Originality relies on a good deal of imitation and even a bit of theft — Picasso this time.

James Polchin, Cezanne, Michelangelo, and Greek sculpture in Picasso’s early drawings:

To look at Picasso’s drawings is to better understand his paintings as something greater than Picasso, an artistic vision based on imitation and purloined art. If we look beyond the artist, we might actually see his art and access his creative process without the shadow and burden of Picasso’s name getting in the way. We might call what Picasso created “invention” or “reinvention,” but it is hard to look at these drawings and not have a sense that so much of what we call originality relies on a good deal of imitation and even a bit of theft.

The principle of collage is the central principle of all art.

No one who has spent more than a few days reading this blog in its 3+ years can have missed the fact that I have been strongly persuaded that the common notion of authorship — that true artists are solitary originating geniuses — is a myth. Kenneth Smith, in “It’s Not Plagiarism. In the Digital Age, It’s ‘Repurposing,’” adresses the same issues and covers much of the same ground, but he brings up a a few very interesting things that I had not previously encountered. The first is the prominent literary critic Marjorie Perloff’s use of the term “unoriginal genius” to describe someone with skill at making his or her way through the contemporary flood of “information.”  A “genius” in this sense is not someone who — as convention has it — comes up with a creation that no one has ever dreamt of before, but, rather, someone with an extraordinary ability to manage available information, parse it, organize it, and distribute it. Perloff believes that in the end it is this type of genius, not the mythical conventional sort, that distinguishes your writing from mine:

Her idea is that, because of changes brought on by technology and the Internet, our notion of the genius—a romantic, isolated figure—is outdated. An updated notion of genius would have to center around one’s mastery of information and its dissemination. Perloff has coined another term, “moving information,” to signify both the act of pushing language around as well as the act of being emotionally moved by that process. She posits that today’s writer resembles more a programmer than a tortured genius, brilliantly conceptualizing, constructing, executing, and maintaining a writing machine.

Perloff’s notion of unoriginal genius should not be seen merely as a theoretical conceit but rather as a realized writing practice, one that dates back to the early part of the 20th century, embodying an ethos in which the construction or conception of a text is as important as what the text says or does. Think, for example, of the collated, note-taking practice of Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project or the mathematically driven constraint-based works by Oulipo, a group of writers and mathematicians. (hyperlinks added)

Even more interesting, however, is what Smith did. He’s taught a class at the University of Pennsylvania he calls “Uncreative Writing.”

In it, students are penalized for showing any shred of originality and creativity. Instead they are rewarded for plagiarism, identity theft, repurposing papers, patchwriting, sampling, plundering, and stealing. Not surprisingly, they thrive. Suddenly what they’ve surreptitiously become expert at is brought out into the open and explored in a safe environment, reframed in terms of responsibility instead of recklessness.

We retype documents and transcribe audio clips. We make small changes to Wikipedia pages (changing an “a” to “an” or inserting an extra space between words). We hold classes in chat rooms, and entire semesters are spent exclusively in Second Life. Each semester, for their final paper, I have them purchase a term paper from an online paper mill and sign their name to it, surely the most forbidden action in all of academia. Students then must get up and present the paper to the class as if they wrote it themselves, defending it from attacks by the other students. What paper did they choose? Is it possible to defend something you didn’t write? Something, perhaps, you don’t agree with? Convince us.

All this, of course, is technology-driven. When the students arrive in class, they are told that they must have their laptops open and connected. And so we have a glimpse into the future. And after seeing what the spectacular results of this are, how completely engaged and democratic the classroom is, I am more convinced that I can never go back to a traditional classroom pedagogy. I learn more from the students than they can ever learn from me. The role of the professor now is part party host, part traffic cop, full-time enabler.

The secret: the suppression of self-expression is impossible. Even when we do something as seemingly “uncreative” as retyping a few pages, we express ourselves in a variety of ways. The act of choosing and reframing tells us as much about ourselves as our story about our mother’s cancer operation. It’s just that we’ve never been taught to value such choices.

After a semester of my forcibly suppressing a student’s “creativity” by making her plagiarize and transcribe, she will tell me how disappointed she was because, in fact, what we had accomplished was not uncreative at all; by not being “creative,” she had produced the most creative body of work in her life. By taking an opposite approach to creativity—the most trite, overused, and ill-defined concept in a writer’s training—she had emerged renewed and rejuvenated, on fire and in love again with writing.

Smith has thus provided another instance of what I already know in a different context — there are more and less original legal writers even though legal writing is one vast collaborative writing enterprise consisting primarily of texts cobbled together from pieces of other legal texts.

