Nesson continues to blame others for his lousy job of lawyering.

The  Harvard Law Record reported yesterday on Charlie Nesson’s address to : a room full of HLS students to explain his motivations and methods as the lawyer representing Joel Tenenbaum in Sony BMG Music v. Tenenbaum, the case that resulted in a $675,000 judgment against his client.

I have on more than one occasion expressed my harsh views regarding Nesson’s lawyering in the case (here and here). But the Harvard Law Record’s story only adds fuel to my fury at Nesson’s lawyering skills. According to the story, “When the case first came to his attention, Nesson knew that there was little chance of victory on the merits, with the only truly viable strategy at trial being the minimization of damages.” (emphasis added)

The RIAA cannot have been happy about the way it looks after winning a judgment of $675,000 from a kid, especially since, as Nesson with some degree of accuracy explains, “[w]hat Joel did in downloading and sharing songs was what just about every kid in his generation did and which I bet a great many of you did.” The RIAA was anxious to settle a similar case in which it won $1.92 million from Jammie Thomas-Rasset for illegally downloading 24 songs. As Mike Masnick wrote, the RIAA “seems to recognize that the insanity of the $1.92 million doesn’t do it any favors. Even the musicians whose music was part of the case are embarrassed by the amount. . . . the RIAA would love to settle the lawsuit for some lower amount so it can run around touting the ‘risks’of file sharing without having people laugh outloud when hearing that someone had to pay $1.92 million for potentially sharing 24 songs that could be bought for $1 each.”

And Tennenbaum quite plainly had the ability to minimize damages through settlement rather than by means of Nesson’s tactic of going to trial. In February, Ars Technica reported that the “RIAA’s initial offer to settle, made way back in 2003, was for $3,500. Joel offered $500, which was declined. After the case went to court in 2007, the judge ordered the parties to settle and work it out between themselves. Joel offered $5,000. The RIAA demanded $10,500.”

And yet Nesson, realizing that “there was little chance of victory on the merits” and that the only viable way of representing his client’s best interests was to minimize the amount of his liability, failed to settle a case that at most would have cost his client $10,500 (assuming, contrary to any notion of common negotiating sense, that the RIAA would not have moved off of its last offer).

The Harvard Law Record’s story goes on to state that “the evidence presented by the RIAA . . . made it look like Tenenbaum blamed others and lied,” thereby interfering “with his effort to appear credible and sympathetic.” The problem is that the evidence didn’t merely make it “look like” Tenenbaum lied. He admitted in trial that had lied in sworn statements he had made before trial that he had not used peer-to-peer file sharing networks to download and upload recordings.

I’ve said it again and again. I’m no fan of the RIAA. The recording industry’s business and legal responses to the technological revolution that has deprived them of their former monopoly on the means of mass producing and distributing recorded music have been, to my legal and business mind, idiotic. But Nesson was Tenenbaum’s lawyer. His professional judgment as a lawyer was that any legal defense to the RIAA’s claims had little chance of success and that the best lawyering job he could do for his Tenenbaum was to minimize the damages he would be liable for. Nesson clearly had the opportunity to do so. That he passed up that opportunity in a quixotic fight for a principle might be something a lot of people admire, but it’s terrible lawyering.

Want to become a practicing lawyer? Don’t go to Harvard! Nesson and Tenenbaum again.

Some of my favorite and most respected former colleagues in practice went to Harvard Law School, but, based on what I’ve been seeing out Charlie Nesson in his role defending Joel Tenenbaum in Sony BMG Music v. Tenenbaum, I have to seriously wonder what Harvard is teaching about the actual practice of law.

I took Nesson to task recently for using his role as lawyer in the case to fight a crusade against the music industry, not to give his client the best defense possible. That attitude alone destroys my confidence in Nesson’s ability to train anyone to be a lawyer.

Now Nesson has proven he can’t write a brief. Yesterday on behalf of Tenenbaum he filed in the court that produced the $675,000 judgment against his client a document entitled Defendant’s Opposition to Entry of Judgment and Injunction (pdf)(the “Brief”). There are some non-frivolous arguments somewhere in that self-righteous screed, but they’re so buried in Nesson’s preference for rhetorical flourish over lawyerly detail that, as a responsibility to the students I am teaching to be lawyers, I have to call him out on his incompetence. A lawyer’s job is to win the judge to his client’s side through persuasive reason and argument; it is not to throw a mess at the judge that may or may not contain winning arguments and leave it to the judge to find those winning arguments.

