Tom Waits: Jockey Full of Bourbon/Down by Law opening

Belle and Sebastian: Legal Man

Steven Colbert on Citizens United and Corporations as People

Chief Justice Roberts has no respect for precedent that doesn’t suit his purposes.

One of the less noticed parts of last week’s Citizens United decision by the Supreme Court overturning precedent that had supported over 100 years of congressional restrictions on corporate campaign contributions was precisely the question of the strength of precedent. During his confirmation hearings, prospective Chief Justice Roberts was questioned intensely on the question of his respect for precedent, particularly with respect to Roe v. Wade. In keeping with the image he plainly intended to project of a true conservative, a non-activist who respects existing institutions, Roberts emphasized his respect for precedent.

Thus, it should not be particularly surprising that Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion in Citizen’s United to supplement his support of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Roberts’ concurrence focused on the need to follow Court precedent — or, rather, the need to depart from precedent in this particular case.

Roberts’ concurrence should leave people convinced he would overturn Roe v. Wade and that his persona as a non-activist “umpire” who merely calls balls and strikes is a fraud. First, Roberts wrote, upholding precedent “is not an end in itself. It is instead ‘the means by which we ensure that the law will not merelychange erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.’”

So why would Roberts depart from precedent? First, if he thinks it’s wrong: “[I]f the precedent under consideration itself departed from the Court’s jurisprudence, returning to the ‘ “intrinsically sounder” doctrine established in priorcases’ may ‘better serv[e] the values of stare decisis than would following [the] more recently decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it.’”

Merely overturning precedent because a judge thinks it’s wrong, of course, does away entirely with what court’s call “stare decisis,” the rule that compels them to follow precedent (except when they don’t). If all that mattered was a judge’s determination of what is right, then there would be no need for stare decisis — a judge will always uphold precedent he or she believes is right.

So Roberts has to come up with something better. What does he come up with? To me it’s plain: precedent ought to be overturned if its justification is difficult, if using it to decide future cases is difficult, and if its original justification is open to question:

[I]f adherence to a precedent actually impedes the stable and orderly adjudication of future cases, its stare decisis effect is also diminished. This can happen in a number of circumstances, such as when the precedent’s validity is so hotly contested that it cannot reliably function as a basis for decision in future cases, when its rationale threatens to upend our settled jurisprudence inrelated areas of law, and when the precedent’s underlying reasoning has become so discredited that the Court cannot keep the precedent alive without jury-rigging new anddifferent justifications to shore up the original mistake.

Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe v. Wade has been under attack by both supporters of the right to choose whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term and those who oppose the right to choose since the day it was issued in 1973. And in fact, our courts should and do uphold precedent if there is any legitimate justification to uphold — that’s a central truth about legal interpretation (and one law students have a very difficult time gaining an understanding of). But Justice Roberts and his allies on the Court now have authority to cite as support for overturning Roe v. Wade because its original justification may not gain widespread support — this opinion of in Citizen’s United.

Finally, Roe v. Wade fits that other justification Roberts advances for overturning precedent —  it is “hotly contested,” and no doubt he and his allies would argue it therefore “cannot reliably function as a basis for decision in future cases.”

One thing I do know — Roberts has no respect for precedent that doesn’t suit his purposes.

If a corporation is a person, why is an animal no more than a chair?

In light of the decision by the Supreme Court the other day in Citizens United regarding the rights of corporations to make campaign contributions without restriction, I felt compelled to republish a post from early last year:

Stephen M. Wise discusses the ways society shapes the development of the law in connection with the rising awareness that animals are not merely “things”:

Is it up to society to force a change in the law? Or will the law change society?

The law both leads and follows society. The legal system changes through the decision of judges or by legislatures enacting statutes. You saw this, for example, in the anti-slavery amendments to the U.S. Constitution in the 19th century and the numerous civil rights statutes of the 20th century. But the way the law changes and the way society changes are connected. People who try to change the law also depend upon changes in societal values, as well as upon scientific discoveries. In recognition of this, Rattling the Cage is crammed with reports about scientific discoveries on the nature of the cognition of chimpanzees and bonobos of the last 20 or 30 years. These discoveries form the springboard from which I can argue for their rights and personhood.