Finally, Smith suggests that the insights he provides (which he would no more claim are original to him than I would claim them mine) have been largely resisted in one profoundly important world of writing: literature:

I’m sensing that literature—infinite in its potential of ranges and expressions—is in a rut, tending to hit the same note again and again, confining itself to the narrowest of spectrums, resulting in a practice that has fallen out of step and is unable to take part in arguably the most vital and exciting cultural discourses of our time. I find this to be a profoundly sad moment—and a great lost opportunity for literary creativity to revitalize itself in ways it hasn’t imagined.

Perhaps one reason writing is stuck might be the way creative writing is taught. In regard to the many sophisticated ideas concerning media, identity, and sampling developed over the past century, books about how to be a creative writer have relied on clichéd notions of what it means to be “creative.” These books are peppered with advice like: “A creative writer is an explorer, a groundbreaker. Creative writing allows you to chart your own course and boldly go where no one has gone before.” Or, ignoring giants like de Certeau, Cage, and Warhol, they suggest that “creative writing is liberation from the constraints of everyday life.”

As John Pareles wrote in “Plagiarism in Dylan, or a Cultural Collage?”, Bob Dylan is another one of those giants leading the way:

The absolutely original artist is an extremely rare and possibly imaginary creature, living in some isolated habitat where no previous works or traditions have left any impression. Like virtually every artist, Mr. Dylan carries on a continuing conversation with the past. He’s reacting to all that culture and history offer, not pretending they don’t exist. Admiration and iconoclasm, argument and extension, emulation and mockery — that’s how individual artists and the arts themselves evolve. It’s a process that is neatly summed up in Mr. Dylan’s album title ” ‘Love and Theft,’ ” which itself is a quotation from a book on minstrelsy by Eric Lott.

Of course, literature has not completely ignored these artistic trends. The group of authors comprising Oulipo were exemplars of what Smith might call “writers as programmers,” and Donald Barthelme wrote:

The principle of collage is the central principle of all art in the Twentieth Century.

And, believe me: if you’ve never read Georges Perec or Barthelme, you’ve never read anything like what they’ve written. Or maybe you have.

Again: Culture is Collaborative. Kembrew McLeod this time.

In the Atlantic, there is an interview with “intellectual property scholar (and Atlantic contributor) Kembrew McLeod,” who, with copyright lawyer Peter DiCola, argues in Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling that “current digital copyright practices unfairly burden musicians who sample snippets of other artists’ songs in their own music. begins by taking us back to the golden age of hip-hop, demonstrating how lawsuits quashed a nascent art form during its artistic ascendancy.” In the course of the interview, McLeod touches on several points I have emphasized in this blog, including the ways sampling (like any sort of artistic appropriation) serves perfectly traditional and ordinary artistic purposes:

Sounds can bring back memories. Some samples remind the listener of a particular era, or connect a song with a particular moment in time. Artists want to transport themselves, and the listener, for nostalgic reasons—or to provide historical resonance. Sampling can function like an audio time machine.

McLeod also articulates a point I have made over and over again: that our conventional notions of “authorship” as the creation of wholly original art from the mind of an inspired genius is not at all consistent with the reality of artistic creation:

The old-school notion of the individual genius author is embedded in European and American copyright law—the lone individual genius toiling away until a burst of creativity creates a truly original work unlike anything else that previously exists. But we know that, in the world of music, you can’t really create a new song without referring to an old song in some way. So the law itself assumes a Romantic notion of authorship, though we know this isn’t how culture is produced. Culture is collaborative.

The entire interview is worthwhile. It covers a wide range of matters relevant to these issues and is especially informative on the history of the music industry’s ways of dealing with sampling.

Appropriation art: is Richard Prince’s loss its end? I don’t think so.

The decision holding Richard Prince liable for infringing Patrick Cariou’s copyright in photographs Prince appropriated (which I wrote about 3 days ago) continues to inspire commentary. Donn Zaretsky does his typically excellent work in collecting the range of intelligent commentary and adding his own. He points to what he considers the key point in the decision, the judge’s belief that Prince’s appropriation was not sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use of Cariou’s photographs because Prince’s work did not sufficiently comment on or otherwise refer back to Cariou’s photographs (hyperlinks in original):

[T]he key bit is that the court rejected the fair use defense because, as Artnet’s Walter Robinson puts it, “Prince’s works do not specifically comment on Cariou’s originals.” (Robinson says: “Face it, the notion of ‘appropriation’ just doesn’t play well in our law courts.”) The NYT’s Randy Kennedy writes that “Judge Batts wrote that for fair-use exceptions to apply, a new work of art must be transformative in the sense that it must ‘in some way comment on, relate to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original works’ it borrows from.”

