PowerPoint and its inadequacy to convey information or analysis effectively. This isn’t the first time I’ve brought up Edward Tufte’s work, but many have pointed out to me what, in fact, had inspired yesterday’s post – The New York Times article 4 days ago discussing the diagram below, part of a PowerPoint presentation made last summer to Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the leader of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. As the article explained, McChrystal’s said, when he saw the slide: “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war.” The room “erupted in laughter.” The article also quotes Gen. James N. Mattis of the Marine Corps, the Joint Forces commander, saying last month that “PowerPoint makes us stupid,” which, of course, is a paraphrase of the headline of the 2003 article on Tufte and the Columbia space shuttle I discussedyesterday. More to the subjects my post yesterday was about, the article states: “Commanders say that behind all the PowerPoint jokes are serious concerns that the program stifles discussion, critical thinking and thoughtful decision-making.” The most obvious conclusion to draw from an examination of the slide below is one I made yesterday, quoting Tufte — to convey any effective analysis that the slide’s creator intended to convey would have required an extensive written document.

John Stewart last night got into the topic last night too:

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart	Mon – Thurs 11p / 10c
Afghanistan Stability Chart
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Melissa Harris Lacewell on Empathy, its importance to social cohesion, and more on its importance to good judging.

Wisdom from Melissa Harris Lacewell on the centrality of empathy in creating a United States:

[W]e are participants in a nation only to the extent that we imagine ourselves to be part of a community or a “people.” Empathy is an important part of what allows us to engage in that imagined sense of linked fate, shared identity, and common purpose. Without empathy we cannot enter into a social contract whereby we are willing to subjugate some of our selfish impulses in order to abide by the rule of law and the dictates of a civil society.  

As Laura E. Little points out in “Adjudication and Emotion,” 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal, 205, 210 ( 2002)  , “Empathy . . . may actually facilitate the process of understanding competing points of view so necesssary to quality adjudication. As Judge Richard Posner argues, empathy enables a judge to integrate into her decsionmaking remote human interests that are not immediately before the judge, but are possibly affectetd substantially by the judge’s decsions. Posner praises empathy for its cognitive character, suggesting that the emotion more likely reflects an evaluation of beliefs, rather than an ungrounded emotional reaction that short-circuits reasoning.” [Citing Richard Posner, “Emotions versus Emotionalism in Law,” The Passions of Law (Susan A. Bandes, ed. 1999).

Yes, Kevin, empathy is part of judging well, and Oliver Wendell Holmes thought so too.

Kevin O’Brien of the Plain Dealer expresses the view of many who mock President Obama’s desire that his Supreme Court nominee have “empathy”:

I have scoured my pocket copy of the Constitution. Couldn’t find a single reference to “empathy,” though. I tried searching an online version, too, but when I typed “empathy” in the search window, the only answer I got back was, “Did you misspell something?”

I looked up the oath of office that Souter’s successor will take. I don’t see “empathy” there, either, . . . 

O’Brien and his ilk have a stunted view of what it means to be a judge. Applying the law is not like doing algebra; instead, it is far more often (at least in cases so contested they get to the Supreme Court) a matter of making difficult judgments that involve weighing values and consequences in the real world. It hardly is ridiculous to consider “empathy” a valuable quality in making these judgments. One need not look far into the past to see a case where an inability to empathize with what Congress plainly intended led to a ridiculous (and soon overturned) outcome.

But you need not take my word for it.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Supreme Court justice and one of the most influential intellects in U.S. legal history, made clear in The Path of the Law that it is a fallacy to think judges can apply only logic to the law and that a keen sense of the social impact of one’s decisions is fundamental to sound judging (emphasis added):

The fallacy to which I refer is the notion that the only force at work in the development of the law is logic. . . . The danger of which I speak is not the admission that the principles governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct. . . .

This mode of thinking is entirely natural. The training of lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for the determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place. We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is self evident, no matter how ready we may be to accept it, not even Mr. Herbert Spencer’s “Every man has a right to do what he wills, provided he interferes not with a like right on the part of his neighbors.”

. . . There is a concealed, half conscious battle on the question of legislative policy, and if anyone thinks that it can be settled deductively, or once for all, I only can say that I think he is theoretically wrong, and that I am certain that his conclusion will not be accepted in practice semper ubique et ab omnibus [always, everywhere, and for everything]. . . .

I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said. . . . I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions.

Best bonds: AIG? Greatest Fascist Dictator: Adolf Hitler? Best Law School: ?????

What is it with the human thirst for numerical rankings, for judging one thing better than another even when the comparisons are known to be completely arbitrary or, at best, based on judgments so subjective regarding criteria so limited as to render the rankings nothing more than crude subjective judgments disguised as hard data?

Woody Allen fittingly complained:

What’s with all these awards? They’re always giving out awards. Best Fascist Dictator: Adolf Hitler.

But it’s not just the thirst for the rankings.  It’s basing one’s actions on rankings as if they have profound meaning despite their lack of meaning.

As I wrote recently, US News and World Report’s rankings of law schools are determined largely by the LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages of the students each law school admits even though those scores and averages bear no correlation to success as a lawyer; rather, they correlate only to success in law school, which, again, bears no meaningful correlation to success as a lawyer (as would not surprise most lawyers but, I would guess, would surprise most non-lawyers, including law students and law professors who have not practiced extensively).

Yet an overwhelming number of law applicants rely on the US News rankings.  Even more depressingly, an overwhelming number of law faculties make their educational decisions to improve those rankings, not to improve the way they educate law students to be lawyers. (As I also pointed out, Detroit Mercy, where I am currently a visiting professor and where I will continue in that capacity next year while remaining on leave from Case Western Reserve, is a rare exception to this rule.)