How do you think our view of animals will develop in the next 20 years?

It is going to develop in a complex way. First, a hierarchy of nonhuman animals will continue. Though nonhuman animals are considered legal things today, society does not view all nonhuman animals in the same way. Some we clearly value more than others. Even though chimpanzees don’t have any legal rights, we no longer euthanize them after they are no longer useful in medical experiments, as we do, say, to white mice. This fact both results from and drives the coming legal personhood of Great Apes. We’re beginning to see this not only in the U.S., but throughout the West. Westerners are also increasingly valuing their companion animals and I see increasing protection for them. The animals whom we thoughtlessly consume for food are being subjected to worse and worse conditions in the U.S. But an opposite trend is rising in [parts of] Europe. I think we will see the European trend expand even as factory farming in the U.S. increases. However, within the next 10 years, the American factory farming industry is going to learn how it has greatly overstepped and miscalculated just how much abuse of nonhuman animals used for food people are willing to accept. Stir in the environmental degradation that is its inevitable consort and there is going to be a backlash that will drive factory farming in the U.S. in the direction that Europe has taken and will, perhaps, drive at least some of it out of business.

True innovation in health care: no-fault insurance for bad medical outcomes.

We would make genuine and profound progress in “fixing” our health care system if we replaced the existing malpractice system with (1) no-fault insurance to compensate patients for the long-term medical and personal costs of bad medical outcomes and (2) an effective mechanism by which the medical profession policed the quality of the care provided by its members.

One political war that never seems to wane is over the medical malpractice system. On the one hand there are the doctors, the insurance companies, and right-wingers screaming that it is medical malpractice that is bankrupting us; on the other, there are the malpractice lawyers and the rest of us who want protection against the risk of suffering unexpectedly from medical treatment.

The critique of the malpractice system has a lot of validity — it’s a lottery in which those patients who have gone to the trouble of hiring lawyers under circumstances smelling sufficiently of medical negligence make out well and the rest of those injured by bad medical outcomes are left with nothing. As a result, too, doctors practice defensive medicine, driving up medical costs for all of us.

But that’s not the entire story. Our health insurance system is a failure, and patients who suffer bad medical outcomes often won’t have coverage sufficient to provide them the care required by the bad outcomes. The only alternative is to sue for malpractice, but the premise of malpractice is that there is no recovery unless the patient is able to prove the doctor was negligent.

Is it any wonder, then, that in a close case, given the choice between, on the one hand, compensating a badly injured patient from with money provided by an insurance company and, on the other, declaring the doctor to be without fault, a jury of human beings will tend to do the merciful thing and find the doctor acted negligently?

Doctors, of course, hate that question. They look at malpractice cases as judgments on their talents, not as tests of mercy. A jury that finds a doctor liable for malpractice has, in the doctor’s eyes, found the doctor to be a bad doctor. To the doctor on trial, The patient’s injuries –as opposed to the doctor’s efforts — are irrelevant.

The dilemma is obvious. First, bad medical outcomes are inevitable regardless of the adequacy of care. As a result, bad medical outcomes are risks we all face. Second, our existing insurance scheme does not spread this risk — rather, those who suffer bad medical outcomes and are not compensated by the malpractice system themselves bear all the costs of that risk.

Wouldn’t we be better off if everyone who suffered a bad medical outcome was compensated for the costs that arose out of that bad medical outcome regardless of the quality of the medical care? No one would be over-compensated, everyone would be fairly compensated, and the abilities of doctors wouldn’t be judged by juries of lay people who are motivated to disregard good judgment regarding those abilities by an entirely understandable and praiseworthy sense of human sympathy.

Such a scheme does raise one problem that the critics of the malpractice system also ignore — we really do enjoy a remarkably high standard of care in this country precisely because of the malpractice system. Doctors have never gone to the trouble of instituting an effective means of policing the quality of medical practice. To some degree they haven’t needed to do so because the risks posed by the malpractice system have forced insurance companies to take on that role. To replace the malpractice system with a no-fault insurance system, therefore, would require some genuine quality control imposed by the medical profession itself.

But if we simply gut the malpractice system and ignore the costs of bad medical outcomes and the need for some genuinely effective means of quality control, we would instead have the worst of all worlds.