That hasn’t always seemed to be a requirement in other fair use cases. In Blanch v. Koons, for example, the Second Circuit noted that Koons used “Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media” (rather than, as Judge Batts would seem to require, fodder for his commentary on Blanch’s image). Quoting the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision, the court said the test of transformativeness is whether the later work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”

As I wrote the other day, I think the “key” element in the case is the evidence that Cariou had (and that the court apparently found credible) that he had been directly damaged by the appropriation. Cariou had been negotiating with a Manhattan gallery owner for a show of his Yes Rasta photographs when the Gagosian Gallery began showing Prince’s works that appropriated Cariou’s photographs. As a result, the gallery owner considering a show for Cariou’s works backed off, because “she did not want to exhibit work which had been “done already” at another gallery. Slip op. at 6-7. In other words, Prince’s work essentially was functioning as a direct market substitute for Cariou’s work.

That is a far cry from the situation in Blanch v. Koons, in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Jeff Koons’ appropriation of a photograph in a collage constituted fair use. There was no reason in Blanch to believe that Koons’ work in any way damaged any market for the appropriated photograph.

Moreover, Cariou’s case does not and cannot conceivably be interpreted to overturn Blanch, in which, as Zaretsky correctly notes, the Second Circuit approved Koons’ use of “‘Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media’ (rather than, as Judge Batts would seem to require, fodder for his commentary on Blanch’s image).”

Judge Batts’ apparent belief that in order to be sufficiently transformative to qualify as fair use an artistic appropriation must comment on or otherwise refer back to the appropriated work is certainly open to question even apart from the unquestionable continuing vitality of Blanch. The proposition that an appropriation must comment on the original to constitute fair use originates in commentary on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,  (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that 2 Live Crew’s appropriation of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman was a non-infringing fair use. While the Court did stress the ways in which 2 Live Crew’s reworking of the song “parodied” Oh, Pretty Woman, I think it is worth wondering whether one’s principal reaction to 2 Live Crew’s song is that it is making fun of Orbison’s song. More importantly, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, emphasized that the less an appropriating work damages the market for the original work it appropriates, the less it needs to reflect directly back on the original to the degree to constitute a non-infringing fair use:

A parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody presented here may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis of parody. If a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk of serving as a substitute for the original or licensed derivatives (see infra, discussing factor four), it is more incumbent on one claiming fair use to establish the extent of transformation and the parody’s critical relationship to the original. By contrast, when there is little or no risk of market substitution, whether because of the large extent of transformation of the earlier work, the new work’s minimal distribution in the market, the small extent to which it borrows from an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.

Id. at 580, n. 14. And, indeed, this understanding fits perfectly the decision in Blanch, in which it would be absurd to suggest that Jeff Koons was parodying the specific photograph he appropriated rather than using it to comment on the worlds of commercial and fashion photography in general:

Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His stated objective is thus not to repackage Blanch’s “Silk Sandals,” but to employ it “`in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’” When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as “raw material,” in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is transformative.

The test for whether “Niagara’s” use of “Silk Sandals” is “transformative,” then, is whether it “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”The test almost perfectly describes Koons’s adaptation of “Silk Sandals”: the use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American “lifestyles” magazine — with changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects details and, crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning — as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space. We therefore conclude that the use in question was transformative.

Blanch v. Koons, at 467 F.3d at 252-53.

I think it is crucial to remain cognizant of the fact that the case law establishes that there can be transformative use of copyrighted work in art other than art that ridicules copyrighted work. I have gone on at great length on this blog about the ways our conventional notions of authorship are too narrow and historically ignorant. But Ray Down is downright eloquent on the ways these issues pertain to art over at his Copyright Litigation Blog in connection, specifically, with Richard Prince. His entire post, with helpful illustrations, is well worth your read. Here’s an excerpt:

Fine art, truly fine art in an art gallery, is a place where a copyrighted work becomes a fetish object, a tribute, a decontextualized thing revealing a new meaning. The urinal of Marcel Duchamp. The Brillo Box of Andy Warhol. Both utilitarian objects made by others and fetishized by the artists.

And look at L.H.O.O.Q. – nothing original in the execution, but the Mona Lisa was in the public domain at the time. Prince is blatantly stealing. Plagiarists take the words of others and try to make you believe that they have crafted them. But Prince’s cutouts from advertising, porn and outlaw biker magazines never misled the consumer.

But somewhere, something bothers me about shutting a highly respected fine artist down completely and burning his works when the first sale doctrine would permit him to buy a copy, modify it and resell it. When the First Amendment lets even repulsive speech be heard and the contemporary art world says it is art, I have a problem with the government burning it.

