Michalis Pichler: Statements on Appropriation (2009)

Michalis Pichler: Statements on Appropriation (2009) 

1. if a book paraphrases one explicit historical or contemporary predecessor in title, style and/or content, this technique is what I would call a “greatest hit”

2. Maybe the belief that an appropriation is always a conscious strategic decision made by an author is just as naive as believing in an “original” author in the first place.

3. It appears to me, that the signature of the author, be it an artist, cineast or poet, seems to be the beginning of the system of lies, that all poets, all artists try to establish, to defend themselves, I do not know exactly against what.

4. Custom having once given the name of ” the ancients ” to our pre-Christian ancestors, we will not throw it up against them that, in comparison with us experienced people, they ought properly to be called children, but will rather continue to honor them as our good old fathers.

5. It is nothing but literature!

6. there is as much unpredictable originality in quoting, imitating, transposing, and echoing, as there is in inventing.

7. For the messieurs art-critics i will add, that of course it requires a far bigger mastery to cut out an artwork out of the artistically unshaped nature, than to construct one out of arbitrary material after ones own artistic law.

8. The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced.

9. Intellectual Property is the oil of the 21st century

10. Certain images, objects, sounds, texts or thoughts would lie within the area of what is appropriation, if they are somewhat more explicit, sometimes strategic, sometimes indulging in borrowing, stealing, appropriating, inheriting, assimilating… being influenced, inspired, dependent, indebted, haunted, possessed, quoting, rewriting, reworking, refashioning… a re-vision, re-evaluation, variation, version, interpretation, imitation, proximation, supplement, increment, improvisation, prequel… pastiche, paraphrase, parody, forgery, homage, mimicry, travesty, shan-zhai, echo, allusion, intertextuality and karaoke.

11. Plagiarism is necessary, progress implies it.

12. Ultimately, any sign or word is susceptible to being converted into something else, even into its opposite.

13. Like Bouvard and Pecuchet, those eternal copyists, both sublime and comical and whose profound absurdity precisely designates the truth of writing, the writer can only imitate a gesture forever anterior, never original

14. The world is full of texts, more or less interesting; I do not wish to add any more.

15.

16. The question is: what is seen now, but will never be seen again?

17. Détournement reradicalizes previous critical conclusions that have been petrified into respectable truths and thus transformed into lies.

18. No poet, no artist, of any art has his complete meaning alone.

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On December 11 2009 six one sentence statements originated by the “artist /author” for the purpose of this piece were mixed, in a container, with eighteen one sentence quotes taken from various other sources; each sentence was printed onto a separate piece of paper. Eighteen statements were drawn by “blind” selection and, in the exact order of their selection, join altogether to form the “statements on appropriation”, for the presentation at Stichting Perdu, Amsterdam.

In the following bibliography the sources (…) may be found although no specific statement is keyed to its actual author.

Roland Barthes,”The Death of the Author”, (1967)

Walter Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library “(1931), repr. In “Illuminations”, (ed.) Hannah Arendt (1968)

Walter Benjamin (1936), “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit”, Frankfurt/Main 1963, p.15 (transl.http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm)

Marcel Broodthaers (interviewed by Freddy de Vree, 1971) repr. in “Broodthaers”, Koeln (1994), p. 93

Ulises Carrión , “The New Art of Making Books”, Kontexts no. 6-7, 1975 and repr. in Guy Schraenen: “We have won! Haven’t we?”, Amsterdam, (1992)

Giorgio de Chirico, repr. in “The New Five-Foot Shelf of Books”, Allen Ruppersberg, Ljubljana (2003)

Guy Debord, “The Society of the Spectacle” Paris, (1967), Paragraph 206, (transl. Ken Knabb http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/debord/8.htm )

Guy Debord, Gil J Wolman, “Mode d’emploi du détournement” in “Les Lèvres Nues #8″ (trans. by Ken Knabb “A User’s Guide to Détournement” (2006))

Eliot, T.S. “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919), repr. in Frank Kermode (ed.) “Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot”, (1984) London:Faber, p.37

Mark Getty, chairman of Getty Images in an interview with “The Economist”, London (2000)

Kenneth Goldsmith , “Being Boring”, in The Newpaper #2, London (2008), p.2,http://www.thenewpaper.co.uk

herakleitos, Ephesos (around 500 BC), quoted by Plato in “Cratylus” (fragment 41)

Julia Kristeva “Word, Dialogue and Novel” (1969), repr. in Toril Moi, (ed.) “The Kristeva Reader”

Comte de Lautréamont (Isidore Ducasse), “Poésies”, London (1978), p.68

Daniel McClean and Karsten Schubert (ed), Dear Images: Art, Copyright, and Culture, (2002)

Allen Ruppersberg, “Fifty helpful hints on the Art of the Everyday” in “The Secret of Life and Death”, LA (1985), p.113

Kurt Schwitters, “i (ein Manifest)” repr. in ” Kurt Schwitters – Das Literarische Werk” (ed.) Friedhelm Lach Band 5, p. 120, Koeln (1973/1981)

Leo Steinberg, (1978) repr. in Schwartz, Hillel, Culture of the Copy, Zone Books, New York (1996)

Max Stirner, “Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum” (1844), Stuttgart (1972), S.16

—–
see also: Douglas Huebler, “Variable piece #20″, Bradford, Massachusetts 1970

Richard Prince doesn’t have to describe one of his paintings as a Rhino in Hot Pants Shouting, “Repent, Repent!” for it to be so.

Tom Waits on the “meanings” of his songs:

If you break open a song, you’ll find the eggs of other songs. Misunderstandings are really kind of an epidemic and acceptable. I think it’s about one thing, but someone else will say, ‘That song is kind of a rhino in hot pants on a burnt rocking horse with a lariat shouting, “Repent, repent!” I think that’s great.

Why do I bring up Waits rejoicing in the fact someone might hear one of his songs as a “kind of rhino in hot pants on a burnt rocking horse with a lariat shouting, “repent, repent!” Because the lawyer for Patrick Cariou believes that a work of art appropriating another work can only be interpreted to be sufficiently “transformative” of that earlier work if the appropriator expresses in words a transformative purpose. Richard Prince, in appropriating Patrick Cariou’s photographs for his own artistic purposes, said he had no real interest in the meaning behind Cariou’s work, and that he used it strictly as “raw material,” that it was “taking for the sake of taking.”

Cariou’s lawyer thinks that Prince’s inability to state an artistic purpose is fatal to his case. In his eyes, the law requires a 2-step process: “First the defendant has to say” he was engaged in a transformative use of the work he was appropriating. “Only then does the court go on to say, ‘Well let’s see if this is reasonably perceivable.’”

As I made clear yesterday, and as I think Tom Waits makes clear far more vividly, it seems absurd to limit the meaning of a work of art to whatever the artist might state it is. Nor is this particular controversial. The phrase “intentional fallacy” was coined in the title of an influential scholarly article (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946) claiming that artists’ intentions are neither available nor desirable as a standard for assessing art. As has been pointed out, “Intentionalists disagreed, arguing that any sense of the artist’s intention, however obscure, can be a useful resource in interpreting a work of art.”