Bob Dylan: Hurricane

Corporations = individuals? Confusions in economic theory and First Amendment jurisprudence

Metaphors are tricky things. Corporations are “persons” under the law in many respects, just as you and I are. And we treat corporations as rational individuals in the market. These figurative equations of legal fictions with human beings certainly have their utility, but they easily can be pushed too far. Individuals at AIG were making individual fortunes based on the income they were bringing into AIG for selling credit default swaps. Those individuals were making and would retain those fortunes even if, as turned out to be the case, AIG might not have sufficient funds to pay off the obligations those credit default swaps imposed on AIG. In other words, if one treated AIG as a rational person, one would suppose AIG would never expose itself to a real risk of obligating itself to pay more than it had in reserve. But AIG is merely a corporation, and the individuals actually making the decisions on behalf of AIG had every incentive to get what they could, subject AIG to irrational risk, and be able to walk away with their tens of millions of dollars.

And now the Supreme Court has overturned over 100 years of precedent permitting limits on corporate contributions to political campaigns because such limits constrained free speech and, according to the truism announced by Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, ”Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” But corporations don’t make decisions about how to spend money on campaign contributions — the individuals who control the corporations do. So what the Supreme Court has done is to remove any limits we might put on corporate CEOs to spend corporate money to advance the interests that indubitably are intended to redound to the benefit of those individual CEOs. I wouldn’t limit the ability of CEOs and shareholders to make individual contributions to political campaigns, but why are we treating purely legal entities like they are made of flesh and blood?

As Buzzflash pointed out recently, Thom Hartmann in his book Unequal Protection explains:

Prior to 1886, corporations were referred to in U.S. law as “artificial persons.” but in 1886, after a series of cases brought by lawyers representing the expanding railroad interests, the Supreme Court ruled that corporations were “persons” and entitled to the same rights granted to people under the Bill of Rights. Since this ruling, America has lost the legal structures that allowed for people to control corporate behavior.

Who needs public services in case of disaster? Not the rich . . .

The market strikes again: worried about help in the event of disaster? Well, with a lot of money, you’ve got nothing to worry about – as Naomi Klein writes, if you’re worried about wild fires burning down your home, you can buy private fire fighters who will stand by and watch your neighbors’ home go up in flames, or you can even buy larger scale disaster relief:

[Pellston, Michigan] is about to become the headquarters for the first fully privatized national disaster response center. The plan is the brainchild of Sovereign Deed, a little-known start-up with links to the mercenary firm Triple Canopy. Like HelpJet ["guarantees its well-heeled members a seat on a chartered jet out of the hurricane zone"], Sovereign Deed works on a “country-club type membership fee,” according to the company’s vice president, retired Brig. Gen. Richard Mills. In exchange for a one-time fee of $50,000 followed by annual dues of $15,000, members receive “comprehensive catastrophe response services” should their city be hit by a manmade disaster that can “cause severe threats to public health and/or well-being” (read: a terrorist attack), a disease outbreak or a natural disaster. Basic membership includes access to medicine, water and food, while those who pay for “premium tiered services” will be eligible for VIP rescue missions.(Hyperlinks added.)

What is a Judicial Author?

I have posted on SSRN a copy of an article entitled “What is a Judicial Author?” I presented several years ago at a conference. I have learned to my utmost gratitude that Lewis Hyde will be quoting and citing the article in his forthcoming, much-anticipated book on the cultural commons. As the article’s abstract explains:

This paper, originally presented in draft at the Con/Texts of Invention Conference sponsored by the Society for Critical Exchange, examines the ways in which judges write opinions, the ways experienced and inexperienced legal readers conceptualize judges as authors, and the affect these conceptions have on the way they read those opinions. The paper describes judicial writing as a quintessential example of collaborative writing, a view corroborated by the ways experienced lawyers use and interpret judicial opinions in practice. The judicial opinion is not, as lay opinion grounded in the Romantic view that forms contemporary common wisdom would have it, the original work of the wise and creative judge pronouncing from on high. Rather, the opinion itself is a piece cobbled together from a number of other sources that include established law, the lawyers’ written and spoken legal arguments, secondary legal sources, and earlier opinions that were themselves built up from the bits and pieces floating through the legal discourse community. Nevertheless, conventional legal thinking has since at least the 19 th Century through today propounded the notion of the judge as quintessentially Romantic author-creator. This clash between legal practice and the conventions of legal (and especially academic) discourse poses real and neglected problems in legal education, especially in the ways the Romantic view of judicial authorship instills in students habits of reading.

