Goldman Sachs is a bunch of big fat liars.

Let’s make sure we understand why Goldman Sachs was willing to pay $550 million to settle the SEC’s lawsuit against it – “one of the largest penalties ever paid by a Wall Street Firm.” Goldman Sachs committed fraud to get investors to buy into a fund of securities. It isn’t even a difficult fraud to understand.

Goldman agreed with John A. Paulson, a prominent hedge fund manager who earned an estimated $3.7 billion in 2007, that Paulson could choose the particular mortgage-backed securities that Goldman would sell. Paulson chose securities he knew would default. At the same time he bought credit default swaps on those same securities — in essence, insurance policies that would pay him the value of those securities if they defaulted. In short, he chose the securities for the fund because he knew they would fail and their failure would profit him mightily.

Goldman’s problem, of course, is that no one would buy the securities if they knew Paulson had chosen them. As the complaint filed in the case by the SEC (embedded below) states: Goldman “knew that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to” sell the securities in the fund “if they disclosed to investors that” someone who had “shorted” the securities, “such as Paulson, played a significant role in selecting the securities.”

So Goldman went out and got ACA Management LLC, a company with experience in analyzing the credit risks associated with funds like that it was selling, to agree to be “Portfolio Selection Agent” — that is, to represent itself as the entity that had chosen the securities Goldman was selling. Of course, ACA was not the Portfolio Selection Agent, but Goldman knew what it needed. As Goldman’s Fabrice B. Tourre wrote in a memo:

“One thing that we need to make sure ACA understands is that we want their name on this transaction. This is a transaction for which they are acting as portfolio selection agent, this will be important that we can use ACA’s branding to help distribute the bonds.”

Tourre later wrote in another memo:

“We expect to leverage ACA’s credibility and franchise to help distribute this Transaction.”

I’m happy to learn that the settlement does not include any agreement with Tourre personally. One thing I wonder, though: wasn’t Paulson part of a conspiracy to defraud investors? Why has he gotten to go off with his billions untouched by the SEC?

S.E.C.’s Civil Lawsuit Against Goldman Over C.D.O

Corporations = individuals? Confusions in economic theory and First Amendment jurisprudence

Metaphors are tricky things. Corporations are “persons” under the law in many respects, just as you and I are. And we treat corporations as rational individuals in the market. These figurative equations of legal fictions with human beings certainly have their utility, but they easily can be pushed too far. Individuals at AIG were making individual fortunes based on the income they were bringing into AIG for selling credit default swaps. Those individuals were making and would retain those fortunes even if, as turned out to be the case, AIG might not have sufficient funds to pay off the obligations those credit default swaps imposed on AIG. In other words, if one treated AIG as a rational person, one would suppose AIG would never expose itself to a real risk of obligating itself to pay more than it had in reserve. But AIG is merely a corporation, and the individuals actually making the decisions on behalf of AIG had every incentive to get what they could, subject AIG to irrational risk, and be able to walk away with their tens of millions of dollars.

And now the Supreme Court has overturned over 100 years of precedent permitting limits on corporate contributions to political campaigns because such limits constrained free speech and, according to the truism announced by Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, ”Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” But corporations don’t make decisions about how to spend money on campaign contributions — the individuals who control the corporations do. So what the Supreme Court has done is to remove any limits we might put on corporate CEOs to spend corporate money to advance the interests that indubitably are intended to redound to the benefit of those individual CEOs. I wouldn’t limit the ability of CEOs and shareholders to make individual contributions to political campaigns, but why are we treating purely legal entities like they are made of flesh and blood?

As Buzzflash pointed out recently, Thom Hartmann in his book Unequal Protection explains:

Prior to 1886, corporations were referred to in U.S. law as “artificial persons.” but in 1886, after a series of cases brought by lawyers representing the expanding railroad interests, the Supreme Court ruled that corporations were “persons” and entitled to the same rights granted to people under the Bill of Rights. Since this ruling, America has lost the legal structures that allowed for people to control corporate behavior.

Credit Default Swaps and Mortgage Backed Securities: a Primer.

I’ve previously noticed Mark Labaton’s writing. Labaton is a lawyer in LA, and he writes with the kind of clarity and precision that is crucial to effective lawyering. In the most recent issue of LA Lawyer (pdf), he applies those writing skills — in the article entitled “Swap Meet” — to explaining “derivatives,” those financial instruments central to our current economic disaster. I’ve tried to do a similar thing here a few times (here, for example), but Labaton’s account is much more comprehensive. It’s an important piece. I can’t say enough to my students that they have to reject any idea that the stuff they have to face is too complicated for them to understand. We were told again and again that credit default swaps were too complicated to understand (see below, from a CNBC Telecast in November 2006). That’s hogwash. Accepting the myth our financial markets were dealing with risks too complicated for anyone to understand (even the most active participants in the markets!) put us in this mess an is keeping us from getting out of it as quickly or effectively as we might. Labaton not only understands this point, he also provides a very useful explanation for the rest of us.