But the point is, even “Intentionalists” acknowledge that judging, interpreting, and assessing art calls on attention to the art and all it evokes in the eyes of the viewer. Those judgments, interpretations, and assessments are never limited to what the artist wanted the viewer to see and think.

So Cariou’s lawyer is advancing nonsense when he suggests the court should be limited in that way. Nor is the precedent for court reliance in making fair use decisions on the expressed intent of the appropriating artist particularly compelling support for that nonsense. It is true that in Blanch v. Koons the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit relied on what Jeff Koons stated his purposes were in appropriating a photograph for use in one of his paintings. But there were no competing interpretations submitted to the court. As the court pointed out: “Koons asserts — and Blanch does not deny — that his purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s goals in creating it.” Quite simply, the court was persuaded by Koons’ explanations. That the court was so persuaded does not mean, however, that the artist’s explanations are the only means by which the court could be persuaded.already stated their intent to parody. Nor, as Cariou’s lawyer contends, did a lower court find that 2 Live Crew’s re-working of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” depended on 2 Live Crew’s assertion their song was a “parody.” In fact, the Court found that 2 Live Crew’s words parodied Orbison’s and remanded the case so a lower court might determine (a) whether there had been any negative economic impact on sales of Orbison’s song in the potential “derivative market” of rap cover versions, and (b) whether the quantity of musical elements taken from Orbison’s song were more than necessary to 2 Live Crew’s purposes. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91. After remand, the case settled, and there were no further court hearings.

Building knowledge in the digital age; the transition continues — science this time.

I have made the point on this blog that the digitization of information and the internet have made the old ways of doing business with information (be it entertainment, news, science, or art) obsolete and that efforts to force the new media into legal forms that evolved with the ways businesses had organized the old technologies are doomed to failure or to killing the innovation those laws are supposed to promote.

But the struggles inherent in the transition from old and established ways of doing business are ongoing and will continue to be. Today’s example comes from the world of science. As the New York Times reports, “For centuries, [scientific] research [was]cdone in private, then submitted to science and medical journals to be reviewed by peers and published for the benefit of other researchers and the public at large.  . . . Peer review can take months, journal subscriptions can be prohibitively costly, and a handful of gatekeepers limit the flow of information. It is an ideal system for sharing knowledge, said the quantum physicist Michael Nielsen, only ‘if you’re stuck with 17th-century technology.’”

But Dr. Nielsen and others argue that science can happen much more quickly and accurately using the new technologies, and reality is catching up to their ideals (even as established institutional players such as universities and grant-makers still depend on the “traditional published paper” as their exclusive criterion of judgment):

Open-access archives and journals like arXiv and the Public Library of Science (PLoS) have sprung up in recent years. GalaxyZoo, a citizen-science site, has classified millions of objects in space, discovering characteristics that have led to a raft of scientific papers.

On the collaborative blog MathOverflow, mathematicians earn reputation points for contributing to solutions; in another math experiment dubbed the Polymath Project, mathematicians commenting on the Fields medalist Timothy Gower’s blog in 2009 found a new proof for a particularly complicated theorem in just six weeks.

And a social networking site called ResearchGate — where scientists can answer one another’s questions, share papers and find collaborators — is rapidly gaining popularity.

Editors of traditional journals say open science sounds good, in theory. In practice, “the scientific community itself is quite conservative,” said Maxine Clarke, executive editor of the commercial journal Nature, who added that the traditional published paper is still viewed as “a unit to award grants or assess jobs and tenure.”

John Oswald, pioneer of the aural collage: the futility of law in the face of technology it cannot control.

I’ve written at length in this blog about compositions consisting of digital remixes of pre-recorded samples and the contentious and utterly unresolved tensions between copyright, fair use, and the extra-legal reality of practices that cannot be controlled by legal rules. I’ve written about artists as varied as Negativland, Girl Talk, Steinski, and Kutiman, among others. Negativland and Steinski were pioneers in the genre, composing their aural collages back in the ancient days before digital media made the stitching together of digital information something one could do sitting in front of a laptop in bed.

But no one was there before John Oswald of Plunderphonics. A mere fraction of his career’s chronology demonstrates that he is perhaps the pioneer of the genre:

1973-75

With the sanction of William S. Burroughs, John Oswald cut up recordings of him reading his texts advocating cutting up methods, & consequently discovered an acoustic pallindrome, mediations between backwards & forwards, polysyllabic masking & phase imploding.

1975

Oswald melds a radio evangelist with alleged satanists Led Zepplin in the early rap track POWER. released in 1995 by Musicworks magazine.

1975-85

MYSTERY TAPES assembly & dissemination (by Mystery Tapes Etc.International), include many early plunderphonistic experiments.

1980

Oswald guest produces a one hour radio show for CFRO in Vancouver called Sounds Wrong which includes the first public issues of Dolly Parton & Rite of Spring transformations.

1982

Collusion, a British magazine publishes an article by Oswald, entitled “Revolutions & Mr Dolly Parton – a vortex of of androgeny”.

1985

An essay by John Oswald entitled “Plunderphonics, or, Audio Piracy as a Compositional Prerogative” was presented at the Wired Society conference in Toronto.

1988

The original Plunderphonics EP (never-for-sale, out-of-print) was for its time the most extreme example of sampling ever produced. Four well-known music personalities representing four musical genres & four notable epochs of recording history were presented in surprising ways, or, as the press release put it: warp drive.

1989

The Plunderphonic CD (never-for-sale, remaining stocks destroyed by Michael Jackson & CBS) has become an underground cult classic. The realistic cover photo of a nude Michael Jackson revealed as a white woman paralleled the musical transformations depicted on the disc. Other electroquoted artists included Bing Crosby, The Beatles, Glenn Gould, Public Enemy & (consequently) James Brown.

You can read a more complete biography of Oswald here.

Far more interesting is an extensive recorded interview with Oswald. One of the most fascinating parts of the interview is Oswald’s account of his experience with the overwhelming legal forces brought to bear in the name of copyright enforcement against his new compositions. In a series of events not unlike those experienced by Negativland in connection with their composition U2, every last CD Oswald retained of his recording was destroyed. Of course, he had already distributed some of those CDs and was unable to recover them. And we all know digital media metastasize beyond any capacity of corporate control. So, of course, as with Negativland’s U2, Oswald’s recording not only continues to exist; it is available (for free) for digital downloading.

For your listening pleasure, I include here one track from the album: Glenn Gould-Aria(mp3).

Steinski: The Motorcade Sped On (for November 22)

Do you think something original can be made entirely from copyrighted pieces? Christian Marclay: The Clock

An Introduction to Copyright, Fair Use, and Appropriation Art, Part 1

In September, I spoke at SPACES on copyright and art, an opportunity that I used to go introduce copyright and fair use and the contentious issues that remain entirely unresolved in connection with appropriation art. I had an opportunity to give a similar talk last week at Wooster College.