Are free markets always the best? Of course not, and where’d we get that idea?

Ideas often trump reality, especially in law. In my career, Law and Economics, grounded in the principle that law works best when it serves some notion of economic efficiency, has grown from a rather small movement identified with the University of Chicago into perhaps the dominant legal theory in our law schools and among our more prominent judges. I’ve always thought, for a number of reasons, that the faith in “markets” on which Law and Economics is grounded is bunk. I’m plainly not alone. Tony Judt writes:

In the last thirty years, a cult of privatization has mesmerized Western (and many non-Western) governments. Why? The shortest response is that, in an age of budgetary constraints, privatization appears to save money. If the state owns an inefficient public program or an expensive public service—a waterworks, a car factory, a railway—it seeks to offload it onto private buyers.

The sale duly earns money for the state. Meanwhile, by entering the private sector, the service or operation in question becomes more efficient thanks to the working of the profit motive. Everyone benefits: the service improves, the state rids itself of an inappropriate and poorly managed responsibility, investors profit, and the public sector makes a one-time gain from the sale.

So much for the theory. The practice is very different. What we have been watching these past decades is the steady shifting of public responsibility onto the private sector to no discernible collective advantage. In the first place, privatization is inefficient. Most of the things that governments have seen fit to pass into the private sector were operating at a loss: whether they were railway companies, coal mines, postal services, or energy utilities, they cost more to provide and maintain than they could ever hope to attract in revenue.

For just this reason, such public goods were inherently unattractive to private buyers unless offered at a steep discount. But when the state sells cheap, the public takes a loss. It has been calculated that, in the course of the Thatcher-era UK privatizations, the deliberately low price at which long-standing public assets were marketed to the private sector resulted in a net transfer of £14 billion from the taxpaying public to stockholders and other investors.

To this loss should be added a further £3 billion in fees to the banks that transacted the privatizations. Thus the state in effect paid the private sector some £17 billion ($30 billion) to facilitate the sale of assets for which there would otherwise have been no takers. These are significant sums of money—approximating the endowment of Harvard University, for example, or the annual gross domestic product of Paraguay or Bosnia-Herzegovina.[2] This can hardly be construed as an efficient use of public resources.

In the second place, there arises the question of moral hazard. The only reason that private investors are willing to purchase apparently inefficient public goods is because the state eliminates or reduces their exposure to risk. In the case of the London Underground, for example, the purchasing companies were assured that whatever happened they would be protected against serious loss—thereby undermining the classic economic case for privatization: that the profit motive encourages efficiency. The “hazard” in question is that the private sector, under such privileged conditions, will prove at least as inefficient as its public counterpart—while creaming off such profits as are to be made and charging losses to the state.

The third and perhaps most telling case against privatization is this. There can be no doubt that many of the goods and services that the state seeks to divest have been badly run: incompetently managed, underinvested, etc. Nevertheless, however badly run, postal services, railway networks, retirement homes, prisons, and other provisions targeted for privatization remain the responsibility of the public authorities. Even after they are sold, they cannot be left entirely to the vagaries of the market. They are inherently the sort of activity that someone has to regulate.

Learn that government regulation can be very effective in under 2 minutes.

Next time someone tells you government regulation doesn’t do any good, ask them to watch the video below and whether they’d rather be driving a car built before the government started regulating automobile safety.

Supreme Court decides, 5-4, that those public courts aren’t so public after all.

From the L.A. Times:

By a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court kept in place Wednesday its order blocking video coverage of the trial of California’s Proposition 8, with a conservative majority ruling that defenders of the ban on same-sex marriage would likely face “irreparable harm” if the proceedings were broadcast to the public.

“It would be difficult — if not impossible — to reverse the harm of those broadcasts,” the court wrote in an unsigned opinion. The witnesses, including paid experts, could suffer “harassment,” and they “might be less likely to cooperate in any future proceedings.” The high court also faulted U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker for changing the rules “at the eleventh hour” to “allow the broadcasting of this high-profile trial” that will decide whether gays and lesbians have a right to marry in California.