To me, an original work of fine art properly labeled as such by a new artist is almost pure speech – or in some way pure idea – even if it includes major appropriations. Things change when the artwork is widely reproduced. When the consumers are paying tens of thousands for Prince to take something no one is interested in, put his spin on it, and add value. Prince’s “appropriation” added ten million dollars worth of value to a pile of books. Everyone knew he didn’t create the original.

This is not a question of consumers being defrauded, these are wealthy ultrasophisticates on the cutting edge who are the purchasers – surrounded by the top art advisers and critics -if these people feel that Prince’s value added is that great, what is the harm in letting them indulge, as long as Prince legally purchased the original books? In fact, Prince’s prices will probably soar – scarcity and scandal drive art prices up.

From a semiotic perspective, isn’t Prince simply holding up a mirror to people who may not want to look at themselves or their art as art in the hands of another? And if your message is mirror-like, is it less valid? And if you don’t have the verbal skills to articulate what you are doing, is that any less a mirror?

In short, I think Dowd is right, but I also think the death knell of non-parodic appropriation is being rung without reason. Finally, I think that if Cariou convinced the court that Prince’s appropriations robbed Cariou of real opportunities to sell his photographs, the outcome of Cariou’s case is obviously correct and does not threaten the kind of appropriation case people like Zaretsky, Dowd, and I talk about when we talk about appropriation by the likes of Prince, Koons, and Shepard Fairey.

If you think you’ll come up with a really original idea, you’re just kidding yourself.

In The City and the City, China Mieville writes a police procedural that takes place in “[t]win southern European cities Beszel and Ul Qoma,” which “coexist in the same physical location” but are “separated by their citizens’ determination to see only one city at a time.” When I read the novel I marveled at the originality of the premise. Of course, as Mieville himself recognizes in an interview on BLDGBLOG, there’s nothing new under the sun:

I should say, also, that with the whole idea of a divided city there are analogies in the real world, as well as precursors within fantastic fiction. C. J. Cherryh wrote a book that had a divided city like that, in some ways, as did Jack Vance. Now I didn’t know this at the time, but I’m also not getting my knickers in a twist about it. If you think what you’re trying to do is come up with a really original idea—one that absolutely no one has ever had before—you’re just kidding yourself.

You’re inevitably going to tread the ground that the greats have trodden before, and that’s fine. It simply depends on what you’re able to do with it.

That indeed is where artistic genius resides — not in the originality of the thought, but in what the artist does with the thought.

Matt Ridley: When ideas have sex

Innovation comes from remixing what we already have.

I’ve written frequently about the myth that creative genius is the product of solitary inspiration and the ways that myth reinforces notions of intellectual property that, under the pretense of rewarding innovation, in fact stifle innovation by preventing the re-use and remixing of existing ideas, creations, and inventions. In reviewing Steven Johnson‘s Where New Ideas Come From, Paul Crowe makes the point that

Greek philosophers said nothing comes from nothing, a new idea, actually a new anything, is simply a rearrangement or unique new combination of things that already exist. When you think of it that way, coming up with new ideas isn’t about having that mysterious “creative” ability, it might be more about a willingness to try lots of new combinations to see what might work, and, hey, anyone can do that, you just need desire and effort.

The myth of authorship and the rise of a new artistic culture

As I’ve pointed out previously, my colleague and friend Martha Woodmansee‘s scholarship is fundamental to the reexamination of the historical bases of our present conceptions of “authorship”:

An “author” in the modern sense is the creator of unique literary, or artistic, “works” the originality of which warrants their protection under laws of intellectual property — Anglo American “copyright” and European “authors’ rights.”

Now Abram Sinnreich, in Mashed Up: Music, Technology, and the Rise of Configurable Culture, extends these insights into the quirks that have produced our notion of authorship and the ways the radical changes in the technological realities governing the creation and distribution of artistic works is undermines that notion. truthdig has posted a substantial excerpt, the entirety of which (like the book, no doubt) is well worth reading. Here’s just a taste, one that begins to develop the relationship between the current conventional wisdom of what an author is and its relationship to our social obsession with converting public goods into private property:

The biggest myth of all is the Romantic notion that artists somehow create their work uniquely and from scratch, that paintings and sculptures and songs emerge fully-formed from their fertile minds like Athena sprang from Zeus. Running a close second is the myth that only a handful of us possess the raw talent – or the genius – to be an artist. According to this myth, the vast majority of us may be able to appreciate art to some degree, but we will never have what it takes to make it. The third myth is that an artist’s success (posthumous though it may be) is proof positive of his worthiness, that the marketplace for art and music functions as some kind of aesthetic meritocracy.