You can see my presentation here. But the presentation, obviously, is only the starting point of a talk, so I thought I’d take this opportunity to “annotate” the presentation, providing some commentary and a lot of links to provide most of the content of the talk here and to supplement it for those who were there.

This post constitutes the first part of these annotations. I will continue this supplement to the presentation in the near future.

The first “slide” (I used Prezi, not PowerPoint, for the first time in this talk) is a video by Kutiman, a musician, composer, producer and animator from Israel. He is best known for creating an online video music project entitled ThruYOU consisting of individual videos mixed entirely from samples of YouTube videos.

The second slide is the title slide: What does an artist need to know about copyright law? Although I spoke a lot about appropriation art and copyright law, I emphasized my sincere belief that to negotiate the difficulties posed by copyright law in an era of novel and breathtaking technologies requires the gifts of an artist. I used Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Can and Shepard Fairey’s Obama Hope poster as 2 examples of what I was talking about in part because they encountered such different responses from the corporation from whom the artist appropriated his image. Warhol received an amusing and appreciative letter from Campbell’s Soup. Fairey was sued by the Associated Press, a lawsuit that was eventually settled and thus left unresolved the underlying legal questions.

The next 2 slides ask, “What is an artist?” and give one answer, provided by performance artist Guillermo Gómez Peña:

[T]he artist doesn’t really give answers. That is the role of the theorist, the scientist, the political activist, and the religious leader. The role of the artist is to ask impertinent and complex questions, irritating questions, and also to make the audience aware of the process of inquiry, and that’s where the pedagogical dimension lies—when the performance becomes the search, and when the process of search becomes the performance; and people see you struggling with meaning, with your own philosophical despair, with your political demons, and your own aesthetics.

Not only does this confrontation with questions that confront all of us strike me as central to the role of the artist; it also strikes me as central to the role of the lawyer. Moreover, one of the most difficult stumbling blocks in teaching law students is getting them over the belief that they will learn answers to the questions they will confront in their careers rather than the skill to identify the right questions and to best move forward in light of those questions.

Thus, the next 2 slides ask, “What is a lawyer?” and provide a quote from from Edward Levi, a legal scholar studied by first year law students when I went to law school but now largely neglected, to the effect that legal “rules” are not the sort of rules people typically expect:

[T]he rules change from case to case and are remade with each case. Yet this change in the rules is the indispensable dynamic quality of law. It occurs because the scope of a rule of law, and therefore its meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will be considered similar to those present when the rule was first announced. The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process.

Lawyers then, like artists, must always be attentive to the similarities and differences that abound in the infinite complexity of human life. If you present me with a legal problem and an answer and then change one fact about the problem, the entire answer may change. Or may not. It depends. So if you’re looking for answers, you’ve come to the wrong place. Another situation is always different. But I can certainly let you in on what I deem important and why.

For the basic rules on copyright and fair use, the U.S. Copyright Office is a terrific starting point on all things copyright. If you are interested in knowing the basics about what you have to do to register a copyright and other nuts and bolts matters, go there.  Stanford’s Copyright and Fair Use Center is also a great resource on all of the questions addressed in my talk. I like the Copyright Website too.

In order to be protected by copyright, a work must be, among other things, “original.” The quintessential illustration of this requirement — which emphasizes that the mere “sweat of the brow” invested by the work’s creator is not sufficient to earn the work copyright protection — is Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the substantial work of compiling and organizing the information required to put together a rural telephone directory did not entitle the directory to copyright protection. The information itself, though the result of the plaintiff’s hard work, constituted “mere facts,” and there was nothing original about the alphabetical arrangement. Thus, the defendant could not be stopped from copying the plaintiff’s directory and selling it as his own.

A more recent example of this principle with some bearing on appropriation art is the case of Meshwerks v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc. (10th Cir. 2008), in wich the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the copyright infringement case brought against Toyota by Meshwerks, which had created digital models of Toyota cars for use in Toyota’s advertising. The digital models are useful because if the art director wants the position of car changed within a photo, the entire scene does not need to be re-shot. All one needs to do is move the digital model around on a computer screen within the digital photograph of the background.

The digital model, while the product of skill, resulted merely in the reproduction of a car. The image itself is nothing more than an image of a fact. While the court noted the obvious difficulties of applying existing law to new technologies, it compared the digital images of cars created by Meshwerks to photographs. Since the invention of photography in the 19th Century — when it was believed by some that photography as a mere transmission of “reality” did not constitute art — courts have concluded that photographs are entitled to copyright protection but only to the extent the photograph consists of elements resulting from the photographer’s choices. Thus, a photograph “is entitled to copyright solely based on lighting, angle, perspective, and the other ingredients that traditionally apply to that art-form.”

Decisions rendering the photograph a protectable “intellectual invention” included: the posing and arrangement of [the subject] “so as to present graceful outlines”; the selection and arrangement of background and accessories; the arrangement and disposition of light and shade; and the evocation of the desired expression. Courts today continue to hold that such decisions by the photographer–or, more precisely, the elements of photographs that result from these decisions–are worthy of copyright protection. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons (“Elements of originality in a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant involved.”) (citations omitted).

The digital image of the car that could be inserted and manipulated within a digital image was, in contrast, merely a reproduction of a car. It would only be when an art director placed it within an image that choices regarding lighting, angle, and other elements would be chosen. In contrast, in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,  the court held that the famous “Zapruder film” was entitled to copyright protection. Abraham Zapruder, a Dallas dress manufacturer, had been taking home movie pictures with his camera, when, by sheer happenstance, he captured President Kennedy’s assassination on film. The court observed that “if Zapruder had made his pictures at a point in time before the shooting, he would clearly have been entitled to copyright.” The fact that the moment he filmed happened to be historic did not change that fact. And, if you’re interested, here’s another interesting photography case.

The fact that Congress has the power to pass laws protecting copyright is a result of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause. There are at least 2 important reasons the constitutional dimension of this power is important. First, the Copyright Clause expressly states that Congress has the power for the purpose of promoting innovation. Thus, to the extent copyright law inhibits innovation rather than promotion it, that law very may well be unconstitutional. In addition, copyright limits the ways people can express themselves and thus is a limitation on the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment. Obviously, that freedom of expression is of supreme importance in our country. Thus, the conflict between the two constitutional rights — the right to protection of one’s creative product and the right of one to express oneself (even by means of another’s creative product) must be balanced. That balance is what results in the doctrine of fair use.

Originality relies on a good deal of imitation and even a bit of theft — Picasso this time.