Though the opinion is unsigned, it clearly speaks for Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito Jr. . . .

The majority cited newspaper accounts from the last year to bolster its contention that opponents of same-sex marriage have been “subject to harassment,” including “confrontational phone calls and e-mail messages” and even “death threats.” Under the court’s rules, the justices do not intervene in pending cases unless they are convinced that the appealing side has a strong legal claim as well as evidence of “an irreparable harm” if the court fails to act.

[Justice] Breyer [in the dissenting opinion joined in by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor] scoffed at the notion that the witnesses in this case would face harm, because they have gone on television in the past to advocate their views. “They are all experts or advocates who have either already appeared on television or Internet broadcasts, already toured the state advocating a ‘yes’ vote on Proposition 8,” he said.

The New Pornographers – The Laws Have Changed

Here’s legal innovation: YouTube Broadcast of the Proposition 8 Trial. But will it happen? Stay tuned.

There are few more important and timely issues concerning innovation and law than the impact of the internet on courts. Courts have always been considered public institutions anyone could walk into to see court proceedings or to look themselves at court files. But now making something “public” means making it available to anyone at his or her own computer, and the inherent resistance to change that resides in any well-established institution makes courts and those who don’t want their legal stands exposed to the brightest possible public lights reluctant to embrace this new notion of public access.

So, as CNN reports, controversy and legal wrangling has erupted over the decision by “the federal judge who is hearing appeals of California’s Proposition 8 this week ruled that the proceedings could be shown — albeit in delayed fashion — on YouTube.”  But opponents of same-sex marriage, outlawed by Proposition 8, appealed the judge’s order and yesterday the Supreme Court postponed the online broadcasts at least until tomorrow (when, it is hoped, the Supreme Court will rule on the issue).

Jon Davidson, legal director of the pro-gay rights Lambda Legal, argued that opponents of same-sex marriage want to keep the trial as much out of the public eye as they can because public debate on same-sex marriage actually increases support for it. In addition, he argued that the risks of true public access to the proceedings is way overblown:

“One of the things we find on the marriage issue, but really on all issues in response to gay rights, is that the more discussion there is — the more conversation, the more people learn — the more likely it is that gay people are going to do well,” Davidson said.

Davidson said posting the trial on YouTube wouldn’t increase the potential for witnesses to be harassed, saying that anyone can read news reports after the fact to find out who spoke and what they said.

Besides, any effort to block new-media coverage of the hearings is already too late, Davidson said. He said people in the courtroom for opening arguments Monday were posting live updates to Twitter throughout.

AP shoots itself (twice) in the Copyright Wars.

The Associated Press occupies a controversial place in the so-called “Copyright Wars,” and it certainly isn’t making many friends anywhere in recent news. First, on December 31 of last year, AP filed its Amended Answer to Complaints, Crossclaim, Counterclaim., and a cross claim against Mannie Garcia. In that document, AP contends that it, not Garcia, owns the copyright in the photograph Garcia took of then candidate Obama that Shepard Fairey subsequently used as the source material for the (in)famous Hope poster. AP’s contention rests on the assertion that Garcia was acting within his the scope of his duties as a staff photographer for AP when he shot the photo and that it therefore constituted a “work for hire.”

There are, I think, two sets of allegations in AP’s latest filing that are interesting in terms of whether Fairey’s use of the photograph as source material for the poster constituted a non-infringing fair use. First, AP states that Garcia was sent to the event at which he shot the photo by AP in order to take photos such as the disputed one. Second, AP states that Garcia sent “several” of those photos to AP and that AP chose the photo it decided ultimately to publish. One might think these allegations reduce the extent to which Garcia can claim the shot was one so much of his own choosing. He was assigned to take the shots he took, he took a lot of them, and AP, not Garcia, chose the one that fit its purposes best.

AP also goes right after Garcia, accusing him in its counter-claim of committing fraud in registering his own copyright in the photo on the grounds that AP’s ownership of that copyright under the work for hire doctrine was so plain that Garcia knew he at the time he filed the copyright registration that he wasn’t entitled to do so. It might not be the only accusation of dishonesty hurled at Garcia in this case.

