Richard Prince doesn’t have to describe one of his paintings as a Rhino in Hot Pants Shouting, “Repent, Repent!” for it to be so.

Tom Waits on the “meanings” of his songs:

If you break open a song, you’ll find the eggs of other songs. Misunderstandings are really kind of an epidemic and acceptable. I think it’s about one thing, but someone else will say, ‘That song is kind of a rhino in hot pants on a burnt rocking horse with a lariat shouting, “Repent, repent!” I think that’s great.

Why do I bring up Waits rejoicing in the fact someone might hear one of his songs as a “kind of rhino in hot pants on a burnt rocking horse with a lariat shouting, “repent, repent!” Because the lawyer for Patrick Cariou believes that a work of art appropriating another work can only be interpreted to be sufficiently “transformative” of that earlier work if the appropriator expresses in words a transformative purpose. Richard Prince, in appropriating Patrick Cariou’s photographs for his own artistic purposes, said he had no real interest in the meaning behind Cariou’s work, and that he used it strictly as “raw material,” that it was “taking for the sake of taking.”

Cariou’s lawyer thinks that Prince’s inability to state an artistic purpose is fatal to his case. In his eyes, the law requires a 2-step process: “First the defendant has to say” he was engaged in a transformative use of the work he was appropriating. “Only then does the court go on to say, ‘Well let’s see if this is reasonably perceivable.’”

As I made clear yesterday, and as I think Tom Waits makes clear far more vividly, it seems absurd to limit the meaning of a work of art to whatever the artist might state it is. Nor is this particular controversial. The phrase “intentional fallacy” was coined in the title of an influential scholarly article (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946) claiming that artists’ intentions are neither available nor desirable as a standard for assessing art. As has been pointed out, “Intentionalists disagreed, arguing that any sense of the artist’s intention, however obscure, can be a useful resource in interpreting a work of art.”

But the point is, even “Intentionalists” acknowledge that judging, interpreting, and assessing art calls on attention to the art and all it evokes in the eyes of the viewer. Those judgments, interpretations, and assessments are never limited to what the artist wanted the viewer to see and think.

So Cariou’s lawyer is advancing nonsense when he suggests the court should be limited in that way. Nor is the precedent for court reliance in making fair use decisions on the expressed intent of the appropriating artist particularly compelling support for that nonsense. It is true that in Blanch v. Koons the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit relied on what Jeff Koons stated his purposes were in appropriating a photograph for use in one of his paintings. But there were no competing interpretations submitted to the court. As the court pointed out: “Koons asserts — and Blanch does not deny — that his purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s goals in creating it.” Quite simply, the court was persuaded by Koons’ explanations. That the court was so persuaded does not mean, however, that the artist’s explanations are the only means by which the court could be persuaded.already stated their intent to parody. Nor, as Cariou’s lawyer contends, did a lower court find that 2 Live Crew’s re-working of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” depended on 2 Live Crew’s assertion their song was a “parody.” In fact, the Court found that 2 Live Crew’s words parodied Orbison’s and remanded the case so a lower court might determine (a) whether there had been any negative economic impact on sales of Orbison’s song in the potential “derivative market” of rap cover versions, and (b) whether the quantity of musical elements taken from Orbison’s song were more than necessary to 2 Live Crew’s purposes. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91. After remand, the case settled, and there were no further court hearings.

What did Jackson Pollock intend when he painted Lavender Mist? Cariou v. Prince, and the importance of scripting the artist’s words.

Patrick Cariou’s lawyers have filed their brief (embedded below) in opposition to Richard Prince’s appeal of the decision holding that Prince’s appropriation’s of Cariou’s photographs constituted copyright infringement. Writing in artnet, Rachel Corbett explains, among other things, that Cariou’s legal team

is banking largely on the claim that Prince’s work failed to comment on or satirize Cariou’s photographs — a common objection against applying the fair use exception to copyright law.

While Prince’s lawyers, Boies, Schiller and Flexner, convincingly argue that “Canal Zone” is “transformative” of the original works, Cariou’s lawyers say that’s not enough. “That argument fails because, absent a justification for the appropriation, taking copyrighted work in order to create ‘something new’ has no practicable boundary and would effectively eviscerate the rights of copyright owners.”