James Polchin, Cezanne, Michelangelo, and Greek sculpture in Picasso’s early drawings:

To look at Picasso’s drawings is to better understand his paintings as something greater than Picasso, an artistic vision based on imitation and purloined art. If we look beyond the artist, we might actually see his art and access his creative process without the shadow and burden of Picasso’s name getting in the way. We might call what Picasso created “invention” or “reinvention,” but it is hard to look at these drawings and not have a sense that so much of what we call originality relies on a good deal of imitation and even a bit of theft.

The principle of collage is the central principle of all art.

No one who has spent more than a few days reading this blog in its 3+ years can have missed the fact that I have been strongly persuaded that the common notion of authorship — that true artists are solitary originating geniuses — is a myth. Kenneth Smith, in “It’s Not Plagiarism. In the Digital Age, It’s ‘Repurposing,’” adresses the same issues and covers much of the same ground, but he brings up a a few very interesting things that I had not previously encountered. The first is the prominent literary critic Marjorie Perloff’s use of the term “unoriginal genius” to describe someone with skill at making his or her way through the contemporary flood of “information.”  A “genius” in this sense is not someone who — as convention has it — comes up with a creation that no one has ever dreamt of before, but, rather, someone with an extraordinary ability to manage available information, parse it, organize it, and distribute it. Perloff believes that in the end it is this type of genius, not the mythical conventional sort, that distinguishes your writing from mine:

Her idea is that, because of changes brought on by technology and the Internet, our notion of the genius—a romantic, isolated figure—is outdated. An updated notion of genius would have to center around one’s mastery of information and its dissemination. Perloff has coined another term, “moving information,” to signify both the act of pushing language around as well as the act of being emotionally moved by that process. She posits that today’s writer resembles more a programmer than a tortured genius, brilliantly conceptualizing, constructing, executing, and maintaining a writing machine.

Perloff’s notion of unoriginal genius should not be seen merely as a theoretical conceit but rather as a realized writing practice, one that dates back to the early part of the 20th century, embodying an ethos in which the construction or conception of a text is as important as what the text says or does. Think, for example, of the collated, note-taking practice of Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project or the mathematically driven constraint-based works by Oulipo, a group of writers and mathematicians. (hyperlinks added)

Even more interesting, however, is what Smith did. He’s taught a class at the University of Pennsylvania he calls “Uncreative Writing.”

In it, students are penalized for showing any shred of originality and creativity. Instead they are rewarded for plagiarism, identity theft, repurposing papers, patchwriting, sampling, plundering, and stealing. Not surprisingly, they thrive. Suddenly what they’ve surreptitiously become expert at is brought out into the open and explored in a safe environment, reframed in terms of responsibility instead of recklessness.

We retype documents and transcribe audio clips. We make small changes to Wikipedia pages (changing an “a” to “an” or inserting an extra space between words). We hold classes in chat rooms, and entire semesters are spent exclusively in Second Life. Each semester, for their final paper, I have them purchase a term paper from an online paper mill and sign their name to it, surely the most forbidden action in all of academia. Students then must get up and present the paper to the class as if they wrote it themselves, defending it from attacks by the other students. What paper did they choose? Is it possible to defend something you didn’t write? Something, perhaps, you don’t agree with? Convince us.

All this, of course, is technology-driven. When the students arrive in class, they are told that they must have their laptops open and connected. And so we have a glimpse into the future. And after seeing what the spectacular results of this are, how completely engaged and democratic the classroom is, I am more convinced that I can never go back to a traditional classroom pedagogy. I learn more from the students than they can ever learn from me. The role of the professor now is part party host, part traffic cop, full-time enabler.

The secret: the suppression of self-expression is impossible. Even when we do something as seemingly “uncreative” as retyping a few pages, we express ourselves in a variety of ways. The act of choosing and reframing tells us as much about ourselves as our story about our mother’s cancer operation. It’s just that we’ve never been taught to value such choices.

After a semester of my forcibly suppressing a student’s “creativity” by making her plagiarize and transcribe, she will tell me how disappointed she was because, in fact, what we had accomplished was not uncreative at all; by not being “creative,” she had produced the most creative body of work in her life. By taking an opposite approach to creativity—the most trite, overused, and ill-defined concept in a writer’s training—she had emerged renewed and rejuvenated, on fire and in love again with writing.

Smith has thus provided another instance of what I already know in a different context — there are more and less original legal writers even though legal writing is one vast collaborative writing enterprise consisting primarily of texts cobbled together from pieces of other legal texts.

Finally, Smith suggests that the insights he provides (which he would no more claim are original to him than I would claim them mine) have been largely resisted in one profoundly important world of writing: literature:

I’m sensing that literature—infinite in its potential of ranges and expressions—is in a rut, tending to hit the same note again and again, confining itself to the narrowest of spectrums, resulting in a practice that has fallen out of step and is unable to take part in arguably the most vital and exciting cultural discourses of our time. I find this to be a profoundly sad moment—and a great lost opportunity for literary creativity to revitalize itself in ways it hasn’t imagined.

Perhaps one reason writing is stuck might be the way creative writing is taught. In regard to the many sophisticated ideas concerning media, identity, and sampling developed over the past century, books about how to be a creative writer have relied on clichéd notions of what it means to be “creative.” These books are peppered with advice like: “A creative writer is an explorer, a groundbreaker. Creative writing allows you to chart your own course and boldly go where no one has gone before.” Or, ignoring giants like de Certeau, Cage, and Warhol, they suggest that “creative writing is liberation from the constraints of everyday life.”

As John Pareles wrote in “Plagiarism in Dylan, or a Cultural Collage?”, Bob Dylan is another one of those giants leading the way:

The absolutely original artist is an extremely rare and possibly imaginary creature, living in some isolated habitat where no previous works or traditions have left any impression. Like virtually every artist, Mr. Dylan carries on a continuing conversation with the past. He’s reacting to all that culture and history offer, not pretending they don’t exist. Admiration and iconoclasm, argument and extension, emulation and mockery — that’s how individual artists and the arts themselves evolve. It’s a process that is neatly summed up in Mr. Dylan’s album title ” ‘Love and Theft,’ ” which itself is a quotation from a book on minstrelsy by Eric Lott.

Of course, literature has not completely ignored these artistic trends. The group of authors comprising Oulipo were exemplars of what Smith might call “writers as programmers,” and Donald Barthelme wrote:

The principle of collage is the central principle of all art in the Twentieth Century.

And, believe me: if you’ve never read Georges Perec or Barthelme, you’ve never read anything like what they’ve written. Or maybe you have.

You convince people by confirming that what they believe about the world is true.

One of the most difficult things to convince law students of is that law is not merely the application of law to facts. Students start out believing that learning law is learning the rules that will answer whatever questions arise. Some students never get past that idea. The ones who become good lawyers do.

There are instances in which there are clear rules that are easy to apply. But if that were the whole of the law, we wouldn’t need lawyers, and law students certainly wouldn’t have to pay $45,000 a year for three years to earn a law degree.

Instead, convincing someone that your view of the law is the correct one requires not only finding and applying the correct rule but also in convincing whomever you are trying to convince that the rule and your interpretation of it make sense, are just, are convincing at a gut level. If you can’t do that, you’ll never become a good lawyer.