It’s a dirty little secret that lawyers don’t like to make too much of: lawyers, not judges, win and lose cases. Lawyers don’t like to make too much of it because they want judges to believe they’re the ones from on high pronouncing judgment. But if you convince the judge you’re right and give him the tools to rule your way, you’ll win. It is remarkably pleasing to get an order from a judge ruling in your client’s favor and realize the order is merely a cut-and-pasted version of your brief. Why shouldn’t the judge steal my words if they explain his result as well as he can figure out how to explain them, and why should he trouble himself trying to find better ways to do so?

But Nesson doesn’t give the judge he’s seeking to persuade anything to work with. First, he’s asking the judge not to enter an order that would impose the jury’s verdict and the injunction against his client. But on what basis? Is he asking for judgment notwithstanding the verdict? What procedural rule is he filing his opposition to the entry of the judgment on? His Brief sure doesn’t explain the basis. Nor does it explain what he is asking the judge to do in lieu of entering the order? Dismiss the case? Lower the damages? Lift the injunction? Any or all?

Listen, students: when you write to the judge make sure she knows what you’re asking her to do and the legal basis she has for doing it.

I won’t get into all of the merits of Nesson’s arguments. I think he may well have a due process argument on the excessiveness of the statutory penalties, but even that one is a stretch.

But the argument he considers “first and foremost” is that “the statute in question does not permit a lawsuit against an individual consumer for statutory damages.” Brief at 1-2 (emphasis added). Having not graduated from Harvard myself, perhaps I am missing something. The operative statute, 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c), provides that “the copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, . . . .” (emphasis added)

Nor is there anything in any authority to suggest that Nesson’s incomprehensible conclusion that the statute does not contemplate imposing statutory damages on individuals is founded in sources to obscure for me to know.

Nimmer on Copyright, Section 14.04[a] provides: “Under the current Act, the copyright owner may elect to recover statutory damages, instead of actual damages and defendant’s profits. He may, moreover, make such an election regardless of the adequacy of the evidence offered as to his actual damages and the amount of defendant’s profits, and even if he has intentionally declined to offer such evidence, although it was available. . . . The availability of statutory damages under the current Act, even under circumstances in which plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s profits are susceptible to precise evaluation, represents a departure from the pertinent provisions of the 1909 Act.Under that former law, the availability of statutory damages was to a degree discretionary with the court and turned largely upon the proof of actual damages and defendant’s profits.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)

Patry on Copyright, Section 22:153 states: “Statutory damages are damages whose assessment has been fixed by the legislature. They have existed in U.S. copyright laws since preconstitutional days and stand in contrast to common law actual damages and an accounting of defendant’s profits. Recovery of actual damages or profits varies according to the harm suffered or the benefit received, without an upper limit on the recovery. Statutory damages have been believed to be particularly valuable where such relief is difficult to prove. The purpose of statutory damages has been noted a number of times by the Supreme Court.”

Thus, the court in In re Mann, 410 B.R. 43, 49 (Bkr. C.D. Cal. 2009), quoting Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Nimmer at § 1404[A] ), stated: “However, a plaintiff may elect statutory damages for copyright infringement ‘regardless of the adequacy of the evidence offered as to his actual damages and the amount of defendant’s profits.’” In Raydiola Music v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 374 (D. Del. 1990), the court explained that “the purpose of statutory damages is to remedy a wrong which would otherwise go unremedied if actual damages could not be proven.” See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John’s Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. at 305 (“Statutory damages were provided by Congress to create a remedy where actual damages [or profits] are not provable at law, but yet where it is proven that a violation of the copyright has occurred.”).”

In short, the plaintiff in a copyright infringement case has an alternative: he can prove and recover actual damages or seek the amounts allowed by statute. Such alternatives are common in situations in which it might be difficult for plaintiffs, even after having established statutory violations, to quantify their economic harm. It might even be argued that illegal downloading is precisely such a case — how can Sony BMG possibly quantify the sales, if any, it lost as a result of Tenenbaum’s unauthorized downloading of copyrighted songs.

Could I be wrong? Of course, but Nesson hasn’t begun to explain to me why. Instead, he’s made himself out to be someone who makes arguments that are patently false.

Don’t get me wrong here. I’m not on Sony BMG’s side. I think the music industry’s legal and business approaches to the technological revolution that has entirely undermined their old business models have been disasters, and I certainly don’t think Joel Tenenbaum should have to pay Sony BMG $675,000.

My problem is that Nesson is Tenenbaum’s lawyer and he hasn’t given me a good reason to believe he can get Tenenbaum free from that monumental verdict.