After all, they point out, Prince plainly, arrogantly, and perhaps fatally, said in district court that he had no real interest in the meaning behind Cariou’s work, and that he used it strictly as “raw material.” It’s “taking for the sake of taking,” Cariou’s lawyers argue.

As I wrote nearly a year ago, I believe it would be absurd to conclude whether Prince’s use of Cariou’s work was transformative based on Prince’s words. Artist’s are not particularly gifted at putting into words what their works mean. Why, after all, would we need their work if their words would suffice?

As Sister Wendy Beckett explains in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online, in words that are so well accepted they are almost trite,

The passageway provided by art is very wide. No single interpretation of art is ever “right,” not even the artist’s own. He or she can tell us the intent of the work, but the actual meaning and significance of the art, what the artist achieved, is a very different matter. (It is pitiable to hear the grandiose discussions of artists’ work by the least talented of our contemporaries.) We should listen to the appreciations of others, but then we should put them aside and advance toward a work of art in the loneliness of our own truth. Each of us encounters the work alone, and how much we receive from it is wholly the effect of our will to accept this responsibility.

What was Jackson Pollock’s purpose in painting Lavender Mist? Van Gogh’s in painting The Irises? Haven’t we accepted by now the limitations focus on artistic intention would impose on our appreciation of art?  Nevertheless, in the decision enjoining the publication of a “sequel” to The Catcher in the Rye, the judge was significantly influenced by the fact the author and his representatives had described the work in words that didn’t fit the legal standard they wanted to meet:

Until the present lawsuit was filed, Defendants made no indication that 60 Years[the new work] was in any way a parody or critique of Catcher [in the Rye]. Quite to the contrary, the original jacket of 60 Years states that it is “. . . a marvelous sequel t one of our most beloved classics.” . . . Additionally, when initially confronted with the similarities between the two works, rather than explaining that60 Years was a parody or critique of Catcher, Colting’s [the new work’s author] literary agent, Mr. Sane, contended that 60 Years “is a completely freestanding novel that has nothing to do with the original Catcher in the Rye.” Opinion and Order at 16, n. 3.

Colting and his agent, obviously, should have called his work a parody and critique, not a sequel or a “freestanding novel.” Plainly, they had not been sufficiently counseled by lawyers who could have put the proper words in their mouths. It’s odd to think that being sufficiently versed in the mere words that would be consistent with the legal outcome you seek should make a difference, though. No matter what an artist said, his work would be the same.

In the same way, it seems odd that Prince’s refusal to articulate an artistic intent should be a determinant of the legitimacy of his artwork. The Amicus Brief filed in support of Prince’s appeal by the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts (also embedded below) makes precisely these points (at 31-34; hyperlinks added):

The district court found Prince’s work was not transformative based entirely on Prince’s apparent inability to verbalize the meaning of it to the court’s satisfaction, and the court’s own conclusions about Prince’s subjective intent.  See SPA-17-20. But transformative meaning must be assessed first and foremost by observation of the work itself, and whether new meaning and expression may  be reasonably perceived from it.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582-83. In Campbell, the Court did not demand testimony from 2 Live Crew, or speculate about their subjective intentions. It concluded that elements of parody could reasonably be perceived from the work itself, and that was enough  to establish its new meaning and expression. See id.

Ultimately, the meaning of art is defined by the viewer, not a judge, or  even the artist himself. A viewer’s reaction to a work of art is shaped by the viewer’s personality, emotions, values, experience and knowledge. So while it is plainly dangerous for those trained in the law to judge the worth or meaning of art, see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582-83, it is equally dangerous to pretend the meaning of art can be defined solely by the intention of the artist herself, much less her ability to articulate that intention to the satisfaction of judges and lawyers.  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009) (recognizing “it frequently is not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed” by a government monument, and the sentiments it expresses “may be quite different from those of . . . its creator”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection” for expressive speech).

That is not to say the testimony of the artist is irrelevant. If, as in Blanch [v. Koons], the artist can explain the intended meaning of his work and how it differs from the work he borrowed, that testimony may be quite informative. But the failure to provide an explanation as polished as the one Jeff Koons provided in Blanch cannot be fatal. If it were, then every artist who works within this tradition will be forced to concoct a narrative that appeals to legal sensibilities, and the law will succeed in protecting only those artists who are scripted by counsel.

Other rules that protect First  Amendment interests do not ask the speaker to demonstrate the value of her speech, or require her to persuade a judge of its worth.  Neither does copyright.  See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time.”).