An inability to get over the stumbling block posed by the desire for a legal system consisting of clear rules that answer every conceivable question, of course, is not confined to some law students. As Jon Krakauer explains in Under the Banner of Heaven, “literalism” — the conviction that there are rules set forth in hallowed texts (which need not be religious, as strains of constitutional “originalism” demonstrate) that answer all the important questions one encounters makes people resistant to the idea that answering the tough questions requires a considerable amount of creativity, acknowledgement of ambiguity, and sensitivity to situational specifics:

For people . . . who view existence through the narrow lens of literalism, the language in certain select documents is assumed to possess extraordinary power. Such language is to be taken assiduously at face value, according to a single incontrovertible interpretation that makes no allowance for nuance, ambiguity, or situational contingencies. As Vincent Crapanzano observes in his book Serving the Word, [this] brand of literalism encourages a closed, usually (though not necessarily) politically conservative view of the world: one with a stop-time notion of history and a we-and-they approach to people, in which we are possessed of truth, virtue, and goodness and they of falsehood, depravity, and evil. It looks askance at figurative language, which, so long as its symbols and metaphors are vital, can open—promiscuously in the eyes of the strict literalist—the world and its imaginative possibilities.

Perhaps this is why literalism rarely carries long-term appeal in a functioning democracy. The majority cannot be convinced for very long without the use of force that there is good reason for elevating the particular hallowed text (much less the literalists particular reading of that text) above all other “reasons.”

I’m reminded of these things by the TED talk embedded below, in which Simon Sinek explains that success in realms as diverse as commerce, invention, and social change depend on making the why of what you do your principle focus.

Thus, in the commercial world, for example, people don’t buy what you do; they buy why you do it. Nevertheless, companies and people typically sell their product or services by explaining what they do and how they do it. They don’t typically even know why they do what they do, and they certainly don’t explain it well.

But the most successful people sell first and foremost why they do what they do. Apple, for example, explains they do what they do to challenge authority. They explain what they do as designing beautiful products that are easy to use. What do they do? They happen to sell computers. That message convinces buyers in ways the typical computer seller’s approach — (1) we sell computers, (2) we make them user friendly — does not.

Simek explains the phenomenon in market terms: the only way to get the majority of consumers to buy a new product or service is to first convince innovators and early adopters, and those people are only persuaded by the conviction they share the seller’s convictions.

But his message about the market is one applicable in all contexts in which one is trying to convince an audience:

People buy what they buy to confirm what they believe about the world.

This American Life tells the story of a “patent troll.”

NPR reporter Laura Sydell and This American Life producer/Planet Money co-host Alex Blumberg tell the story of Intellectual Ventures, which is accused of being the largest of the “patent trolls,” a derogatory term in Silicon Valley for companies that amass huge troves of patents and make money by threatening lawsuits:

Artists don’t protect their “purity” through copyright overclaiming.

Readers of this blog know I feel pretty strongly about this, particularly in connection with genres often disparagingly referred to as “appropriation art.”

Well, my friend Andrew Dubber pointed me to this very cool “8 bit, chiptune” reworking of an all-time favorite of mine (and just about everybody’s my age) — Miles Davis’ Kind of Blue — dubbed Kind of Bloop.

Andy Baio, Kind of Bloop‘s creator, unfortunately ran into the type of problem with which I am all too familiar. As he writes,

Before the project launched, I knew exactly what I wanted for the cover — a pixel art recreation of the original album cover, the only thing that made sense for an 8-bit tribute to Kind of Blue. I tried to draw it myself, but if you’ve ever attempted pixel art, you know how demanding it is. After several failed attempts, I asked a talented friend to do it.

You can see the results below, with the original album cover for comparison.

Unfortunately, Jay Maisel, the photographer who shot the original photo of Miles Davis used for the cover of Kind of Blue. threatened a lawsuit for copyright infringement seeking hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages. Baio settled, agreeing to pay Maisel $32,500 and not to use the artwork again. And he writes, in words I firmly endorse:

But this is important: the fact that I settled is not an admission of guilt. My lawyers and I firmly believe that the pixel art is “fair use” and Maisel and his counsel firmly disagree. I settled for one reason: this was the least expensive option available.

At the heart of this settlement is a debate that’s been going on for decades, playing out between artists and copyright holders in and out of the courts. In particular, I think this settlement raises some interesting issues about the state of copyright for anyone involved in digital reinterpretations of copyrighted works.

Baio includes in the account of his ordeal several works of art that reinterpret earlier copyrighted works as well as a list of links to other such works. They are all worth checking out and almost all add to those referred to in the posts in that “appropriation art” link above.

One thing both Baio and I find particularly troubling is a statement Maisel’s lawyer made in a letter to Baio in explaining that Maisel never even would have licensed the use of the image:

“He is a purist when it comes to his photography,” his lawyer wrote. “With this in mind, I am certain you can understand that he felt violated to find his image of Miles Davis, one of his most well-known and highly-regarded images, had been pixellated, without his permission, and used in a number of forms including on several websites accessible around the world.”

I am no cynic, and I have respect for people’s work and spiritual purity, but this is nonsense. Copyright does not give an artist the power to control the way his work is used to the point that he can forbid transformative uses of it. Or, rather, it does, but only if he is willing to use his financial weight and the ways our legal system allows that financial weight to coerce those without the same resources. And that is hardly the behavior of a “purist.” But it is copyright overclaiming.

Art builds on art. Maybe Maisel should read The Gift, by Lewis Hyde. The introduction is available here (pdf).

In memory of Gill Scott-Heron — No New Thing

Again: Culture is Collaborative. Kembrew McLeod this time.

In the Atlantic, there is an interview with “intellectual property scholar (and Atlantic contributor) Kembrew McLeod,” who, with copyright lawyer Peter DiCola, argues in Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling that “current digital copyright practices unfairly burden musicians who sample snippets of other artists’ songs in their own music. begins by taking us back to the golden age of hip-hop, demonstrating how lawsuits quashed a nascent art form during its artistic ascendancy.” In the course of the interview, McLeod touches on several points I have emphasized in this blog, including the ways sampling (like any sort of artistic appropriation) serves perfectly traditional and ordinary artistic purposes:

Sounds can bring back memories. Some samples remind the listener of a particular era, or connect a song with a particular moment in time. Artists want to transport themselves, and the listener, for nostalgic reasons—or to provide historical resonance. Sampling can function like an audio time machine.

McLeod also articulates a point I have made over and over again: that our conventional notions of “authorship” as the creation of wholly original art from the mind of an inspired genius is not at all consistent with the reality of artistic creation:

The old-school notion of the individual genius author is embedded in European and American copyright law—the lone individual genius toiling away until a burst of creativity creates a truly original work unlike anything else that previously exists. But we know that, in the world of music, you can’t really create a new song without referring to an old song in some way. So the law itself assumes a Romantic notion of authorship, though we know this isn’t how culture is produced. Culture is collaborative.