Of course, these myths fly in the face of our everyday experience. We know rationally that Picasso’s cubism looks a lot like Braque’s, and that Michael Jackson sounds a lot like James Brown at 45 RPM. We doodle and sing and dance our way through our days, improvising and embellishing the mundane aspects of our existence with countless unheralded acts of creativity. And we all know that American Idol and its ilk are total B.S. (very entertaining B.S., of course!). Each of us can number among our acquaintance wonderful singers, dancers, painters or writers whose creations rival or outstrip those of their famous counterparts, just as each of us knows at least one beauty who puts the faces on the covers of glossy magazines to shame.

And yet, we believe the myths. How could we not? Who among us has the time, the energy, or even the motivation to buck the overwhelming support the myth of the Artist receives from the institutions that govern our society – to dispute our schools, our churches, even our laws? What is copyright, after all, but the legal assertion of an individual’s sole ownership over a unique artifact of creative expression? These laws, sometimes enforced at gunpoint, require us to believe the myths, or face the consequences.

Of course, there’s a reason the myths exist. Our economy runs on the privatization of hitherto public goods. Our legal system is premised on the individual as the locus of all rights, all liability, all blame. Our society’s profound inequalities are only acceptable because we believe ourselves to live in a meritocracy, a world where a person’s success is de facto proof of his or her inherent worthiness. In short, the myth of the Artist-with-a-capital-A allows us to believe in America-with-a-capital-A.

Plagiarizing about Plagiarism

You could write a column entitled “When it comes to songwriting, there’s a fine line between inspiration and plagiarism” any day of the week, and I believe I have, though I only stole the idea from the KLF (or Negativland or Bob Dylan, or Jim Jarmusch or Jonathan Lethem or David Shields or  David Markson or Shepard Fairey or . . . )

Stealing what you love

John Pareles wrote, in “Plagiarism in Dylan, or a Cultural Collage?,”that “[i]deas aren’t meant to be carved in stone and left inviolate; they’re meant to stimulate the next idea and the next.” Accordingly, in words apropos of a point I’ve made over and over and over on this blog, he explains:

The absolutely original artist is an extremely rare and possibly imaginary creature, living in some isolated habitat where no previous works or traditions have left any impression. Like virtually every artist, Mr. Dylan carries on a continuing conversation with the past. He’s reacting to all that culture and history offer, not pretending they don’t exist. Admiration and iconoclasm, argument and extension, emulation and mockery — that’s how individual artists and the arts themselves evolve. It’s a process that is neatly summed up in Mr. Dylan’s album title “Love and Theft, ” which itself is a quotation from a book on minstrelsy by Eric Lott. (hyperlinks added)

Another masterful artist, David Foster Wallace, wrote, “No one who is invested in any kind of art . . . can read [Lewis Hyde's book] The Gift and remain unchanged.” It is Hyde’s thesis not merely that all art builds on earlier art, but that it is precisely the artist’s recognition that his creations are gifts that sustains his creativity. In other words, the capacity to create is a gift given to the artist and is given only if the artist understands his own creations as gifts themselves that other artists can use themselves in their acts of creation:

It is the assumption of this book that a work of art is a gift, not a commodity. Or, to state the modern case with more precision, that works of art exist simultaneously in two “economics,” a market economy and a gift economy. Only one of these is essential, however: a work of art can survive without the market, but where there is no gift there is no art.

So it should be no surprise that Andreas Hykade entitled this brilliant video “Love & Theft“:

The internet and mixing and matching texts is not destroying authorship, and to believe so is to misunderstand authorship. Kakutani this time.

“The Principle of collage is the central principal of all art in the Twentieth Century.” – Donald Barthelme

In a rambling and incoherent diatribe in yesterday’s New York Times, Michiko Kakutani mixes and matches wildly disparate issues and controversies in what purports to be an effort to address “the contentious issues of copyright, intellectual property and plagiarism that have become prominent in a world in which the Internet makes copying and recycling as simple as pressing a couple of buttons.”

While Ms. Kakutani’s piece defies any effort to identify, much less analyze and criticize, any single thesis (or even a manageable number of theses), I cannot leave unchallenged her following contention:

As John Updike pointed out, . . .   ‘the end of authorship’ — hobbling writers’ ability to earn a living from their published works, while at the same time removing a sense of both recognition and accountability from their creations — would result from the hypothetical possibility that “books would cease to be individual works but would be scanned and digitized into one great, big continuous text that could be ‘unraveled into single pages’ or ‘reduced further, into snippets of a page,’ which readers  . . . could then appropriate and remix, like bits of music, into new works of their own.”

As Martha Woodmansee, Peter Jaszi, and others have pointed out, Ms. Kakutani and Mr. Updike’s conceptions of “authorship” are narrow-minded  historical artifacts resulting from the efforts in the 18th Century of book publishers, not authors, to protect their economic interests  and of the conceptions of copyright law that those publishers managed to enact into law and that persist to this day.