The long tradition of appropriating existing images in the context of collage and other expressive practices described in Section I clearly demonstrates the important new meaning and expression these uses deliver. The Court should recognize that the use of existing images in visual art may convey a wide array of transformative meaning that goes far beyond direct commentary on the original and is not limited by the expressed intentions of the artist.

Cariou v Prince Appeal, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee

Cariou v Prince Warhol Foundation Amicus Brief

Blanch v. Koons, transformative appropriation art, and Fairey v. AP

It’s well worth revisiting the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit (the Circuit in which the court hearing Shepard Fairey’s lawsuit against AP and Manny Garcia is pending) in Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2006). Andrea Blanch, “an accomplished professional fashion and portrait photographer,” unsuccessfully sued Jeff Koons for copyright infringement of a photograph she had shot entitled “‘Silk Sandals by Gucci’ (‘Silk Sandals’), [which] depicts a woman’s lower legs and feet, adorned with bronze nail polish and glittery Gucci sandals, resting on a man’s lap in what appears to be a first-class airplane cabin. The legs and feet are shot at close range and dominate the photograph. Allure published ‘Silk Sandals’as part of a six-page feature on metallic cosmetics entitled ‘Gilt Trip.’” The court explained how Koons appropriated and used ‘Silk Sandals’ as follows:

Koons scanned the image of “Silk Sandals” into his computer and incorporated a version of the scanned image into [his painting entitled] “Niagara.” He included in the painting [pictured at left] only the legs and feet from the photograph, discarding the background of the airplane cabin and the man’s lap on which the legs rest. Koons inverted the orientation of the legs so that they dangle vertically downward above the other elements of “Niagara” rather than slant upward at a 45-degree angle as they appear in the photograph. He added a heel to one of the feet and modified the photograph’s coloring. The legs from “Silk Sandals” are second from the left among the four pairs of legs that form the focal images of “Niagara.” Koons did not seek permission from Blanch or anyone else before using the image

Koons was paid $126,877 for “Niagra.” Allure had paid Blanch $750 for “Silk Sandals.” In addressing whether Koons’ appropriation of “Silk Sandals” was fair use or a copyright infringement, the court highlighted the fact that answering this question requires balancing the conflicting interests in protecting the “intellectual property” rights of creators and protecting the freedom of expression, including referencing the works of others in new works of creation:

Copyright law thus must address the inevitable tension between the property rights it establishes in creative works, which must be protected up to a point, and the ability of authors, artists, and the rest of us to express them — or ourselves by reference to the works of others, which must be protected up to a point. The fair-use doctrine mediates between the two sets of interests, determining where each set of interests ceases to control.

At the heart of the fair use analysis is the nature of the allegedly infringing work. As the 2d Circuit notes, it considers with respect to this factor whether the work is “transformative” — that is, whether it adds something new to the original work so that it stands on its own as an original work of creation. The court thus quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994):

The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supersedes the objects” of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message …, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.” Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such transformative works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space …. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164(citations omitted).

The court’s conclusion that “Niagra” is genuinely transformative in its use of “Silk Stockings” is worth quoting almost in its entirety (citations omitted) because it is the very heart of the decision to find in favor of Koons:

Koons asserts — and Blanch does not deny — that his purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s goals in creating it. Compare Koons Aff. at ¶ 4 (“I want the viewer to think about his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.”) with Blanch Dep. at 112-113 (“I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense[;] … to get … more of a sexuality to the photographs.”). The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating, “Silk Sandals” confirms the transformative nature of the use. 

Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His stated objective is thus not to repackage Blanch’s “Silk Sandals,” but to employ it “`in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’” When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as “raw material,” in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is transformative. 

The test for whether “Niagara’s” use of “Silk Sandals” is “transformative,” then, is whether it “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”The test almost perfectly describes Koons’s adaptation of “Silk Sandals”: the use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American “lifestyles” magazine — with changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects details and, crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning — as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space. We therefore conclude that the use in question was transformative.

The court also noted that in Campbell the Supreme Court had rejected the notion that a”the commercial nature of [a] use could by itself be a dispositive consideration. The Campbell opinion observes that ‘nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107 [setting forth the fair use test], including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research … “are generally conducted for profit.”‘” Thus, the “‘more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.’” (Quoting NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir.2004)). Moreover, since “Niagra” is “‘substantially transformative, the significance of other factors, [including] commercialism, are of [less significance],’ [w]e therefore ‘discount[] the secondary commercial nature of the use.’” (citations omitted.)