The entire interview is worthwhile. It covers a wide range of matters relevant to these issues and is especially informative on the history of the music industry’s ways of dealing with sampling.

Doesn’t anyone understand that just because you can make money off of it doesn’t mean it should be property?

Our culture’s obsession with ownership and control seems to know no bounds. Ray Madoff writes in the New York Times about ownership of a person’s identity after death:

According to Hebrew University of Jerusalem . . ., when it inherited Einstein’s estate, the bequest included ownership of Einstein’s very identity, giving it exclusive legal control over who could use Einstein’s name and image, and at what cost.

Einstein is not the only example. While we might think of people like the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., George Patton, Rosa Parks, Frank Lloyd Wright and Babe Ruth as part of our cultural heritage, available for all to use, the identities of each of them, and thousands more, are claimed as private property, usable only with permission and for a fee.

This phenomenon is fairly recent — and it’s getting out of control. For most of this country’s history, a person’s identity was not something that could be owned. . . .

Today the right of publicity clearly allows people to control the commercial use of their names and images during their lives. What happens after death is much murkier.

Throughout much of the world, the right of publicity ends at death, after which a person’s identity becomes generally available for public use. In the United States, however, this issue is governed by state laws, which have taken a remarkably varied approach. In New York, the right of publicity terminates at death; other states provide that the right of publicity survives death for limited terms. But in Tennessee (whose laws govern the use of Elvis Presley’s image, since he died there), Washington (home of a company that purports to own Jimi Hendrix’s right of publicity) and Indiana (where CMG Worldwide, which manages the identities of hundreds of dead people, is based), control over the identities of the dead has been secured for terms ranging from 100 years to, potentially, eternity.

Extending control over the identity of important people to their estates after death is, I think, to mistake how culture and art work and to elevate property rights to an importance that does us very little good. The identities of famous people as varied as Einstein, Elvis Presley, and Marilyn Monroe become part of our culture’s language. That cultural meaning then becomes part of the language of our cultural conversations, and as a part of that language it then has meaning that can be used in the sorts of compressed and symbolic ways that culture and art thrive on. To remove the identities of dead people from this language in the absence of payment for their use would substantially damage our culture. Madoff suggests congressional legislation limiting control over a person’s identity to a short term of, for example, ten years. To extend control at all past death seems to me to be problematic as a cultural and expressive matter (and Madoff raises all sorts of ways in which it is problematic as a matter of estate law). But to extend it any longer than ten years seems just plain obtuse — doing so would raise the threat that by the time an identity becomes available for use as part of the public domain it would have lost much if not all of its expressive value.

Appropriation art: is Richard Prince’s loss its end? I don’t think so.

The decision holding Richard Prince liable for infringing Patrick Cariou’s copyright in photographs Prince appropriated (which I wrote about 3 days ago) continues to inspire commentary. Donn Zaretsky does his typically excellent work in collecting the range of intelligent commentary and adding his own. He points to what he considers the key point in the decision, the judge’s belief that Prince’s appropriation was not sufficiently “transformative” to constitute fair use of Cariou’s photographs because Prince’s work did not sufficiently comment on or otherwise refer back to Cariou’s photographs (hyperlinks in original):

[T]he key bit is that the court rejected the fair use defense because, as Artnet’s Walter Robinson puts it, “Prince’s works do not specifically comment on Cariou’s originals.” (Robinson says: “Face it, the notion of ‘appropriation’ just doesn’t play well in our law courts.”) The NYT’s Randy Kennedy writes that “Judge Batts wrote that for fair-use exceptions to apply, a new work of art must be transformative in the sense that it must ‘in some way comment on, relate to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original works’ it borrows from.”

That hasn’t always seemed to be a requirement in other fair use cases. In Blanch v. Koons, for example, the Second Circuit noted that Koons used “Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media” (rather than, as Judge Batts would seem to require, fodder for his commentary on Blanch’s image). Quoting the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision, the court said the test of transformativeness is whether the later work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”

As I wrote the other day, I think the “key” element in the case is the evidence that Cariou had (and that the court apparently found credible) that he had been directly damaged by the appropriation. Cariou had been negotiating with a Manhattan gallery owner for a show of his Yes Rasta photographs when the Gagosian Gallery began showing Prince’s works that appropriated Cariou’s photographs. As a result, the gallery owner considering a show for Cariou’s works backed off, because “she did not want to exhibit work which had been “done already” at another gallery. Slip op. at 6-7. In other words, Prince’s work essentially was functioning as a direct market substitute for Cariou’s work.

That is a far cry from the situation in Blanch v. Koons, in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Jeff Koons’ appropriation of a photograph in a collage constituted fair use. There was no reason in Blanch to believe that Koons’ work in any way damaged any market for the appropriated photograph.

Moreover, Cariou’s case does not and cannot conceivably be interpreted to overturn Blanch, in which, as Zaretsky correctly notes, the Second Circuit approved Koons’ use of “‘Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media’ (rather than, as Judge Batts would seem to require, fodder for his commentary on Blanch’s image).”

Judge Batts’ apparent belief that in order to be sufficiently transformative to qualify as fair use an artistic appropriation must comment on or otherwise refer back to the appropriated work is certainly open to question even apart from the unquestionable continuing vitality of Blanch. The proposition that an appropriation must comment on the original to constitute fair use originates in commentary on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,  (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that 2 Live Crew’s appropriation of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman was a non-infringing fair use. While the Court did stress the ways in which 2 Live Crew’s reworking of the song “parodied” Oh, Pretty Woman, I think it is worth wondering whether one’s principal reaction to 2 Live Crew’s song is that it is making fun of Orbison’s song. More importantly, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, emphasized that the less an appropriating work damages the market for the original work it appropriates, the less it needs to reflect directly back on the original to the degree to constitute a non-infringing fair use:

A parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody presented here may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis of parody. If a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk of serving as a substitute for the original or licensed derivatives (see infra, discussing factor four), it is more incumbent on one claiming fair use to establish the extent of transformation and the parody’s critical relationship to the original. By contrast, when there is little or no risk of market substitution, whether because of the large extent of transformation of the earlier work, the new work’s minimal distribution in the market, the small extent to which it borrows from an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.

Id. at 580, n. 14. And, indeed, this understanding fits perfectly the decision in Blanch, in which it would be absurd to suggest that Jeff Koons was parodying the specific photograph he appropriated rather than using it to comment on the worlds of commercial and fashion photography in general:

Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His stated objective is thus not to repackage Blanch’s “Silk Sandals,” but to employ it “`in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’” When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as “raw material,” in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is transformative.

The test for whether “Niagara’s” use of “Silk Sandals” is “transformative,” then, is whether it “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”The test almost perfectly describes Koons’s adaptation of “Silk Sandals”: the use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American “lifestyles” magazine — with changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects details and, crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning — as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space. We therefore conclude that the use in question was transformative.