Lawyers do the best they can for clients; I wish law professors realized that’s what lawyers should always do.

As someone who has practiced over ten years and taught over ten years I am particularly sensitive to the divide between legal practice and legal academia, and I am partial to the legal practice side of the debate. It’s not that a lot of law professors don’t do a lot of good things; rather, it’s that too many law professors and too much legal education proceeds as if the world of practice is irrelevant. In fact, I am convinced that legal education and legal theory divorced from the application of law in practice is meaningless. Law does not exist except as it has the potential to affect the real world (unless you’re talking about religious law).

And it is fundamental to the practice of law that the first and primary responsibility of the lawyer is to the client’s best interests. When you start treating the client merely as a means to raise intellectual issues you find of greater interest you’re doomed to get in trouble.

Charles Nesson is a good example of a law professor who doesn’t understand how to be a lawyer. Nesson ignored the advice of many who are sympathetic to the plight of file sharers in conducting his defense of Joel Tenenbaum, a case which resulted in a $675,000 verdict against his client. There were many who considered Nesson’s defense bad lawyering, including myself. Blue Mass Group even asked whether he was “the worst lawyer ever” in a post that supported the legitimacy of the question with examples from the case:

[T]hrough the course of the litigation, Tenenbaum gave sworn statements that he then contradicted at trial. And in a dramatic moment, it seems that at the end of his testimony, just before the verdict, he actually admitted liability, causing the judge to find him liable and the leave only question of damages for the jury to decide. Who prepared Tenenbaum to testify? Did anyone bother?

It also seems that Professor Nesson made audio-recordings of depositions in the case–perhaps for use in the classroom?–without the knowledge of the lawyers on the other side of the case. This is potentially a crime, as well as an apparent violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which require a lawyer taking a deposition to notify the other side of the method to be used to record it (though perhaps if Professor Nesson was recording depositions taken by the other side, he would not be in violation of the rule–I’m not sure).

Now, Professor Nesson says he will appeal on the judge’s failure to instruct the jury on fair use. I’m not a copyright law expert, but I’ve heard others describe this issue as likely to lose.

In any case, it seems clear to me that Professor Nesson did not really act to protect Tenenbaum’s interest. This twenty-something graduate student is now facing bankruptcy when he could have settled the case for next to nothing.

More support for the criticism of Nesson’s job defending Tenenbaum comes today with the news that the judge in Tenenbaum’s case ordered defendants who did not even bother to defend file sharing charges to pay the minimum penalties allowed under the Copyright Act, prompting Ars Technica to point out that Tenenbaum and others like him “would have been far better off monetarily if they had simply ignored the complaint altogether and failed to show up in court.”

The sad part is Ars Technica is right — sometimes bad lawyering is worse than no lawyering.

Nesson’s response to criticism that he ignored defenses and other strategies he might have used to minimize Tenenbaum’s liability? He writes, without an ounce of apparent regret: “these defenses do not join the fundamental issues. this trial was not an exercise in getting joel off the hook.”

That’s precisely my point. If you treat a case as a means to an end and are willing to sacrifice the client’s best interests to get to that end, you are not doing your ethical duty as a lawyer. If you insist on a jury, make legal arguments there is no good reason to think will prevail, allow your client to lie in pretrial testimony and go ahead and put him on the stand anyway, flout good sense in recording hearings without having gotten the judge’s permission to do so, and then go and post those recordings on line, is it any wonder your client ends up paying a big price?

As I indicated in my last post (and numerous times on this blog and elsewhere), I am convinced the RIAA’s campaign to sue file sharers is misbegotten as a practical, business matter. I’ve even gone out of my way to try to help Nesson. (See also here.) That doesn’t mean that Nesson is a noble guy in sacrificing his client to what he considers a greater cause, and a lawyer should know better.

Is Nesson crazy? Statuory damages need not relate to actual damages.

As I explained the other day, the merits of Professor Charles Nesson’s argument that peer-to-peer file music file sharing constitutes fair use entirely escapes me (and, apparently, others). But Nesson seems to be making another argument as well — that if the plaintiff cannot show actual damages it is not entitled to the alternative remedy under the copyright statute, up to $150,000 in statutory damages per infringement:

He will argue that statutory damages only apply to commercial infringers.  The law offers rightsholders the chance to seek either statutory or actual damages, but that the two are meant to be equivalent. If the two remedies are equivalent, and if “individual noncommercial copying results in no provable actual harm to the copyright harm holder,” then actual damages would be zero-and so would statutory damages.  