I by no means would suggest that Blanch is so obviously on point in all respects that it requires the court hearing the Fairey v. AP case to find in favor of Fairey. But it certainly is quite meaningful in that respect. If only because of the tremendous resonance the Obama Hope poster had in the course of the 2008 presidential, a resonance that would have been inconceivable had the poster substituted Garcia’s photo for Fairey’s reworking of that source material, it seems at the very least quite arguable that Fairey’s reworking of the photo meets the 2d Circuit’s test of a transformative work — one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”

Blanch also makes clear that it is of no moment that, Dan Heller’s assertions notwithstanding, Fairey’s work (1) was intended to convey a message, (2) was intended to “make a buck.”

It also makes plain that Heller is just plain misunderstanding the law when he states that “you cannot misappropriate someone’s likeness or their property without their consent.” (Emphasis in Heller’s original.) Koons neither sought nor received Blanch’s consent to use her photograph. Koons plainly made more than a buck in the transaction. And the fact that Koons’ message might have been a commentary on the world of “mass communication” does not seem any more worthy of fair use analysis even if we do assume, as does Heller, that Fairey’s poster was “merely” a piece of political advocacy. Finally, there is no applicable “right of publicity” that Fairey violated in appropriating Obama’s image (nor does the Associated Press or its photographer, Manny Garcia, have any right to assert any right of publicity Obama hypothetically could enjoy on his behalf).

ADDENDUM: J O’Shea on Shepard Fairey and the Art of Appropriation.

How do we promote creativity?

One common theme that runs through my views regarding intellectual property is that there is way too much treatment of intellectual property as the equivalent of real property (that is, land). I can fence off my land and keep everyone off of it. Therefore, too many feel, I can fence off my intellectual property and prevent anyone from doing anything with it that I don’t give them permission to do. One commenter on my post last week regarding Shepard Fairey’s Obama campaign poster manifested this confusion about the differences between real property and intellectual property. I think the authors who didn’t want their books to be accessible for word searches via the Google Library Project did as well.

My greatest knowledge about intellectual property concerns copyright. The first thing to know is that copyright is a relatively recent legal creation and that tall U.S. copyright law exists by virtue of and within the limits of 27 words in Article 1. Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution:

The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

In other words, copyright law exists to promote invention and creativity, and to the extent it discourages invention and creativity it is unconstitutional. Works that are genuinely creative in their own right but appropriate copyrighted works (Girl Talk and Shepard Fairey, among many others) therefore have a very strong claim to legitimacy as long as they do not exploit the market created by the original work. Indeed, that’s exactly what the fair use doctrine is intended to allow and is beginning to reflect.

My views are shaped to a considerable degree by my belief that all creativity is grounded in previous work, and that the more leeway the law gives to appropriation the more creativity we will have. Of course there are limits. You cannot entirely rob the artist of the financial profits of his work. But using that first artist’s work in an altered way that creates something people want for reasons entirely different than the reasons they wanted the original work does not rob the first artist of the fruits of his labor. Rather, it allows someone else to sprout new fruit.

Apparently, IBM shares this attitude with respect to inventions it could patent. As Securing Innovation reports:

IBM used the occasion of the recent announcement of its 2008 patent record to introduce plans to help stimulate innovation and economic growth. The company plans to increase by 50% — to more than 3,000 — the number of technical inventions it publishes annually instead of seeking patent protection.

Why? According to IBM’s press release:

Publication of technological information is one means to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” the phrase in the U.S. Constitution giving the Congress the power to enact patent laws. Publication protects inventors from allegations of infringement by placing the intellectual property into the body of prior art. Publications also improve patent quality, since they can be cited by patent offices in limiting the scope of patent applications. Publication also helps spur follow-on innovation that ensures dynamic business growth.

While IBM will continue to seek patents and will protect its intellectual property, its planned increase in publishing inventions will focus on those technology areas that will increase the build out of a new, smarter infrastructure. The evolution of IBM’s policy builds on prior efforts to stimulate innovation by pledging not to assert certain patent rights in the area of open source software, health care, education, the environment, and software interoperability.