Meanwhile, AP, of course, has been quite vocal about voicing its contention that “news aggregators” infringe AP’s copyrights on a regular basis. No matter your view on the legitimacy of the infringement claim, there’s lots of reason to believe that AP’s stance is bad business. Google seems to have been a principal target of AP’s complaints, and yet shutting Google off (something, incidentally, AP could do at any time) would seem likely to drive traffic away from AP’s stories.

Well, Google seems to have called AP’s bluff. The Guardian reports that “it has become apparent that new Associated Press stories are no longer appearing on the site, which has hosted them since 2007. Google hasn’t added new AP content since December 24.“

Billy Bragg & Wilco: Against the Law

Vengeance breeds vengeance; we are a country of laws, not torture.

There’s creativity in legal thought, and then there’s “interpretation” utterly unhinged from any logic or authority to justify evils such as torture. Eric Martin at Obsidian wings points out another stupid mistake in any argument in favor of torturing in order to obtain information to aid the so-called “war on terror” — it discourages people from coming forward with information. People applaud “the underpants bomber’s father, Alhaji Umaru Mutallab, who had the strength of character to report his son’s activities to U.S. authorities despite the possible legal repercussions for his son.” But if a father knows his son will be tortured, he’s far, far less likely to turn him in. And, of course, if we’re trying to win the hearts and minds of, among others, Afghanis, aren’t we undercutting our purposes by betraying our morality and our laws? Martin writes:

Alienated Muslims that feel guilty for nothing other than being Muslim are less likely to cooperate with U.S. authorities in thwarting plots. Parents, siblings and friends will not be as quick to intercede if they think their loved one will be brutalized, psychologically scarred beyond repair and denied basic rights. Innocent victims of military strikes will be radicalized as enemies, not converted to allies.

Yet, despite the stakes, certain pundits would have us sacrifice potentially life-saving assets for the sake of maintaining a torture regime – a morally reprehensible practice in its own right, one that corrupts prisoner and questioner alike, and that produces inferior, unreliable intelligence regardless. Not only do they want to keep employing these self-defeating policies that sully our principles, they intend to demagogue the issues relentlessly. Dick Cheney and the GOP leadership – as well as their media enablers – use Obama’s refusal to torture and profile as political cudgels when, in reality, the blows will they attempt will fall most heavily on the American people in the end.

At the end of The Libation Bearers, the second play in the Oresteia trilogy, the story of the seemingly endless cycle of guilt and retribution that plagued the noble House of Atreus, Aeschylus asks:

Where will it end? When will it all/ be lulled back into sleep, and cease,/ the bloody hatred, the destruction?

The answer is the culmination of the third play, The Eumenides: Athena establishes a court of law as the remedy, in place of vengeance, for criminal guilt. At bottom, I think that vengeance is all the advocates of torture can legitimately claim we are getting from torture, and we’ve understood for thousands of years that vengeance does nothing but breed vengeance.

Addendum: I realized that in discussing the Oresteia in connection with torture and the rule of law, I was “betraying” my liberal arts background. But, of course, our blindness to the consequences of abandoning the rule of law because of the alleged necessities brought on by the 9/11 attacks goes hand in hand with a culture that has decided that money is the only valid measuring stick of value and that “free” markets are the best means of making all our choices, even our choices about war.

And the market is governing our choices about education, making liberal arts undergraduate majors so unpopular they’re beginning to disappear. Thus, according to an annual survey by the University of California, Los Angeles, of more than 400,000 incoming freshmen:

In 1971, 37 percent responded that it was essential or very important to be “very well-off financially,” while 73 percent said the same about “developing a meaningful philosophy of life.” In 2009, the values were nearly reversed: 78 percent identified wealth as a goal, while 48 percent were after a meaningful philosophy.