Greenberg v. AIG: the evidence and the truth

The difference between journalists and lawyers?  Journalists, at least as they practice their craft these days in this country, practice a pretended objectivity by giving voice to both sides of a dispute.  I presume the purpose is to leave the reader to be the judge.  It’s a way of going about thet job that gives the impression of being as fair as it is possible to be.  Fox News has grounded its entire image  in precisely this perception of what is most fair: “We report, you decide.”

I’ve bemoaned before the absence of critical thinking that goes into this style of reporting.  The New York Times is at it again today, this time on a subject far more important than whether a hot artist’s most valuable products infringe the copyrights of other creators — how AIG got our country into the financial mess it’s in and whether we ought to trust the people who brought us here to lead us out.  Hank Greenberg, the long-time head of AIG who was deposed in 2005, testified yesterday to Congress and claimed that the Obama administration should have let AIG go bankrupt, that the administration’s policies have deprived AIG of its most valuable assets by driving off the people who led AIG into its catastrophic state, and that Mr. Greenberg’s policies — which included the creation of the credit default swaps that “insured” the mortgage backed securities that were doomed to failure — had nothing to do with the eventual failure of AIG.  He might not have provided reserves to allow AIG to afford the liabilities it had assumed when it sold the credit default swaps (thereby earning itself enormous amounts of money, profits that of course contributed to the fortunes made by Mr. Greenberg and the other geniuses who our government has driven away), but, he says, he would have set aside reserves to meet those liabilities (thus averting the necessity of the bailout) had he been allowed to stick around.

The story does give the other side of the story, quoting a spokesperson for the current management of AIG contradicting Mr. Greenberg and asserting flat out that he lacks any credibility:

“Hank Greenberg continues to deny his role in allowing [AIG's Financial Products Division] to write the multisector credit-default swaps which sowed the seeds for AIG’s troubles,” the company said, referring to the financial products unit. It went on to denounce Mr. Greenberg as evading questions and lacking credibility as a business strategist.

“He refuses to acknowledge that he approved entry into the credit-default swap business, approved more than $40 billion of swaps written on C.D.O.’s containing subprime loans, and didn’t hedge or put up reserves against them,” the company said. Collateralized debt obligations are securities made from pools of loans and other forms of debt.

“We don’t understand how he can be viewed as having any credibility on any AIG issue.”

My problem with this type of journalism is that it doesn’t make judgments that can be made.  It often may be difficult to tell right from wrong with certainty, but there are often clear judgments to be made about which position is better and which worse.  Mr. Greenberg’s self-interest in these matters, his lifetime of self-promotion in the interests of building an immense personal fortune, and his rank hypocrisy are legendary.  A journalist is capable of giving both sides of an argument and of understanding context and making judgments.  To fail to do so leaves the reading public to do that work themselves, something that people simply don’t have the time to do.

Lawyers, on the other hand, do contend always with adversaries setting forth evidence that seems to contradict the evidence they are presenting on behalf of their own clients.  But setting forth the evidence is only part of a lawyer’s job.  The lawyer also structures that evidence into arguments on behalf of his client’s position, explaining specifically how that evidence should be viewed.  Then decision makers (juries, judges, arbitrators, etc.) decide.  The lawyer doesn’t rely on the decision-maker to figure out how to explain the evidence.  The lawyer gives the decision-maker the means of understanding it.

I don’t know why journalists don’t do so more often.

A better solution to the mortgage crisis, the federal governments bailout policies, and AIG’s failures to meet the obligations it took the risk of not meeting

I have several thoughts about the AIG bailout apart from what I consider the justifiable outrage over multi-million dollar bonuses being paid to the very people who set up the house of cards AIG had constructed.

First, I can’t understand why anyone would be surprised, much less outraged, that AIG paid much of the bailout money it received to other financial institutions.  Those institutions (Goldman Sachs, for example) owned mortgage backed securities and had purchased from AIG the “credit default swaps” that were, in essence, insurance that the owners of the mortgage backed securities would not earn from those securities what they were supposed to. Goldman Sachs had not received what they were owed on the mortgage backed securities because the crash in the housing market meant that homeowners were not making the mortgage payments that made up the pools of money out of which the owners of mortgage backed securities were to be paid.  Thus, when Goldman Sachs was not paid what it was supposed to be paid from the homeowners, Goldman Sachs turned to AIG and asked to be paid pursuant to the insurance policies it had purchased from AIG (that is, the credit default swaps).

AIG had never planned for such a shortfall in mortgage payments.  It had essentially sold the credit default swaps to earn easy money (the “premiums” for the sales) that it did not believe it would ever have to pay out on.  Thus, when in fact it did have to pay out on those credit default swaps, AIG was threatened with bankruptcy because its obligations to the owners of mortgage backed securities far exceeded its assets.

The U.S. could not afford to let that happen.  AIG is the world’s biggest insurer.  It’s failure would set off massive insecurity in every single aspect of life in which people and institutions depended on the availability of its insurance.  Neither could the U.S. afford to let the financial institutions fail.  That would mean a collapse of our banking system, an even greater and more profound impact on the functioning of our credit markets and other aspects of our economy — in short, a Depression on the order of The Depression.