The Case Western Reserve English Department’s Authorship Collective, building largely on the work of Professor Woodmansee, summarizes this history as follows:

An “author” in the modern sense is the creator of unique literary, or artistic, “works” the originality of which warrants their protection under laws of intellectual property — Anglo American “copyright” and European “authors’ rights.” This notion is so firmly established that it persists and flourishes even in the face of contrary experience. Experience tells us that our creative practices are largely derivative, generally collective, and increasingly corporate and collaborative. Yet we nevertheless tend to think of genuine authorship as solitary and originary.

This individualistic construction of authorship is a relatively recent invention, the result of a radical reconceptualization of the creative process that culminated less than two centuries ago in the heroic self-presentation of Romantic poets. In the view of poets from Herder and Goethe to Wordsworth and Coleridge genuine authorship is originary in the sense that it results not in a variation, an imitation, or an adaptation, and certainly not in a mere reproduction, but in a new, unique — in a word, “original” — work which, accordingly, may be said to be the property of its creator and to merit the law’s protection as such. [See Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’”; rpt. in Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market, 35-55.

With its emphasis on originality and self-declaring creative genius, this notion of authorship has functioned to marginalize or deny the work of many creative people: women, non-Europeans, artists working in traditional forms and genres, and individuals engaged in group or collaborative projects, to name but a few. Exposure of these exclusions — the recovery of marginalized creators and underappreciated forms of creative production — has been a central occupation of cultural studies for several decades. But the same cannot be said for the law. Our intellectual property law evolved alongside of and to a surprising degree in conversation with Romantic literary theory. At the center — indeed, the linchpin — of Anglo-American copyright as well as of European “authors’ rights” is a thoroughly Romantic conception of authorship.  Romantic ideology has also been absorbed by other branches of intellectual property law such as the law of patent and trademark; and it informs the international intellectual property regime. In patent it survives today both in figurations of the inventor and in the emphasis, which this body of law shares with copyright, on the “transformative” moment in the creative process.

We suggested above that cultural production necessarily draws upon previous creative accomplishments. For the better part of human history this derivative aspect of a new work was thought to contribute to, if not virtually to constitute, its value. Writers, like other artisans, considered their task to lie in the reworking of traditional materials according to principles and techniques preserved and handed down to them in rhetoric and poetics — the collective wisdom of their craft. In the event that they chanced to go beyond the state of the art, their innovation was ascribed to God, or later to Providence. Similarly, in the sphere of science, invention and discovery were viewed as essentially incremental — the inevitable outcome of a (collective) effort on the part of many individuals applying inherited methods and principles to the solution of shared problems.

It was not until the eighteenth century, and then chiefly in Western Europe, that an alternative vision of creative activity focusing on the endowments and accomplishments of the individual “genius” began to take shape. In a sharp departure from the self-understanding of writers of previous generations, authors in the new Romantic mode viewed their task as one of transforming the materials of personal sense experience through the operation of their unique, individual genius. This change of emphasis mystified the writing process, obscuring the reliance of these writers on the work of others. The notion that a technological or scientific breakthrough owes its existence to the “genius” — the unique creative abilities — of an individual inventor seems to be even more recent. It appears to date only to the third quarter of the nineteenth century.  Borrowed from literary discourse, this notion similarly obscures the collective or collaborative element in scientific invention and discovery. Both misrepresentations of creative activity appear to have fostered and been fostered by modern intellectual property law. Like copyright, modern patent emphasizes individual achievement — chiefly by rewarding the identification of a single genuinely transformative moment in what in most places through most of human history has been viewed as a collaborative because incremental and continuous process.

“Authorship is rarely a simple question.” — Architecture this time

I’ve written before that it boggles my mind when people write seriously that legal documents that duplicate others might constitute copyright violations. Originality is not of any value in a legal document — the document’s effectiveness in accomplishing its purpose is all that matters. Moreover, as I’ve also mentioned, legal writing is a quintessentially collaborative enterprise. Of course, law is not unique in this regard. In the course of finishing up a paper on the nature of a judge as an “author,” I came across a story from the New York Times written in 2005 about why accusations of plagiarism by architects rarely make it to court. Guess what? Architecture too is largely a collaborative enterprise. As the story states:

One reason accusations of plagiarism [between architects] rarely make it to court is that architecture, despite the romantic image of the solitary genius, is largely a collaborative pursuit. Principal, project architect, project designer and outside consultants of all stripes contribute to a design. All the while, young architects move from firm to firm, spreading ideas and sometimes eventually opening their own, competing offices. As for student architects, well, just because they don’t get paid for their work doesn’t mean it never enters the commercial arena. There’s so much rich activity going on at the schools,” said Bill Sharples of the Manhattan firm SHoP/Sharples Holden Pasquarelli, ‘it’s hard not to be influenced by it.’ With so many influences and so many echoes, authorship is rarely a simple question.”