And today, reading in the New York Times about Moody’s, I realized another reason the US News rankings are so useless and their importance so poisonous to legal education.  It is because the US News rankings are accepted, followed, and never questioned in a way meaningful enough to threaten their influence. There is therefore little incentive to make judgments on a law school’s quality based on judgments independent of those rankings.

Moody’s is one of the private companies that rate corporate bonds.  When a corporation sells bonds to raise money (simply put, they borrow money from the purchasers of the bonds and pay back the loan at the interest rate called for by the bond), Moody’s issues “grades” to the bonds that predict the likelihood the corporation will pay back the loan.  “Junk” bonds are so-called because they are bonds issued by companies that are at high risk of being unable to pay the purchaser of the bond when payment is due.  In other words, junk bonds are “sub-prime” bonds.  Why do people loan money to companies or homeowners despite the high risk the borrowers will default?  Because those borrowers have to pay a higher interest rate.  The high interest rate on the loans that are repaid makes up for the loans that aren’t paid back.

The unconscionable innacuracy of Moody’s rankings, however, has played a major role in our financial crisis.  As the Times points out:

Moody’s rated Lehman Brothers’ debt A2, putting it squarely in the investment-grade range, days before the company filed for bankruptcy. And Moody’s gave the senior unsecured debt of the American International Group, the insurance behemoth, an Aa3 rating – which is even stronger than A2 – the week before the government had to step in and take over the company in September as part of what has become a $170 billion bailout.

Moody’s and the other major ratings companies also “put their seals of approval on countless subprime mortgage-related securities now commonly described as toxic.”

There are numerous reasons to the ratings companies were bound to fail, but the Times article brought up an interesting one I had never considered before.  There is little incentive to question anyone who is paid to judge the the quality of something unless and until the accuracy of those judgments is put to the test. As Frank Psrtnoy, a law professor at the Universitiy of San Diego and a former derivatives trader, explains it:

Imagine if you had a rabbi and said, “All the laws of kosher depend on whether this rabbi decides if food is kosher or not.”  If the rules say “You have to use this rabbi,”  he could be totally wrong and it won’t affect the value of his franchise.

In other words, if you wanted kosher food, you’d buy food approved by that rabbi and never question his judgment unless and until the accuracy of his judgments was threatened in a meaningful way. US News is that rabbi.  It has become the principal judge of law school quality and it doesn’t matter whether its judgments are legitimate or not.  Students buy its rankings guides, law faculties and deans make decisions driven solely by the desire to meet the criteria US News employs, and applicants and legal academia continue to make their educational decisions based on the criteria employed by US News rather than on their own judgments.

It’s a terrible situation, and particularly ironic when it comes to legal education.  Lawyers every day, every moment, make judgments and decisions based on incomplete, subjective, and biased information.  You can only consider the circumstances under which those decisions are made inadequate, however, if you believe it is ever possible to have all the information you would want and if all that information could be stripped of the distortions inherent in the limitations of human perception.  Making decisions based on incomplete, subjective, and biased information is what life is about. That doesn’t mean there aren’t better and worse judgments; it merely means that one can never be certain, that there is always risk, that almost every important decision one makes in one’s life cannot be reduced to a choice between black and white, right and wrong, #1 and #2.  Lawyers make their living making such difficult decisions and judgments.  The legal situations where there are clear answers don’t require lawyers, and if lawyers become involved they certainly don’t make much of a living answering those questions.

Yet law school applicants and law professors act as if the judgment that one law school is better than another can be reduced to a comparison of hard numbers, and that, therefore, those numbers should be the determinant of their actions.  They’re being as stupid as the investors in Lehman Brothers and AIG were in relying on Moody’s.

And the Times article mentions one other fact that bears on this point.  Warren Buffett — the man “known as the Oracle of Omaha,” the daddy we turn to to guide us out of our financial pit, “the closest thing that the United States economy has to a life coach”  — owns 20% of Moody’s.  But you know what?  In making his investment decsions he doesn’t rely at all on Moody’s ratings.  He has his own research department.  He makes his own judgments.  I wish more college graduates did the same.  And it maddens me beyond measure that most law professors don’t.

Question authority, and then question those questioning authority

It may seem off topic to engage in a prediction regarding a sports event, but let it be heard here first — this weekend Michigan will beat Ohio State in football. In fact, you are likely to hear it nowhere else. Michigan is suffering its worst football season in history. Ohio sports writers are writing things like “Michigan (3-8) couldn’t be a bigger underdog if it were coming off a loss to St. Ignatius [an Ohio high school football power] at home instead of a loss to Northwestern.”

But my point is this: lawyers beat adversaries who never question the assumptions and premises most people never question. Lawyers need to make decisions. That’s a topic for another day. And one could question premises and assumptions forever without ever coming to a decision, so I’m not suggesting that one engage in perpetual questioning, that one ape Hamlet.

Rather, I am suggesting that the common wisdom is far more common than it is wise and that no lawyer ever got far for long by going with his unexamined gut instincts. And it almost seems a law of sports that when one team is considered unbeatable it will lose.

In the political arena, Tom Tomorrow has it right on.

Oh yeah: GO BLUE!

p.s. A friend at the ABA Journal is asking lawyers to complete the Journal’s survey on how you think the recession will affect the legal profession. You can do so here. All I know is that if Congress doesn’t help out the auto industry there are an awful lot of people in Michigan and Ohio who will lose their jobs and/or never get paid for goods and services they have already provided. I suppose, though, that bankruptcy lawyers will make out well.