Here’s what I don’t quite understand.  The underlying problem was that too many homeowners were unable to make their mortgage payments.  Why not readjust everyone’s mortgage payments (by, say, automatically cutting mortgage rates to the current low rates).  The owners of the mortgage backed securities would not make as much as they otherwise would have had the original rates been paid, but too many of the original rates weren’t paid to make enough of the mortgage backed securities assets with any material value.  The owners of the mortgage backed securities would make some of the money they had expected.  They would still be able to look to AIG under the credit default swaps for the difference between what they had expected to make under those securities and what they made under the readjusted, low rates, but AIG’s exposure would have been considerably lower — not the entire value of the mortage backed securities but, rather, the difference between what those securities earned under the new adjusted mortgage rates and what they originally were supposed to have been paid.  To the extent that obligation still threatened AIG’s existence, the government could make up the shortfall, but the amount of federal dollars required to do so would have been far less.

One objection, of course, is that we’d be rewarding those homeowners who took the risk of assuming mortgages they couldn’t afford.  The problem with that argument, of course, is that the owners of mortgage backed securities took the risk they wouldn’t get paid either through the securities from the pools of mortgage payments or from AIG, but we’re bailing them out.  And AIG, of course, took the risk in selling its credit default swaps that it would not be able to meet its obligations under them, but we’re bailing them out.  We’re doing so because we have to.

But we have to bail out the homeowners too.  The very existence and health of our cities depends on us doing so.  Why are the homeowners any more to be the victims of “moral hazards” than the financial institutions.

Everyone wins.  Homeowners stay in their homes at today’s mortgage rates.  The lenders don’t get what they contracted for, but they get what, given the circumstances we’re in, is a perfectly reasonable rate of return.  More importantly, the lenders don’t fail as a result of mortgage defaults and the insufficiency of foreclosure as a remedy to make up the loss resulting from the default.  The banks that own the mortgage backed securities are made whole (or almost so), and AIG is made whole (or almost s0).

Could anyone tell me what I’m missing here?  I do not claim to be an expert on these matters, but I am smart enough to follow the money and the trails of contract obligations, and I’m not quite sure where my logic fails.  I’m sure it must, but where?

The financial institutions and their lawyers could not see the big picture, redux

I’ve written before of the failure of our financial geniuses to see the “big picture” when they created their house of cards built of mortgage backed securities, credit default swaps, and the assumption that housing prices wouldn’t crash. But there’s a piece of the picture other than the inevitability of falling markets those geniuses failed to consider — what is required to foreclose on the homes that are the underlying asset giving the mortgage backed securities their value.

In order to foreclose, the owner of the mortgage has to be identified.  But no one knows who owns mortgages that have been packaged into mortgage backed securities.

The mortgages packaged into mortgage backed securities weren’t packaged whole.  In other words, if you are the owner of a mortgage backed security, you were not holding the right to collect on the loans to one or more specific homeowners.  Instead, you were holding the right to collect a portion of an enormous number of loans made to an enormous number of homeowners.  Thus, each homeowner’s mortgage is owned in by an enormous number of buyers of mortgage backed securities, to each of whom some fraction of his loan is owed.

For example, the day after I financed my house my mortgage company sold its rights to collect on my home loan to one of the companies who put together these mortgage backed securities.  Then that company likely took its right to collect on my loan, split it up in littlet pieces, and put those each of those little pieces into different mortgage backed securities along with little pieces form other loans.  Theoretically, if I owed $1000 per month on my mortgage, there could be one thousand people to whom I each owe one dollar,  or one hundred thousand people to whom I each owe one cent, and so on. Could anyone tell me who owns my mortgage? Maybe 1,000 or maybe 100,000 different individuals and institutions.  Could anyone identify them to a court hearing a foreclosure case against me?

I doubt it.

Thus, as the Foreclosure Defense Group puts it:

In Ohio and other states, the inability of the “Lender” or Mortgage Servicer [the company in the above example who purchased my mortgage the day after it was created and subsequently packaged it into mortgage backed securities] to produce the original note and mortgage, combined with their inability to produce the documentation regarding the assignment or sale of the loan has resulted in de-linking the mortgage from the security interest in the home and the cancellation of the note giving the borrower free and clear title to the property that was subject to the original loan transaction.

It’s hard to train good lawyers.  Students just want “the law.”  But practicing law isn’t just a matter of knowing the law.  Knowing the law or, as is more often the case, knowing where to find the law, is of course necessary, but it’s the easy part.  The hard part is making sure your clients make good business decisions based in part on the law and in part on all the other constraints the clients operate within (including financial constraints, constraints established by the client’s aversion or lack of aversion to risk, constraints imposed by market and social conditions, etc.).

In order to do that you always have to have in mind the “big picture,” the implications of any specific decisions to the client’s long-term interests.  Lawyers might have reviewed every single possible regulation pertaining to securities when they approved the mortgage backed securities.  What they apparently didn’t think to look at, however, were the requirements the states impose on foreclosure actions.  Without the power to foreclose, the mortgage backed securities have no mortgages to back them.

The next time someone starts talking about financial geniuses (which I hope at least won’t be for some years), run!