Blanch v. Koons, at 467 F.3d at 252-53.

I think it is crucial to remain cognizant of the fact that the case law establishes that there can be transformative use of copyrighted work in art other than art that ridicules copyrighted work. I have gone on at great length on this blog about the ways our conventional notions of authorship are too narrow and historically ignorant. But Ray Down is downright eloquent on the ways these issues pertain to art over at his Copyright Litigation Blog in connection, specifically, with Richard Prince. His entire post, with helpful illustrations, is well worth your read. Here’s an excerpt:

Fine art, truly fine art in an art gallery, is a place where a copyrighted work becomes a fetish object, a tribute, a decontextualized thing revealing a new meaning. The urinal of Marcel Duchamp. The Brillo Box of Andy Warhol. Both utilitarian objects made by others and fetishized by the artists.

And look at L.H.O.O.Q. – nothing original in the execution, but the Mona Lisa was in the public domain at the time. Prince is blatantly stealing. Plagiarists take the words of others and try to make you believe that they have crafted them. But Prince’s cutouts from advertising, porn and outlaw biker magazines never misled the consumer.

But somewhere, something bothers me about shutting a highly respected fine artist down completely and burning his works when the first sale doctrine would permit him to buy a copy, modify it and resell it. When the First Amendment lets even repulsive speech be heard and the contemporary art world says it is art, I have a problem with the government burning it.

To me, an original work of fine art properly labeled as such by a new artist is almost pure speech – or in some way pure idea – even if it includes major appropriations. Things change when the artwork is widely reproduced. When the consumers are paying tens of thousands for Prince to take something no one is interested in, put his spin on it, and add value. Prince’s “appropriation” added ten million dollars worth of value to a pile of books. Everyone knew he didn’t create the original.

This is not a question of consumers being defrauded, these are wealthy ultrasophisticates on the cutting edge who are the purchasers – surrounded by the top art advisers and critics -if these people feel that Prince’s value added is that great, what is the harm in letting them indulge, as long as Prince legally purchased the original books? In fact, Prince’s prices will probably soar – scarcity and scandal drive art prices up.

From a semiotic perspective, isn’t Prince simply holding up a mirror to people who may not want to look at themselves or their art as art in the hands of another? And if your message is mirror-like, is it less valid? And if you don’t have the verbal skills to articulate what you are doing, is that any less a mirror?

In short, I think Dowd is right, but I also think the death knell of non-parodic appropriation is being rung without reason. Finally, I think that if Cariou convinced the court that Prince’s appropriations robbed Cariou of real opportunities to sell his photographs, the outcome of Cariou’s case is obviously correct and does not threaten the kind of appropriation case people like Zaretsky, Dowd, and I talk about when we talk about appropriation by the likes of Prince, Koons, and Shepard Fairey.

Can you be original if you do nothing but appropriate the work of others?

From Wikipedia: Ophir Kutiel (born 1982), professionally known as Kutiman, is a musician, composer, producer and animator from Israel. He is best known for creating the online music video project ThruYOU, an online music video project mixed entirely from samples of YouTube videos which has received more than 10 million views. Time Magazine named it one of the 50 Best Inventions of 2009.

Here is This is What it Became, one cut from ThruYOU:

Mike Masnick of techdirt, writes yesterday, in terms that a lawyer for Gregg Gillis would love:

[T]o hear some people talk about these things, none of this is “creative.” It’s all just “copying.” In some cases it’s outright “piracy.” After all, Kutiman is using the works of others, and doing so entirely without permission. And yet, I have trouble seeing how anyone can legitimately claim that these songs are “piracy” in any real sense of the word. Kutiman is clearly a musician. That he uses a note played by someone else on a YouTube video, and then “plays” it himself, strikes me as no different than playing a keyboard that plays a recorded sounded, or even strumming a guitar. A musician is putting different sounds together to create music. Does it really make a huge difference if that music involves someone making a note from an instrument directly themselves… or by taking the note originally played by someone else and doing something creative and amazing with it?

I think Masnick is right on in stating that the use of technology widely available only in the last several years to compose a work from pieces of other recorded work is “no different than playing a keyboard that plays a recorded sounded, or even strumming a guitar.” What many fail to recognize is that the music the likes of Kutiman, Gillis, DJ Earworm and a myriad of others are producing today is the result of new technology, not a new mindset. There are plenty of people out there who would tell you that rampant sampling is the consequence of a generation without respect for property rights. But I think people who say such things are missing the real point: ten years ago, it would have been very difficult for people like Gillis and Kutiman to compose the work they compose today. Twenty years ago it would have been impossible without efforts few but the most dedicated would resort to.

In short, we have new instruments today. That those instruments produce their sounds by means of reproducing pre-recorded sounds does not make them any less instruments than instruments that can produce only a limited number of notes.

Substantially similar or original? Can’t it be both?

From The Millions: “’Substantially Similar? (after Koons 2010),’ [right] is composed of 36 rectangular panels, each contributed by a different artist and then assembled by the artist who conceived the piece, Alfred Steiner. The result was an instantly recognizable riff on Jeff Koons’s ‘Popeye’ series [left] – an appropriation from an appropriator who has made headlines in several highly publicized copyright cases. A note beside ‘Substantially Similar?’ left no doubt about its creator’s stance on the passionate arguments for and against copyright laws: ‘By engaging these issues, the project may also suggest how copyright antagonizes artistic freedom while providing artists no discernible benefit.’”

Steiner is a “lawyer who happens to be an artist.” Steiner described his methods in composing Substantially Similar? (after Koons 2010):

I took an electronic version of the Koons original and divided it up into 36 pieces and sent each artist just one little piece, via e-mail, so they wouldn’t recognize the whole thing. I gave them instructions on how to create an image based on the image that I’d e-mailed them. The only other instructions were a very close paraphrase of the 2nd Circuit’s test for copyright infringement – which is, “would a reasonable person regard the two works’ esthetic impact as the same?”

TM: In other words, would a layman recognize these two works as being the same thing?

AS: Right.

TM: So the contributors didn’t know what they were reproducing?

AS: Right.

TM: And the result was a piece that looked vaguely like Koons, but was different.

AS: It had the essence of the original but was clearly a new work.

In connection with Girl Talk, Steiner states what is very much my thinking — why would we want to stop something so good?

[Greg Gillis] will make songs that are totally based on samples. One song may have 200 samples, so many that there’s no way you could pay each artist. He’s very well received critically. The question is, should it be possible to make that kind of work or not? I kind of think, yes, it should be possible.

Cariou v. Prince: the damage to plaintiff is far more important than Richard Prince’s inability to articulate an artistic intent.