People don’t read the Oresteia anymore. I would bet only a handful of my students even know what it is. So I’m afraid the only thing I don’t agree with when Glenn Greenwald writes the following is any particular sense of being astounded:

It’s truly astounding to watch us — for a full decade — send fighter jets and drones and bombs and invading forces and teams of torturers and kidnappers to that part of the world, or, as we were doing long before 9/11, to overthrow their governments, prop up their dictators, occupy what they perceive as holy land with our foreign troops, and arm Israel to the teeth, and then act surprised and confused when some of them want to attack us. In general, the U.S. only attacks countries with no capabilities to attack us back in the “homeland” — at least not with conventional forces. As a result, we have come to believe that any forms of violence we perpetrate on them over there is justifiable and natural, but the Laws of Humanity are instantly breached in the most egregious ways whenever they bring violence back to the U.S., aimed at Americans. It’s just impossible to listen to discussions grounded in this warped mentality without being astounded at how irrational it is. What do Americans think is going to happen if we continue to engage in this conduct, in this always-widening “war”?

Umberto Eco 13 years ago on the Next Decade in Book Culture

A few days ago Critical Mass, the blog of the National Book Critics Circle Board of Directors, posted my piece as part of a series of guest posts on “The Next Decade in Book Culture.” In it, as a lover of literature, I expressed and called for optimism about the changes being wrought by the internet. Umberto Eco, in his 1996 lecture “From Internet to Gutenberg,” expresses well some of my reasons for suggestions that the internet will be the death of literature –in short, history tells us that technological change doesn’t kill earlier artistic forms; rather technological change transforms and enriches earlier artistic forms:

The arrival of new technological devices does not necessarily make previous device obsolete. The car goes faster than the bicycle, but cars have not rendered bicycles obsolete and no new technological improvement can make a bicycle better than it was before. The idea that a new technology abolishes a previous role is too much simplistic. After the invention of Daguerre painters did not feel obliged to serve any longer as craftsmen obliged to reproduce reality such as we believe we see it. But it does not mean that Daguerre’s invention only encouraged abstract painting. There is a whole tradition in modern painting that could not exist without the photographic model, Think for instance of hyper-realism. Reality is seen by the painter’s eye through the photographic eye.

Certainly the advent of cinema or of comic strips has made literature free from certain narrative tasks it traditionally had to perform. But if there is something like post-modern literature, it exists just because it has been largely influenced by comic strips or cinema. For the same reason today I do not need any longer a heavy portrait painted by a modest artist and I can send my sweetheart a glossy and faithful photograph, but such a change in the social functions of painting has not made painting obsolete, except that today painted portraits do not fulfill the same practical function of portraying a person (which can be done better and less expensively by a photograph), but of celebrating important personalities, so that the command, the purchasing and the exhibition of such portraits acquire aristocratic connotations.

This means that in the history if culture it has never happened that something has simply killed something else.

I do think that the 13 years that have passed since Eco’s lecture have undermined one of the points he made regarding the need for books (in codex, rather than electronic, form). Eco is convinced that a writer must print his material in order to edit it fully: “In order to re-read a text, and to correct it properly, if it is not simply a short letter, one needs to print it, then to re-read it, then to correct it at the computer and to reprint it again. I do not think that one is able to write a text of hundreds of pages and to correct it without printing it at least once.”

I now teach students who were ten years old at the time of Eco’s lecture, and they grew up writing and editing on-screen. I now write and substantially edit what I write on-screen even though in 1996 I would’ve been convinced that I would never be able to do so. And ebooks don’t cause the eyestrain Eco attributes to computer screens — he did not at all seem to anticipate that reading in electronic form would not necessarily take place in the future only on electronic devices with which he was familiar back in the previous century.

We can’t trust eye witnesses.

I tell my students the jury is our truth-telling machine. We don’t have God’s Videotape of reality. (Even if we did, would he have enough camera angles and high enough resolution to give us complete confidence in what the tape seems to show?)

But juries, of course, depend on evidence, a substantial amount of which is the evidence of witnesses. As US Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan stated in his dissent in Watkins v. U.S., 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1982), there is “nothing more convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”

But eyewitness identification evidence is the leading cause of wrongful conviction in the United States. There’s a lot of scholarship on perceptual biases — ways our perception is shaped not by reality but, rather, by assumptions our minds impose on our perceptions — but I think the study discussed and shown below is one of the most vivid demonstrations I’ve ever seen of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. 75% of the subjects did not even notice that the person for whom they began filling out the experimental consent form, after he’d bent down behind the counter, had been replaced by a different person!