Robert Johnson made no deal with the devil; he listened to and learned from his colleagues.

In “Beyond Authorship: Refiguring Rights in Traditional Culture and Bioknowledge,” the Case Western Reserve University English Department’s Authorship Collaborative (building on the work of my colleague and friend Martha Woodmansee) explains that the prevailing view of an author as the originator of new works is a relatively recent phenomenon arising out of the Romantic Movement and its view of an artist as someone uniquely inspired. This view of authorship stands in stark contrast to an older view becoming new again in today’s remix cutlure — a view that creative endeavors are derivative and collaborative, that originality is not the product of isolated genius but of, well, remixing:

An “author” in the modern sense is the creator of unique literary, or artistic, “works” the originality of which warrants their protection under laws of intellectual property — Anglo American “copyright” and European “authors’ rights.” This notion is so firmly established that it persists and flourishes even in the face of contrary experience. Experience tells us that our creative practices are largely derivative, generally collective, and increasingly corporate and collaborative. Yet we nevertheless tend to think of genuine authorship as solitary and originary. This individualistic construction of authorship is a relatively recent invention, the result of a radical reconceptualization of the creative process that culminated less than two centuries ago in the heroic self-presentation of Romantic poets. In the view of poets from Herder and Goethe to Wordsworth and Coleridge genuine authorship is originary in the sense that it results not in a variation, an imitation, or an adaptation, and certainly not in a mere reproduction, but in a new, unique — in a word, “original” — work which, accordingly, may be said to be the property of its creator and to merit the law’s protection as such. See Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’”; reprinted in Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market, 35-55.

The post I referred to yesterday by Rene Kita noted the tension between the collaborative nature of creation and the Romantic notion of authorship in connection with the Blues: “[Y]ou may ‘create’ a new instance of The Blues by shuffling the notes and words around by a set amount. Shuffle too little and you’re in trouble with the law. Shuffle too much and the purists start screaming rape.”

My former colleague Olufunmilayo B. Arewa makes the point in much greater depth in “Seeing but not Hearing Music: How Copyright Got and Didn’t Get the Blues,” a working paper she recently presented at the recent Conference on the 100th Anniversary of the 1909 Copyright Act. Arewa focuses on Robert Johnson, the musician who remained largely obscure until decades after his death he became known as the greatest and quintessential Blues musician. In Arewa’s view, Johnson is an archetypical example of the way the Romantic view of authorship promotes individual genius over cultural context:

Commentators have so elevated Johnson by using classic language associated with Romantic author discourse that emphasizes the unique genius of Johnson’s compositions. Romantic author discourse has generally played an important role in defining who constitutes an “author” for copyright purposes in part by emphasizing the unique and genius-likecontributions of individual creators. Romantic author assumptions are a primary mechanism by which borrowing and collaboration in creation are minimized or even denied. This vision of authorship has significantimplications for the application of copyright to blues music. The collaborative nature of blues musical composition does not lend itself very well to Romantic author characterizations. In blues practice, the combination of individual performers crafting material from a collaborative tradition is a difficult one from the perspective of current assumptions about creation in copyright. Later romanticization of his musical creations aside, Robert Johnson falls firmly within a blues tradition characterized at least in part by repetition and reuse of existing music and lyrics as a core aesthetic. [Charles Ford, "Robert Johnson's Rhythms", 17 Popular Music 71, 88 n. 57 note 57, at 88 (noting that Johnson borrowed and pasted-in materials much like his predecessors and shaped his pieces into unique and autonomous forms)].The divergence between Robert Johnson’s actual musical practice and later characterizations of both the nature and musical practices underlying his “musical genius” is thus significant. (footnotes omitted)

Why, then, did Robert Johnson, who in Arewa’s view was likely of a piece with an entire genre to African American audiences in the 1920s and 1930s, become known as a genius among musicians comparable to the way Shakespeare is viewed among writers? Because a bunch of white British musicians in the 1960s listened to his recordings and heard something they genuinely had never heard before. In other words, as Arewa explains, perceiving originality in the Romantic sense is more a matter of being ignorant of sources and influences than it is of genuinely discovering independent genius:

Conceptions of Robert Johnson’s work highlight the context dependent nature of notions of originality. Originality is yet another characteristic of copyrightability that is not always easy to delineate in actual contexts of creation. However, what might seem original to those in one context may not seem as original in other contexts. Consequently, within the context of African American audiences of the 1920s and 1930s, Johnson’s work probably did not seem startlingly original in the way that it did to British and other musicians and audiences listening to Johnson’s music, often in relative isolation, in the 1950s and 1960s. This later audience was largely removed from the original context of other music that was prevalent at the time Johnson produced his music or able to listen to a limited and likely biased sample of such music. For early African American blues listeners, what seemed original and
interesting was very different that what seemed interesting and original to the largely white blues fans that were the major force behind the blues revival in the 1950s and 1960s. For the latter, romantic conceptions about the blues were closely tied to notions of authenticity that are often unsuited to musical creation in living musical traditions. As a result, what is perceived as original may depend in significant part on the contexts within which listeners hear music. (footnotes omitted)

Don’t believe it? Here’s a song by Charlie Patton (1891-1934) and one by Robert Johnson:

How do we promote creativity?

One common theme that runs through my views regarding intellectual property is that there is way too much treatment of intellectual property as the equivalent of real property (that is, land). I can fence off my land and keep everyone off of it. Therefore, too many feel, I can fence off my intellectual property and prevent anyone from doing anything with it that I don’t give them permission to do. One commenter on my post last week regarding Shepard Fairey’s Obama campaign poster manifested this confusion about the differences between real property and intellectual property. I think the authors who didn’t want their books to be accessible for word searches via the Google Library Project did as well.

My greatest knowledge about intellectual property concerns copyright. The first thing to know is that copyright is a relatively recent legal creation and that tall U.S. copyright law exists by virtue of and within the limits of 27 words in Article 1. Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution:

The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

In other words, copyright law exists to promote invention and creativity, and to the extent it discourages invention and creativity it is unconstitutional. Works that are genuinely creative in their own right but appropriate copyrighted works (Girl Talk and Shepard Fairey, among many others) therefore have a very strong claim to legitimacy as long as they do not exploit the market created by the original work. Indeed, that’s exactly what the fair use doctrine is intended to allow and is beginning to reflect.

My views are shaped to a considerable degree by my belief that all creativity is grounded in previous work, and that the more leeway the law gives to appropriation the more creativity we will have. Of course there are limits. You cannot entirely rob the artist of the financial profits of his work. But using that first artist’s work in an altered way that creates something people want for reasons entirely different than the reasons they wanted the original work does not rob the first artist of the fruits of his labor. Rather, it allows someone else to sprout new fruit.

Apparently, IBM shares this attitude with respect to inventions it could patent. As Securing Innovation reports:

IBM used the occasion of the recent announcement of its 2008 patent record to introduce plans to help stimulate innovation and economic growth. The company plans to increase by 50% — to more than 3,000 — the number of technical inventions it publishes annually instead of seeking patent protection.

Why? According to IBM’s press release:

Publication of technological information is one means to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” the phrase in the U.S. Constitution giving the Congress the power to enact patent laws. Publication protects inventors from allegations of infringement by placing the intellectual property into the body of prior art. Publications also improve patent quality, since they can be cited by patent offices in limiting the scope of patent applications. Publication also helps spur follow-on innovation that ensures dynamic business growth.

While IBM will continue to seek patents and will protect its intellectual property, its planned increase in publishing inventions will focus on those technology areas that will increase the build out of a new, smarter infrastructure. The evolution of IBM’s policy builds on prior efforts to stimulate innovation by pledging not to assert certain patent rights in the area of open source software, health care, education, the environment, and software interoperability.

Ruling Imagination: Law and Creativity/Is creativity individual or collective?

The question of authorship on scientific papers is an important question. For centuries, every paper was a single-author paper. Moreover, each was thousands of pages long and leather-bound. But now, when science has become such a collaborative enterprise and single-author papers are becoming a rarity, when a 12-author paper turns no heads and 100-author papers are showing up more and more, it has become necessary to put some order in the question of authorship.

An “author” in the modern sense is the creator of unique literary, or artistic, “works” the originality of which warrants their protection under laws of intellectual property — Anglo American “copyright” and European “authors’ rights.” This notion is so firmly established that it persists and flourishes even in the face of contrary experience. Experience tells us that our creative practices are largely derivative, generally collective, and increasingly corporate and collaborative. Yet we nevertheless tend to think of genuine authorship as solitary and originary.

[In contrast, the] individualistic construction of authorship is a relatively recent invention, the result of a radical reconceptualization of the creative process that culminated less than two centuries ago in the heroic self-presentation of Romantic poets. In the view of poets from Herder and Goethe to Wordsworth and Coleridge genuine authorship is originary in the sense that it results not in a variation, an imitation, or an adaptation, and certainly not in a mere reproduction, but in a new, unique — in a word, “original” — work which, accordingly, may be said to be the property of its creator and to merit the law’s protection as such. See Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author‘”.