I discussed here nearly 2 years ago the lawsuit by photographer Patrick Cariou against Richard Prince alleging that the collages Prince had exhibited at the Gagosian Gallery in 2008 because they had appropriated photographs of Rastafarians Cariou had taken and published in his book Yes Rasta in 2001. I wrote then that the lawsuit “could have a profound impact on the art world, either clarifying that the widespread acceptance in the art world of appropriation art is legally legitimate or opening the door to an increased number of lawsuits by copyright holders against artists engaged in collage, sampling, satire, and any  number of other genres that have become increasingly easy to engage in with the digitalization of media and the rise of the internet.”

The verdict is in: the court ruled in favor of Cariou and against Prince. The decision is embedded below.

On the one hand, the decision is not as far reaching as it might have been. The court emphasized that it was declining to accept Prince’s argument that “appropriation art is per se fair use, regardless of whether or not the new artwork comments on the original works appropriated.” Slip Op. at 17-18. On the other, the court limited the scope of fair use in appropriation art to work that comments on the original works, insisting that, “to the extent that [Prince’s works] merely recast, transform, or adapt the photos, [they] are . . . infringing derivative works.” Id. at 18.

There are a several interesting aspects of the case. First, the court emphasized that Prince “testified that he has doesn’t “really have a message” he attempts to communicate when he making art,” and that “[i]n creating [his] Paintings Prince did not intend to comment on any aspects of the original works or the broader [Rastafarian] culture.”

It may be a dangerous thing to depend on the artist’s intent in judging the transformative nature of his art. As Sister Wendy Beckett explains in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online, in words that are so well accepted they are almost trite,

The passageway provided by art is very wide. No single interpretation of art is ever “right,” not even the artist’s own. He or she can tell us the intent of the work, but the actual meaning and significance of the art, what the artist achieved, is a very different matter. (It is pitiable to hear the grandiose discussions of artists’ work by the least talented of our contemporaries.) We should listen to the appreciations of others, but then we should put them aside and advance toward a work of art in the loneliness of our own truth. Each of us encounters the work alone, and how much we receive from it is wholly the effect of our will to accept this responsibility.

What was Jackson Pollock’s purpose in painting Lavender Mist? Van Gogh’s in painting The Irises? Haven’t we accepted by now the limitations focus on artistic intention would impose on our appreciation of art? Yet, in Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added), the Second Circuit, in holding that Jeff Koons’ appropriation of a copyrighted photograph constituted fair use, based its conclusion that Koons’ use of the photograph was “transformative” precisely on Koons’ statements regarding what he intended:

Koons asserts — and Blanch does not deny — that his purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s goals in creating it. Compare Koons Aff. at P4 (“I want the viewer to think about his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.”) with Blanch Dep. at 112-113 (“I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense[;] . . . to get . . . more of a sexuality to the photographs.”). The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating, “Silk Sandals” confirms the transformative nature of the use. See Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 609 (finding transformative use when defendant’s purpose in using copyrighted concert poster was “plainly different from the [*253] original purpose for which they were created”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (first fair-use factor is the “purpose and character of the use” (emphasis added)).

Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 142 (quoting Leval, supra, 103 Harv. L. Rev, at 1111). When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as “raw material,”Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is transformative. Id.; see alsoBill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 609 (use of concert posters “as historical artifacts” in a biography was transformative); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody of a photograph in a movie poster was transformative when “the ad [was] not merely different; it differ[ed] in a way that may reasonably be perceived as commenting” on the original). His stated objective is thus not to repackage Blanch’s “Silk Sandals,” but to employ it “‘in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’”

The test for whether “Niagara’s” use of “Silk Sandals” is “transformative,” then, is whether it “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration incorporated);Davis, 246 F.3d at 174 (same). The test almost perfectly describes Koons’s adaptation of “Silk Sandals”: the use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American “lifestyles” magazine — with changes of its colors, the background against which it is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ details and, crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning — as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space. We therefore conclude that the use in question was transformative.

In short, courts seem to be basing the transformative nature of alleged infringements on the avowed intentions of the artists themselves. Thus, in the decision enjoining the publication of a “sequel” to The Catcher in the Rye, the judge was significantly influenced by the fact the author and his representatives had described the work in words that didn’t fit the legal standard they wanted to meet:

Until the present lawsuit was filed, Defendants made no indication that 60 Years [the new work] was in any way a parody or critique of Catcher [in the Rye]. Quite to the contrary, the original jacket of 60 Years states that it is “. . . a marvelous sequel t one of our most beloved classics.” . . . Additionally, when initially confronted with the similarities between the two works, rather than explaining that60 Years was a parody or critique of Catcher, Colting’s [the new work’s author] literary agent, Mr. Sane, contended that 60 Years “is a completely freestanding novel that has nothing to do with the original Catcher in the Rye.” Opinion and Order at 16, n. 3.

Colting, obviously, should have called his work a parody and critique, not a sequel or a “freestanding novel.” It’s odd to think that makes a difference, though. No matter what he said, his work would be the same.

In the same way, it seems odd that Prince’s refusal to articulate an artistic intent and Koons elaborate description of his own intent are the most significant determinants of the legitimacy of their respective artworks.

Of course, there are more obvious was to distinguish Prince’s case from Koons’. Koons’ use of a fashion photograph in his collage quite plainly had no impact on any reasonably foreseeable markets for that fashion photograph. In contrast, Prince’s work quite obviously did have an impact on the commercial value of Cariou’s work. Cariou had been negotiating with a Manhattan gallery owner for a show of his Yes Rasta photographs when the Gagosian Gallery began showing Prince’s works that appropriated Cariou’s photographs. As a result, the gallery owner considering a show for Cariou’s works backed off, because “she did not want to exhibit work which had been “done already” at another gallery. Slip op. at 6-7.

So we need not go so far as to conclude that Cariou’s lawsuit signals the death of appropriation art in all its various guises. Blanch v. Koons alone is proof that is not the case. But if we realize how plainly and directly Prince’s appropriations damaged Cariou’s opportunities to economically benefit from his own work, the outcome (if not all of the reasoning) of this new case is obviously correct.

Cariou v Richard Prince

If you think you’ll come up with a really original idea, you’re just kidding yourself.

In The City and the City, China Mieville writes a police procedural that takes place in “[t]win southern European cities Beszel and Ul Qoma,” which “coexist in the same physical location” but are “separated by their citizens’ determination to see only one city at a time.” When I read the novel I marveled at the originality of the premise. Of course, as Mieville himself recognizes in an interview on BLDGBLOG, there’s nothing new under the sun:

I should say, also, that with the whole idea of a divided city there are analogies in the real world, as well as precursors within fantastic fiction. C. J. Cherryh wrote a book that had a divided city like that, in some ways, as did Jack Vance. Now I didn’t know this at the time, but I’m also not getting my knickers in a twist about it. If you think what you’re trying to do is come up with a really original idea—one that absolutely no one has ever had before—you’re just kidding yourself.

You’re inevitably going to tread the ground that the greats have trodden before, and that’s fine. It simply depends on what you’re able to do with it.

That indeed is where artistic genius resides — not in the originality of the thought, but in what the artist does with the thought.