As he also has been quoted:

It would be a bizarre statute indeed that offered two completely unrelated remedies,” he writes, “one which granted actual damages and lost profits, and the other of which granted plaintiffs the right to drive a flock of sheep across federal property on the third day of each month. 

It doesn’t strike me as so bizarre. Statutory damages often serve the purpose of providing a remedy for a proven violation of law where the lawmakers have concluded it would be too burdensome to also require proof of damages, particularly in cases in which damages might be difficult to prove. It does not seem bizarre to believe that Congress in enacting the Copyright Act concluded that situations precisely like the one Nesson is defending — blatant individual infringements that cumulatively could have an impact on an industry but the individual effects of which are difficult to ascertain — should be subject to some liability. In addition, even if the statutory remedy bears no relationship to actual damage it can still serve a legitimate function: deterrence. And, indeed, my very brief research on the question has demonstrated the courts are quite aware of these arguments. In Pret-a-Printee, Ltd. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 218 U.S.P.Q. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court stated:

An award of statutory damages is appropriate where the measure of actual damages is difficult to ascertain. See Peter Pan Fabrics v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1964). Moreover, “[t]he broad discretionary power given the courts to make such an award serves the dual purposes of the Copyright Act: to compensate copyright owners and to provide a deterrent to would-be infringers.” Lauratex Textiles Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), citing Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 592 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1978).

So where is Nesson coming from. I confess: I can’t tell. Perhaps he believe damages divorced from damage somehow violate the Copyright Clause of the Constitution because they discourage rather than encourage innovation. Such arguments, however, have failed in far more compelling circumstances.

ADDENDMUM: “In effect, subject to the limits the statute places on maximum and minimum awards, this gives to the court or the jury the power to simply pick a sum of money to be awarded as damages instead of any other monetary remedies without any proof of monetary loss by the copyright owner.” Howard B. Abrams, 2 The Law of Copyright § 17:11 (2008) (emphasis added).

ADDENDUM 2: The question may be more complicated than I originally believed, and a statutory damage award entirely divorced from any relationship to damages might raise due process concerns. So the court stated in Zomba Enters. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587-588 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2429, 171 L. Ed. 2d 229 (2007). Nonetheless, the court in Zemba affirmed an award of statutory damages that were 44 times greater than actual damages and emphasized the extreme deference appellate courts must give in reviewing trial courts’ awards:

This review, however, is extraordinarily deferential — even more so than in cases applying abuse-of-discretion review. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210, 55 S. Ct. 365, 79 L. Ed. 862 (1935) (Congress’s purpose in enacting the statutory-damage provision of the 1909 Copyright Act and its delineation of specified limits for statutory damages “take[] the matter out of the ordinary rule with respect to abuse of discretion”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Star Amusements, Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1995)   (interpreting the modern Copyright Act and noting “that the standard for reviewing an award of statutory damages within the allowed range is even more deferential than abuse of discretion”).

In Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2008)(citations omitted), the court, without addressing the question, observed that “[th]e defenses which have possible merit include: (1) whether the amount of statutory damages available under the Copyright Act, measured against the actual money damages suffered, is unconstitutionally excessive . . . .”

Is peer-to-peer music downloading fair use? I doubt it.

In defending an individual against liability for downloading music via peer-to-peer networks, Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson apparently is going to argue that his client’s activities constitute fair use of the copyrighted music. His arguments don’t seem terribly persuasive to his peers, and I confess that it is not clear to me at all what his argument is. Ars Technica even asks, “Is Harvard Law professor Charlie Nesson crazy?”

Nesson seems likely to argue that there is no remedy for non-commercial music downloading in the absence of proof of actual economic harm. If that is the basis of his argument for fair use, at least it makes some sense (even if it seems unlikely to prevail). 

More effective, perhaps, will be Nesson’s efforts to convince the court that a jury should decide his client’s fate. As he explains:

 Fair use is recognized as a common law, perhaps a constitutional concept, not defined by but merely recognized and continued by the statute (Sony, Harper); that the statutory four factors are illustrative and not exhaustive; that analysis must be case by case; and the question is a jury issue. 

But I’m not sure he’s entirely right about that. Both an influential treatise (4-13 Nimmer on Copyright Section 13.05, n. 17) and the courts suggest that whether certain acts constitute fair use is a “mixed question of law and fact.” A question of law is one a judge determines; a question of fact is one a jury determines. A mixed question of law and fact is one in which a jury determines what happened, and the judge determines the legal effect of those facts. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)  I’m not sure how Nesson is going to persuade jurors who might be sympathetic to his client to find the historical facts he needs to convince the court his client’s music downloading was fair use.